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TYLER FELGENHAUER:  Prevention and Protection:  The Simultaneous Implementation 
of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Policy Responses 
(under the direction of Dr. Mort Webster) 
Mitigation and adaptation are the two key responses available to policymakers to 
reduce the risks of climate change.  This three-essay dissertation is motivated by the fact that 
no coherent or policy-relevant understanding yet exists for how adaptation should be 
integrated into an overall understanding of the climate problem, or how policymakers can 
appropriately view mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs for decision making.  The research 
goal is to frame and conceptualize these tradeoffs in joint implementation for decision 
makers in a way that is useful for understanding policy.  My hypothesis is that in order to 
achieve this goal, emphasis should be given to two key strategy characteristics that most 
inform the relevant relationships and tradeoffs that occur when mitigation and adaptation are 
considered together.   
The framework development of the first essay finds that mitigation and adaptation 
tradeoffs are most apparent to policymakers if the strategies are compared on their 
investment lifetimes and strategy limits, in relation to climate damages, as well as how they 
both behave under uncertainty.  Because of these two fundamental differences in strategies, 
adaptation is more usefully thought of as a portfolio of distinct investment types with 
different lifetimes and design capacity ranges for different damage sectors.  Three distinct 
classes of adaptation activities can be created as a simplifying construct for policy analysis:  
flexible and short-lived flow spending, committed and long-lived new stock investments, and 
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retrofitting of pre-existing adaptation stock investments.  These adaptation types can be 
integrated with mitigation into an explicit decision analysis framework in order to explore the 
optimal portfolio of mitigation and different adaptation responses over time.   
In the second essay this framework is incorporated into a new DICE-based integrated 
assessment model that characterizes adaptation to climate change as either short-lived flow 
spending or long-lived adaptation stock investments.   
In the third essay I examine the extent to which the design of the policy mechanism 
for raising and distributing international adaptation financing as part of a global climate 
change regime affects participation in and compliance with such a treaty, and thus the 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is the hardest political problem the world has ever had to deal with. 
   – The Economist (2009b). 
1.1.  Motivation 
Mitigation and adaptation are the two key responses available to policymakers to 
reduce the risks of climate change.  Continued rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
the global warming commitment mean that human adaptation to climate change will be 
necessary even with the most stringent mitigation policies and under the mildest future 
climate change damage scenarios.  It is now recognized that optimal global climate policy, 
with the lowest overall societal losses, is a portfolio of simultaneously implemented 
mitigation and adaptation strategies with tradeoffs and interactions between the two 
responses.   
The climate-related effects of mitigation are homogenous, global, and realized over 
the long term, while those of adaptation are heterogeneous over temporal, technological, and 
damage scales, even within a fixed locality and with a single implementing agent and 
affected sector.  These differences have frustrated previous efforts to effectively consider the 
two policies jointly as a unified climate change response portfolio.  Treating adaptation as a 
single and uniform response, either within a conceptual framework or in an integrated 
assessment model, is not an accurate way to describe reality.  Yet overdevelopment of 
adaptation typologies and constructs has not generated the policy guidance that 
decisionmakers need to make informed investment and implementation choices between 
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mitigation and adaptation, as many of the construct attributes are not relevant to combining 
the two responses.   
Resources will be simultaneously allocated to these two imperfectly substitutable 
response strategies as climate change continues and damages rise.  These decisions on what 
to emphasize in a response to climate change, and when, will occur regardless of whether as 
a result of a consciously developed policy portfolio that balances expected risks, as a result of 
politicized budget processes at national or international levels that may emphasize non-
climate co-benefits of the strategies rather than climate-related objectives, or from other 
motivations of local or national policy actors.  Climate change decision makers will want to 
know how to choose from among different response portfolios and how these choices will 
reduce human risk exposure to climate change (Pielke Jr. 1998; Kane and Shogren 2000; 
Yohe 2005; Barrett 2008).  Analyzing how the individual components of an overall response 
to climate change interact to create different outcomes in damages, costs, and welfare can 
provide useful insights to policymakers by improving policy allocation decisions.   
1.2.  Framing, Modeling, and International Policy Application:  An Overview of the 
Findings 
The goal of this dissertation is to frame mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs in joint 
implementation for decision makers in a way that is useful for understanding policy.  My 
hypothesis is that in order to achieve this goal, emphasis should be given to two key strategy 
characteristics that most inform the relevant relationships and tradeoffs that occur when 
mitigation and adaptation are considered together.  First, mitigation and adaptation have 
different limits of policy effectiveness that are based on their technologies and the timescales 
of when the policies have an effect.  The responses differ on how they relate to the type of 
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damages over time, the technological mechanism of the response to these changing damages, 
and the damage profile of the affected sector.  Climate change investments in both strategies 
will be made repeatedly over time, but those for adaptation allow for flexibility on the 
desired longevity of the investment’s effects as well as the technology that can be paired with 
different types of damages.   
Second, uncertainty affects mitigation and adaptation policies differently.  This 
applies specifically to when the uncertainty of the response strategy enters the society-
climate-policy system, the mechanism for the resolution of this uncertainty, and the timing 
and clarity of its resolution.  The process of adapting and resolving uncertainty about how 
much we need (and are able) to adapt today can affect mitigation policy pathway decisions, 
but the act of mitigating and then learning from this how much we can (or need to) mitigate 
provides much less information for today’s adaptation decision.   
Because of these two fundamental differences in strategies, adaptation is more 
usefully thought of as a portfolio of distinct investment types with different lifetimes and 
design capacity ranges for different damage sectors.  Three distinct classes of adaptation 
activities can be created as a simplifying construct for policy analysis:  flexible and short-
lived flow spending, committed and long-lived new stock investments, and retrofitting of 
pre-existing adaptation stock investments.  These adaptation types can be integrated with 
mitigation into an explicit decision analysis framework in order to explore the optimal 
portfolio of responses over time of mitigation and different adaptation activities.   
The analysis framework is in two parts:   
1) Mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs are most apparent to policymakers if the 
strategies are compared on their investment lifetimes and strategy limits, in 
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relation to climate damages, as well as how they both behave under uncertainty, 
and 
2) these comparisons are best understood when adaptation is divided into different 
investment types with different design capacities.   
Such an explicit demarcation of adaptation investment types provides policymakers with a 
more realistic representation of climate change responses and allows them to better isolate 
the important policy characteristics of a combination of mitigation and aggregated adaptation 
policies.  This framework can be incorporated into integrated assessment models of the 
mitigation and adaptation allocation decision to more closely match how policy tradeoffs are 
made and understand how different policy allocations over time will change welfare 
outcomes.  Applying this framework to ongoing negotiations on international adaptation 
financing in a post-Kyoto climate regime could better inform policy discussions by outlining 
the portion of adaptation aid that may be designed for ongoing but short-lived flows rather 
than intermittent lump sum payments for specific stock adaptation projects in the developing 
world.  In so doing, the current gap between negotiating positions could narrow as the 
perceived interests of aid donor and recipient nations are changed.   
1.3.  Dissertation Structure 
The dissertation is structured as a set of three essays that  explore the questions of 
jointly implemented mitigation and adaptation from three perspectives.  The three essays can 
stand independently of each other but develop sequentially from framework development 
(chapter two) to modeling development and exploration (chapter three) to an application to 
international climate policy negotiations (chapter four).  The analysis approaches from 
different perspectives.  Chapter two comes from the perspective of a policymaker faced with 
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trying to make sense of the climate policy options that are available.  Chapter three takes the 
perspective of a global policy optimizer who balances among mitigation, flow adaptation, 
and stock adaptation as policy options.  Chapter four looks at the multiple perspectives of 
three different groups of national-level actors, each with different incentives and constraints.  
In the dissertation conclusion I unify the themes of the three essays and draw some general 
lessons and policy recommendations.   
*  *  * 
Chapter two develops this analytical framework with multiple adaptation types and 
mitigation.  It is motivated by the fact that no coherent or policy-relevant understanding yet 
exists for how adaptation should be integrated into an overall understanding of the climate 
problem, or how policymakers can appropriately view mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs for 
decision making.  My research goal is to frame and conceptualize these tradeoffs in order that 
a representative global- or national-level decision maker is better able to characterize and 
understand the essential long-term question of how to balance different climate policies.   
In this chapter I review previous conceptualizations of mitigation and adaptation and 
show how they are not as useful in improving upon ways to integrate adaptation with 
mitigation.  I then explore the tradeoffs between mitigation and general forms of adaptation.  
After focusing on previous conceptions of adaptation I drop the commonly applied 
typologies and emphasize instead the importance of both the temporal and technological 
limits of each strategy as well as the flexibility of each strategy under uncertainty.  I develop 
the three flow, stock, and retrofitting adaptation types and explore how describing adaptation 
investments as a repeated choice over time among these three types may allow for a more 
coherent incorporation of adaptation and mitigation into one policy framework.  Finally, I 
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investigate the implications for uncertainty across mitigation and adaptation in a decision-
analytic framework.   
Chapter three takes a step toward applying this framework to a new climate-economy 
model.  The chapter presents results from a new DICE-based integrated assessment model 
(IAM) that characterizes adaptation to climate change as either short-lived flow spending or 
long-lived adaptation stock investments.  The modeling work is motivated by the premise 
that using a single policy variable to represent distinctly different adaptation measures within 
an IAM may not accurately portray the tradeoffs between adaptation and mitigation, 
particularly under uncertainty.  The research objective is to represent policy-driven 
adaptation in a DICE-type climate-economy model with jointly-implemented mitigation in a 
way that more realistically represents adaptation spending decisions in practice and allows 
for meaningful comparisons between adaptation and mitigation, and thus obtain policy-
relevant insights.   
In this chapter I review previous joint analyses of mitigation and adaptation where the 
latter has been conceptualized as a flow, as a stock, or both, in different model types and 
under certainty and uncertainty.  I then describe how flow and stock adaptation are 
characterized within the new AD-DICE S/F model and how the stock adaptation is calibrated 
to AD-DICE results.  Using the new model I present results from optimal policy decisions 
across climate change mitigation, short-lived flow adaptation spending, and investments in 
long-lived adaptation stock.  I conduct sensitivity analysis on different rates of depreciation 
for adaptation stock, climate sensitivity, the allocation of flow and stock adaptation as factor 
inputs in the adaptation production function, the elasticity of substitution between the two 
adaptation types, and the existence of a capacity limit to flow adaptation.  In the final section 
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I address the implications of flow adaptation capacity limits under uncertainty, in 
combination with different assumptions about the elasticity of substitution and the allocation 
of flow adaptation within the adaptation production function.   
Chapter four addresses the extent to which the design of the policy mechanism for 
raising and distributing international adaptation financing (IAF) as part of a global climate 
change regime affects participation in and compliance with such a treaty and thus the 
emergence of such a successful agreement.
1
  The research is motivated by the understudied 
and potential role that IAF from the world’s richest countries to its poorest can play in such a 
treaty 
Proposals for IAF within a post-Kyoto climate agreement are analyzed for their effect 
on mitigation efforts within that same regime.  These IAF mechanisms are scored 
qualitatively on performance criteria I develop related to supporting the two requirements for 
international treaty success – participation by relevant national parties and compliance by 
those parties once the treaty is joined.  The IAF effect on national participation is analyzed 
for the two key negotiating blocs that would join the treaty:  1) rich countries that donate the 
IAF money, and 2) a coalition of both the fast growing as well as the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries, the latter of which will receive the funds.  The IAF effect on national-
level treaty compliance is measured by its effect on resource competition at the expense of 
mitigation efforts, as well as adaptation policy interactions (positive or negative) with 
mitigation.  I discuss the roles that participation and compliance will have, as well as 
                                                 
1
 This chapter was presented at the Association of Public Policy and Management (APPAM) November, 2009 
meeting in Washington, DC, under the title ―International Adaptation Financing as Part of the Evolving Climate 
Change Regime:  Tradeoffs in Participation and Compliance to Achieve Mitigation Goals.‖  
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alternate ways of structuring the adaptation aid delivery that may promote negotiated 
agreement.   
In the concluding chapter five I briefly summarize the dissertation and synthesize a 
number of general insights from the work.  I emphasize the four key themes of the research, 
on mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs, adaptation types, adaptation limits, and uncertainty.  
From these themes I draw a number of implications for policy decision making that lead to 
several specific policy recommendations.  I conclude with a discussion of areas in which this 
research may be extended.     
 
  
CHAPTER 2.  MULTIPLE ADAPTATION TYPES WITH MITIGATION:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 
2.1.  Introduction 
Mitigation and adaptation remain for now largely separate realms of research, and 
completely separate areas of public policy.  Open questions remain on how to coherently 
integrate adaptation into an overall understanding of the climate problem that is useful for 
policymakers, or how they can appropriately view mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs for 
decision making.  The main challenge to answering these questions is that the two responses 
are so different.  A simple mitigation versus adaptation approach is not precise enough 
because of the diversity of adaptation approaches that are available across damage sectors, 
investment lifetimes, and decisions on investment timing.  For mitigation the intertemporal 
effect on climate damages is dictated by the climate system, while for adaptation the damage 
baselines, and hence the choice of the adaptation response, will always be changing.  As 
policy frameworks for mitigation optimization are already well developed and understood the 
emphasis of this chapter is more on how to properly conceptualize adaptation as it is brought 
into climate policy areas that have until now been dominated by mitigation research.   
In addition to figuring out how to best revise or discard previous behavioral patterns, 
much of the climate policy challenge is in deciding what to do with all of our current climate-
related stock in the transition to a new policy approach that incorporates mitigation and 
adaptation.  Capital stock turns over slowly and most of it was built (and most of the 
associated behaviors learned) when climate change was not considered in decisions.  Most 
mitigation-related stock has neither been retrofitted nor rebuilt so that it can start mitigating 
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and move off of a business as usual (BAU) emissions path.  In contrast, adaptation-related 
stock has already started adapting to climate change damages by the very nature of its 
exposure to the climate (and Dumas and Ha-Duong (2008) estimate that as much as one 
quarter of current global capital may be exposed to the climate).  However, the majority of 
this climate-related stock is not yet adequately prepared for climate change, either because 
damage expectations were not designed into the construction when it was built or because it 
has not yet been either retrofitted or rebuilt.  We are thus in the process now of moving from 
the old trajectories of both climate change responses to a new decision regime in which 
climate change is incorporated into investment decisions and mitigation and adaptation are 
considered as policy options.  For adaptation, Fankhauser et al. (1999) note that the challenge 
is ―to keep the design of the capital stock in tune with prevailing climate conditions, taking 
into account that these conditions are likely to change continuously, but in an uncertain way.‖  
―Stationarity‖ of the climate system and the human response to it is ―dead‖ (Milly et al. 
2008), and we are beginning the process of converting from a non-adaptive investment 
trajectory to an adaptive one.  As global awareness of climate change and its effects becomes 
common knowledge, we can imagine that all new long-lived stock investments (as well as 
relevant policies) will have climate change damage expectations built into their designs.   
In this chapter I look at mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs in a shared portfolio.  I 
argue that such tradeoffs can become more transparent to policymakers if adaptation is 
characterized appropriately by its most important attributes as they relate to mitigation, 
namely, investment lifetimes and strategy limits in relation to uncertain damages as well as 
how each strategy behaves under uncertainty.  The different characteristics of adaptation vis-
à-vis mitigation clarify a set of distinct adaptation investment types from which to choose, 
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with different lifetimes and design capacity ranges for different damage sectors.  I develop an 
explicit decision analysis framework that integrates mitigation with three types of adaptation 
investments:  1) flexible and short-lived ―flow‖ spending, 2) committed and long-lived new 
stock investments, and 3) retrofitting of pre-existing adaptation stock investments.  The 
tradeoff outlined in Fankhauser et al. (1999) is also explored more thoroughly in the case of 
uncertainty.  For adaptation the question is one of what adaptation type is worth funding, and 
when should that funding start.  As is explored further in the concluding chapter five, the 
framework that is developed here and which is based on primarily ―hard‖ capital stock and 
spending, can be extended to encompass the full spectrum of policy-driven adaptation (both 
―hard‖ and ―soft‖), with the goal of providing adaptation services.   
Section 2 of this chapter reviews previous conceptualizations of mitigation and 
adaptation.  Though ways of thinking about adaptation in isolation have been well explored 
they are not as useful in improving upon ways to integrate adaptation with mitigation.  In 
section 3 a first take at integrating mitigation and adaptation within a joint response is made, 
where tradeoffs and interactions are explored.  At this stage it is apparent that while such 
general comparisons are able to provide basic insights about global strategy approaches, a 
more detailed breakdown of adaptation is necessary to more precisely represent the diversity 
of approaches available to policymakers.  This focus on adaptation is done in section 4, 
which jettisons the commonly applied typologies of adaptation and emphasizes instead the 
importance of both the temporal and technological limits of each strategy as well as the 
flexibility of each strategy under uncertainty.  Based on these key characteristics of 
adaptation (notable for their differences in comparison with mitigation), the three flow, stock, 
and retrofitting adaptation types are developed in section 5.  I explore how describing 
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adaptation investments as a repeated choice over time among the three types may allow for a 
more coherent incorporation of adaptation and mitigation into one policy framework.  The 
policymaker’s choice across mitigation and adaptation types is developed in a decision-
analytic framework, and I explore the implications for uncertainty and irreversibility.  
Section 6 concludes with policy recommendations.  
2.2.  Background and Literature Review 
2.2.1.  Definitions and Scope 
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) defines mitigation as ―technological change and substitution that reduce 
resource inputs and emissions per unit of output…  implementing policies to reduce GHG 
[greenhouse gas] emissions and enhance sinks‖ (IPCC and Verbruggen 2007).  Essentially it 
is a reduction in the rise of atmospheric GHG concentrations via emissions abatement or 
carbon sequestration.  While the definition of mitigation resists debate, that of adaptation is 
open to broader interpretation.  Some emphasis is given here on how adaptation has been 
conceptualized as a step towards integrating it more coherently with mitigation.   
The IPCC AR4 defines adaptation as ―adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities‖ (IPCC 2007a).  This definition draws on that of Smit et al. 
(2000) where adaptation is the human adjustment to economic, social, or environmental 
systems in response to actual or expected climatic changes.  For Reilly and Schimmelpfennig 
(2000) adaptation is ―fundamentally about deciding to do something differently,‖ defining 
adaptation as ―a response that improves the outcome.‖  I draw upon and clarify these 
definitions to define climate change adaptation as the set of actions taken to respond to a 
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changing climatic mean that:  1) improve welfare, 2) do not change the climate as the goal, 
and 3) would not have been taken were the climatic mean not changing.  Part one of this 
definition stipulates that the adaptation is rational, that public policy decision makers and 
economic actors make welfare-enhancing investments.  As this chapter explores, some 
adaptations provide more benefits than others, and the timing of the adaptation investment 
decision will be a significant factor in the amount of benefits received.  The discounted net 
benefits from an adaptive investment are the climate damages avoided from that action at the 
given GHG concentration minus the cost of the adaptation.
1
  Part two of the definition 
excludes global geoengineering responses, which are beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Part three emphasizes that these adaptation investments come from funds that we wish we 
did not have to spend, because apart from their climate-related effects the projects are 
economically unproductive.  This does not mean that adaptation steps will not be taken for 
their significant non-climate co-benefits.  But for the purpose of analyzing climate change 
policy, and policy tradeoffs to address it, such non-climate benefits should not be included in 
policy comparisons as they relate to climate change.  From this definition of adaptation 
follows the definition of adaptive capacity used here – the extent to which the hard structure, 
policy, or institution can adapt and reduce damages, as measured by a coping range particular 
to the damage sector and the response.
2
 
                                                 
1 
If these net benefits are negative then the investment can be defined as a maladaptation, i.e., it actually lowers 
overall welfare.  If there is room for Pareto improvement with more adaptation, then the current situation is one 
of under-adaptation, which is measured as an ―adaptation deficit‖ (Burton 2004).  According to these 
definitions, maladaptation can contribute to under-adaptation, but not the other way around.  Even if the climate 
mean were not changing, many societies could still be under-adapted to the variance in weather extremes.  
Thus, to the extent that current adaptation to the present climate is sub-optimal in either of these two ways, 
much adaptation to the climate would make sense regardless of the rate of future climate change.   
2
 The IPCC AR4 (2007a) defines adaptive capacity as ―The ability of a system to adjust to climate change 
(including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, 
14 
 
Adaptation to climate change can be disaggregated in multiple ways, and under 
several constructs, as listed in Table 1.  Reilly and Schimmelpfennig (2000) identify three 
characteristics of systems that are relevant to identifying how adaptation behaves in that 
particular setting:  1) whether the adaptation response of the system is autonomous or 
requires conscious recognition by a human agent that the climate has changed and conscious 
action by the agent to change the system to reduce losses;  2) whether there are 
irreversibilities (fixed costs) associated with adaptive actions that reduce flexibility to adapt 
in the short run;  and 3) whether the agent knows what adaptive action to take (and has the 
capacity to undertake it).  For the IPCC (2007a), adaptation may be distinguished by when it 
occurs in relation to the climate damages (anticipatory or reactive), or whether or not public 
policy intervention occurs (planned versus autonomous adaptation).  Smit et al. (1999) pose 
three questions upon which to base an adaptation framework:  1) adaptation to what?, 2) who 
or what adapts?, and 3) how does adaptation occur?  Ruhl (2010) distinguishes adaptation by 
the actor, response orientation, goals, management target, policy foundation, capital that is 






                                                                                                                                                       
or to cope with the consequences.‖  Yohe and Tol (2002) develop the definition of adaptive capacity as based 
on the determinants of climate vulnerability.   
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Table 1.  Adaptation constructs. 
General Differentiating  
Concept or Attribute Examples of Terms Used 













ex ante ex post 
temporal scope /  
investment lifetime 
short term / temporary / seasonal long term / permanent 
tactical strategic 
 




routine natural disaster response 
spatial scope /  
implementation agent 
localized widespread 
individuals / private sector government / public sector 
  dispersed collective 
function/effects retreat – accommodate – protect   
  prevent – tolerate – spread – change – restore 
Source:  Author’s revisions and additions to Table 2 “Bases for Differentiating Adaptation” in Smit et al. (1999).   
A simple demarcation of the two primary climate policy responses has mitigation as 
the strategic prevention of damages and adaptation as the tactical protection from damages, 
or damage control.  Mitigation is only anticipatory to damages that will occur several 
decades in the future.  No matter how stringent the mitigation measure there is no such thing 
as remediative or concurrent mitigation where the climate-related effects of decisions taken 
today are also felt today.  Unlike mitigation, adaptation can be anticipatory (before the 
damages are expected to occur), reactive (concurrent with the impact of the climate effects), 
or remediative (correcting for damages that have already occurred).  The sequence of  
Fig. 1 defines these adaptation types by when they occur in relation to the damages.   
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Fig. 1.  Adaptation types and climate damages in a continuous sequence.     
 
As today’s reactive adaptation is also anticipating future damages, it is impossible to 
determine which of today’s adaptation is reactive to what has already happened and what is 
anticipating what will happen in the future.  We are always reacting to what has happened, is 
happening, and is expected to happen, with learning about the uncertain effectiveness of the 
adaptation in relation to damages that occur throughout the sequence.  Such a tautology 
shows that splitting adaptation along temporal limes only is artificial and not particularly 
useful to policymakers.   
Adaptation types could also be distinguished by the level of public policy intervention 
that is necessary to drive the adaptation.  On this, Reilly and Schimmelpfennig (2000) 
develop five adaptation ―portraits‖ as depicted in Fig. 2, where public policy to affect 
adaptation only works within a subset of response types.  In portrait number one the 
adaptation is autonomous and the system responds by itself, and in portrait number five little 
or no adaptation is possible as the limits of adaptation have been reached.  In these two cases 
―social science research on behavioral responses is irrelevant‖ (ibid.), and hence public 
policy intervention is not applicable.   
Fig. 2.  Five adaptation “portraits” and the applicability of adaptation policy.   
 
Source:  Adapted from Reilly and Schimmelphennig (2000). 
1) autonomous  
adaptation 
response 
5) no adaptation 
response 
2) fast response 
with conscious 
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3) people lack 
knowledge of 




























Autonomous adaptation is what humans have always done without any outside 
prompting – maximize their own utility based on perceived conditions as subject to 
constraints.  In an optimal setting autonomous adaptation occurs as a result of interactions 
among fully-informed actors in a functioning market and thus does not require any conscious 
public policy intervention, as it is assumed that the system will adapt easily subject to 
technological and economic constraints.  Indeed, given the relative shares in the overall 
economy of both private and public resources and number of economic agents, most 
adaptation to climate change will come from autonomous private sector behavioral changes.
3
   
While the framework developed here can apply to either the public or private sector, 
the emphasis in this dissertation is on public sector investments and public policy approaches 
to both response strategies to climate change.  If viewed from an economy-wide global 
perspective, the public/private distinction is not an important separation, as the money spent 
on adaptation investments – the total opportunity cost and reallocation within the economy – 
will be the same regardless of whether or not it is spent by the government or the private 
sector.  However, if market failures are present then public policy intervention may create 
Pareto-superior outcomes.
4
  Aaheim and Aasen (2008) list these cases:  when adaptation is a 
public good, when transaction costs are large, and when adaptation requires that primary 
factors of production will have to be physically moved.
5
  Planned adaptation requires 
deliberate and conscious analysis of a response decision, either in the public or private sector.  
                                                 
3
 My thanks are to Doug Crawford-Brown for raising this point in discussions.   
4
 The public/private distinction matters for other aspects of adaptation, for instance with project efficiency as 
affected by differences in actor motivations (Mendelsohn 2000), as well as in distributional impacts of 
adaptation policies and investments. 
5
 ―The fundamental concept is that impacts of climate change will affect the behaviour of economic agents, who 
will adapt autonomously, but autonomous adaptation is not always the optimal solution‖ (ibid.).   
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In the public sector, this results in investments to correct for market failures in the private 
sector, where the latter lacks the ability to adapt because of incorrect or incomplete 
information or because of sub-optimal provision of public goods (examples would be large 
public infrastructure and/or publicly-funded research on adaptation strategies).  Such a 
response is a collective engagement and investment in the public sphere (IPCC 2001; 
Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti 2002), which is only possible when functioning governments 
exist with the capacity to tax people for collective good provision as well as formulate policy 
decisions based on credible estimates of future conditions.   
The menu of descriptive typologies to categorize all of the forms that adaptation may 
take appears comprehensive.  Variations on adaptation investment types, damage types by 
sector, and relevant decision makers can also be applied.  But such lists of examples do not 
provide policy guidance on what are the important characteristics among all of these 
adaptation sub-types for developing policy, especially in a joint response with mitigation.  
Absent this prioritization of the important adaptation construct, efforts have proceeded on 
joining mitigation and adaptation into a coherent approach, as discussed below.   
2.2.2.  Integrated Mitigation and Adaptation 
The question is how to properly frame the two primary policy options available to 
decisionmakers for climate change, mitigation and adaptation, along with the third alternative 
of damages (or ―suffering‖) – all as part of a coherent strategy (Holdren 2008; Tulkens and 
Steenberghe 2009).  For instance, Parry (2009) asks, ―What combination of emissions 
reduction and adaptation can best reduce the impacts of climate change?‖ attributing our lack 
of progress in answering it on both a failure to properly frame the question as well as a lack 
of knowledge on the connections between mitigation, adaptation, and impacts.  Klein et al. 
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(2005) incorporate economic development into the policy mix and would constrain our use of 
the other approaches to create a socially, economically, and environmentally justifiable 
policy portfolio.  Apart from the framing of the issue, joint modeling of the two strategies in 
integrated assessment models (IAMs) has gone forward as well.
6
 
The characteristics of the climate change policy challenge and the differences in each 
response strategy has led to critiques of present efforts to integrate mitigation and adaptation 
in a form that is usable for decision makers.  Morgan et al. (1999) argue that because climate 
change operates on temporal, spatial, and socio-political scales that are much broader than 
traditional policy issues, the standard tools of utility theory, benefit-cost analysis, statistical 
decision theory, multi-attribute utility theory, and contingent valuation have serious 
limitations in integrated policy analysis.
7
  Patt et al. (2010) critique adaptation modeling in 
IAMs in particular as being too optimistic about the net benefits that adaptation can provide, 
and hence argue that such approaches underestimate the amount of mitigation that is 
necessary.  Other arguments portray the effort to define an optimal mitigation and adaptation 
portfolio as misguided because the data is lacking to allow for meaningful decisions to be 
                                                 
6
 See chapter three for an overview of integrated assessment modeling of both mitigation and adaptation.  
Optimizations of separate mitigation and adaptation policies have also been studied.  Mitigation has been 
modeled under certainty and uncertainty, both with and without technological growth, and alternatively under 
different cost effectiveness constraints to achieve particular goals.  On the adaptation side, Mendelsohn (2000) 
studies the determinants of an optimal adaptation level, which depends upon the present and future perceptions 
of the magnitude of the climate change, the climate sensitivity (CS) of the sector, and the vulnerability of the 
location (Mendelsohn 2009).  Climate sensitivity is the surface temperature increase that results from a doubling 
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations.   
7
 Six assumptions are required to apply traditional policy tools:  1) a single public-sector decision maker who 
faces a single problem in the context of a single polity;  2) impacts are of manageable size and can be valued at 
the margin;  3) values are known, static, and exogenously determined, for which the decision maker may select 
a policy by maximizing expected utility;  4) time preferences are accurately described by conventional 
exponential discounting of future costs and benefits;  5) modest and manageable uncertainty;  and 6) system 
linearity in most cases (Morgan et al. 1999).  Any of these assumptions may be violated when applied to climate 
change.     
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made (Ruhl 2010), it is too complex,
8
 or it is the wrong question upon which to focus 
because of strong linkages between climate change and economic development.
9
  In practice 
mitigation and adaptation will be implemented across different institutional, spatial, and 
temporal levels, and no shared climate change policy budget exists for an explicit mitigation-
adaptation tradeoff to occur.  Given these challenges, more comprehensive interdisciplinary 
analysis frameworks have been proposed (Dowlatabadi and Morgan 1993; Jacoby 2004; 
Dowlatabadi 2007; Martens et al. 2009).
10
 
Another critique from Tol (2005) allows that mitigation and adaptation could be 
optimized in principle, but because of the strategy differences mitigation and most forms of 
                                                 
8
 Klein et al. (2003) argue that such an optimization incorrectly assumes there to be a single number for all 
possible climate scenarios, socio-economic scenarios, different societal preferences and values, and 
uncertainties.  For these authors (and further in Klein et al. (2005) and Hall (2007)), robustness is a better tool 
than traditional optimization because of concerns about using probability distributions for making adaptation 
decisions.  
9
 This argument has three versions.  The first is that the correct tradeoff to examine is not mitigation spending 
versus adaptation spending, but instead spending on mitigation and adaptation versus economic growth.  
Economic development makes societies richer over time, and more wealth is preferred over less.  Therefore 
development should be promoted at the expense of climate policy in order to alleviate the negative effects of all 
problems, climate-related or otherwise (Schelling 1997; Michaels 2008).  The second and related version is that 
climate policies should be delayed either to build a larger response capacity to be implemented later or to avoid 
costly mistaken overinvestment in both climate response infrastructure and technology, in case climate change 
turns out to be not as bad as was originally thought.  The third version is that, when compared with other public 
policy challenges, climate change:  a) is unlikely to be the largest source of damages and welfare loss over this 
century (Schelling 1997; Goklany 2005; Pielke Jr. and Sarewitz 2005; Lomborg 2006; 2007; 2009), and b) will 
have impacts that are promulgated mainly via interactions with other stresses on sustainable development 
(Wilbanks et al. 2007).  In other words, we should address societal problems directly rather than as part of the 
co-benefits of either mitigation or adaptation (Dowlatabadi 2007; Pielke Jr. et al. 2009).   
The first argument is weakened by noting that the wealth generated from economic development is not 
completely substitutable for what is being lost due to climate change damages (Mort Webster raised this point).  
As for the second argument for delay, the mere existence of uncertainty is not a reason by itself for delay or 
action, as the decision will depend on the parameters of the system analyzed (Webster 2002).  Finally, the third 
argument does not negate the importance of climate change as an issue even if other public policy problems will 
be just as challenging and in many cases more worthy of public policy resources.  Once it is decided how much 
emphasis climate change deserves as a public policy problem the question still matters of how much to devote 
to mitigation and how much to adaptation.   
10
 Two alternatives to integrated assessment modeling of climate change are multi-criteria decision making 
(Bell et al. 2003) and structured decision making, an approach with strong stakeholder involvement (Wilson and 
McDaniels 2007).   
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adaptation should be kept separate in policy analyses.  Only a subset of adaptation – 
―facilitative adaptation,‖ which is in essence a way of enhancing adaptive capacity – should 
be included with mitigation in an optimization.  In this version, facilitative adaptation occurs 
when a national government intervenes less in order to allow economic actors to adapt better, 
with the result that society becomes more robust and more flexible in responding to both 
climate and non-climate threats.  By this definition, much of facilitative adaptation is 
correcting for maladaptation.  In other versions the facilitative adaptation is about doing 
more, such that the appropriate regulatory and market incentives are designed to allow 
governments, firms, and households to better respond to climate change (McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen 2004).  In the Smit et al. (2001) version, adaptive capacity building takes the form 
of integrating adaptive measures into sustainable development, i.e., adaptation 
mainstreaming (Stern 2006a; IPCC 2007b).   
Acknowledging this complexity and these relationships does not negate the validity 
of narrowing the focus to mitigation and adaptation only.  As climate change continues and 
damages rise, resources will be simultaneously allocated to these two imperfectly 
substitutable response strategies, regardless of whether such an allocation comes as a result 
of a consciously developed policy portfolio that balances expected risks, or instead from 
politicized budget processes at the national or international levels that reflect more emphasis 
on the non-climate co-benefits of the strategies rather than climate-related objectives, or on 
other motivations of local or national policy actors.  In acknowledging the complexity of 
real-world decisions we can also learn how to improve their outcomes.   
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2.3.  Mitigation and Adaptation Characteristics and Tradeoffs 
2.3.1.  Mitigation and Adaptation Compared and Contrasted 
Mitigation and adaptation are complementary tools of climate risk management, 
where mitigation lowers the overall future risk as well as the likelihood of unrealized but 
possible damages, and adaptation lowers the negative consequences of realized future 
damages (Webster 2002; Jones 2003; Yohe and Strzepek 2007).  Risk is defined as the 
product of the probabilities of all types of damages and the cost consequences of those 
damages.  The two strategies also both have significant co-benefits, i.e., positive welfare 
effects that are completely unrelated to climate change such as reducing air pollution with 
mitigation and reducing losses from normal climatic variability with adaptation.  Both 
responses will involve a series of private and public sector investments over time, and for 
both the decision to be made is one of how much and when.   
The differences between the two strategies are significant, however, and cover such 
attributes as timescales, good types, institutional scales, costs and benefits, clients and policy 
beneficiaries, methods of achieving climate-related goals, and other environmental effects.  
The development of a legal foundation for adaptation will be far more complicated than for 
mitigation (Craig 2010), and there are also important global distributional effects from each 
policy.
11
  The importance of these different characteristics on strategy allocations will depend 
on the scale of analysis.  Both mitigation and adaptation will require large shifts in behavioral 
patterns, as pushed by changes in prices or other public policy inducements. 
                                                 
11
 For mitigation, the distribution of benefits is ―global, but most valuable to those who are least capable of 
adaptation,‖ while adaptation is ―limited to those who have adaptive capabilities not those most impacted‖ 
(Dowlatabadi 2007).   
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The capital stocks that are related to mitigation and adaptation activities will behave 
differently as well.  Mitigation-related stocks such as the energy and industrial infrastructure 
are affected primarily by public policy decisions, rather than by the climate.  Such 
investments only start to mitigate when they are either rebuilt or retrofitted, as induced by 
policies that raise the price of operating the old stock.  For mitigation it takes a conscious 
decision to change the nature of this stock that is unrelated to any climate change damages.  
Adaptation stock is different, as that which has already been built and is ―climate-exposed‖ 
will already begin to provide adaptive services even though it was not designed for climate 
change.  Because of these differences the type of spending done to adjust to the new climate 
and climate policy world may be different as well.  For instance, mitigating may involve the 
construction of more new stock (e.g., nuclear power plants, wind farms, etc.) than it does the 
retrofitting of existing stock (carbon capture and sequestration add-ons to existing coal-fired 
power plants).  In contrast, adaptation stock decisions may place more emphasis on the 
retrofitting of existing climate-exposed stock than new stock, because the current stock is 
already working to reduce climate damages – it just may not work as well in the future.   
In order to understand this complexity, metaphors for comparing mitigation and 
adaptation have been proposed to better convey the relationship between them, some of 
which are listed in Table 2.  As with climate change, in the four examples listed the best 






Table 2.  Metaphors to compare mitigation and adaptation. 
Metaphor Mitigation Adaptation 
health care and 
the provision of 
health services 
long-term preventative medicine and healthy 
practices that lower the likelihood and 
severity of a wide range of ailments;   
forward-looking 
emergency room or other hospital visits – 
addressing health problems only after they 
occur;  individualized symptom treatment 
riding a bicycle  
(AMICA 2007) 




installing anti-lock brakes on the car, which 
reduce the likelihood of an accident 
wearing seatbelts, which reduce the likelihood 
of injury if there is an accident 
military tank defensive:  the tank’s armor defends  
against all outside threats without 
discrimination among threat types 
offensive:  the tank's guns can be fired when 
the threat is imminent or in sight (implying less 
uncertainty) and targeted to specific threats 
(unlike the tank's armor) 
 
Fig. 3 shows how mitigation and adaptation both work to reduce the probabilistic 
expected damages of climate change.  Expected damages in a BAU scenario without any 
mitigation policy cover an uncertain range, as bounded by the straight solid lines with the 
mean expected damages as the bold solid line.  With mitigation investments, the mean and 
variance of expected damages fall and shrink, respectively, as is depicted in the shaded range 
that is bound by dashed lines.  Generic aggregated adaptation investments (the arcs resting on 
the x-axis) are made to lower damages within their technology- and sector-specific adaptive 
capacity ranges, i.e., the ranges of damages over which adaptation services are provided 
(Smit et al. 2000).  As illustrated, when the adaptation investment lines overlap the range of 
expected damages the adaptive investments are at their expected efficiency.  This efficiency 
rises with implementation, peaks, and then falls.  The examples of adaptation spending 
shown are designed to address climate change damages 90% of the time under a mitigation 
scenario.  Even if the damage profile is below the 90% upper bound, it does not mean that the 
adaptation investments are eliminating all remaining post-mitigation damages, but instead 
that these adaptation responses are performing as expected and as they were designed to do 
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when confronted with damages of that type.  Adaptation continues to provide benefits as its 
efficiency drops, until the limits of its adaptive capacity are breached and it becomes 
completely useless.  Each damage sector will have its own relevant coping range and, as 
shown in the figure, mitigation allows this range to be exceeded more slowly.   
Fig. 3.  Mitigation and aggregated adaptation in joint implementation.   
 
Mitigation reduces the probability of damages while adaptation reduces damages.  An example of the 
adaptation shown is new seeds planted by a farmer in response to changing climatic conditions.  With 
adaptive performance measured in crop yields, these will peak and then start to decline as climate change 
means continue to rise (see Mendelsohn (2000)).  The falling yields will not move gradually to zero but instead 
will reach a critical threshold after which the entire crop will fail completely.  If the adaptation curves are 
below either of the two damage distributions, then this is a case of under-adaptation.  Other adaptive 
investments could continue to provide non-climate benefits even after their climate usefulness has been 
exhausted, but these are not shown in the diagram.  Alternative graphical representations are in Patt et al. 
(2010) and (Yohe 2009).   
As Fig. 3 illustrates, mitigation creates a smaller set of damages to which we must 
adapt (or tolerate).  Even if mitigation does not lower eventual damages but instead slows the 
climate damages and the 
coping range for adapting 
to those damages 
time 
= no mitigation 
illustrative damage probability distributions, 
means, and 10-90% confidence intervals:   
two damage/capacity ratio thresholds that are 
particular to each adaptation type, past which 
adaptation ceases to provide benefits related to 
climate change 
= with mitigation 
= two separate and generic  
   adaptation investments improving  
   in adaptive capacity 
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rate at which damages rise, then it has the effect of extending the time before the limits of the 
adaptation strategy are exceeded.  However, these mitigation benefits will take so long to be 
felt as to have little effect on adaptation policy and investment decisions.  Mitigation reduces 
risk and damages everywhere, but with a non-uniform distribution, while adaptation reduces 
risk and damages locally and, if the scale is small enough, with uniform effects.   
2.3.2.  Scale and Good Types 
Mitigation is a global public good that is nonrival and nonexclusive in consumption 
(Friedman 2002a).  The mitigation benefits of the reduced risk from climate change accrue to 
all, while the costs are felt by those who invest in mitigation technologies, leaving open the 
potential for actor free riding on the efforts of others (Wiener 2007).  The public good nature 
of mitigation means that – except for the world’s largest GHG emitters – the actions of any 
one national, local, or individual actor will do relatively little to increase the supply of the 
public good, as the emissions contribution of many countries is still small compared to global 
emissions.  Conversely, adaptation is a local private or club good where the benefits from 
adapting are for the most part restricted to the particular locality or damage sector to which 
the investment is applied.  Adaptation actions produce significant benefits directly for the 
investing actor, while the welfare benefits accrued from mitigation are overwhelmingly 
smaller.  Mitigation and adaptation adhere to this public/private goods dichotomy in most 
cases as the examples in Table 3 show.  The shaded boxes indicate the dominant cases, while 
the generation of non-climate co-benefits from each strategy can create important exceptions.   
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Table 3.  Examples of mitigation and adaptation across economic good types. 
 
For adaptation, the dividing line between a private good and a public good (whether national or local) 
depends on the perspective of the policy beneficiary.  An individual’s adaptation is a private good with the 
costs and benefits circumscribed to that person.  The benefits of a municipality’s adaptation do not go beyond 
the town’s borders, and thus are not accessible to free-riding by outsiders.  Within the town, however, the 
adaptation takes on the traits of a public good as local residents will pay taxes for its provision.  The same is 
true on a larger scale for national-level adaptation.  In this way adaptation can be either a constrained public 
good or a club good with a wide dissemination of benefits.   
The distinction on good types matters because climate change policy will be designed 
and implemented at international, national, and local scales, and the choice of response 
strategy will be shaped by this scale.  Policy motivations will be shaped by who gets the 
benefits and who pays the costs of mitigation and adaptation.  The climate change benefits of 












global dissemination of new 
mitigation technologies spurs 
economic development
GHG emissions cuts 
anywhere reduce climate 
change damages everywhere
national appropriation of 
mitigation technology leads
to reduced local or
regional air pollution
"no-regrets" mitigation 
measures such as changing 
to energy efficient light bulbs 
creates private cost savings;  
private ownership of mitigation 
technology reaps profits
private good effects are only 
apparent if the largest emitters 
undertake deep cuts
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                 good with
         broad benefits
private good
much adaptation, such
as protecting carbon sinks, 
create positive synergies
with mitigation
regional or national facilitative 
adaptation and planning
autonomous adaptation 




zone management promotes 
global biodiversity
new adaptation technologies (like new seed varieties) or 
knowledge (from local demonstration projects) can be 
disseminated from smaller scales to a wider audience 
outside of the original benefits area
national- or local-level 
adaptation can promote larger 
economic development goals
autonomous adaptation may 
provide non-climate co-




shrinks the relevance of mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs to the decision maker falls.  At 
the smallest limit of a self-interested individual all climate change-related benefits come from 
autonomous adaptation, while zero climate-specific benefits accrue from personal mitigation 
(though there often may be personal co-benefits or ―no-regrets‖ mitigation steps at the 
individual level).   
Thus, decision makers or agencies in charge of local policy implementation will 
usually find a mitigation-adaptation portfolio allocation highly theoretical or even irrelevant.  
Even if a local budget for both mitigation and adaptation exists, locally optimized levels of 
each strategy would not match those that are nationally or globally optimized (Klein et al. 
2007).  Furthermore, local policy goals may not be relevant to global climate change efforts.  
This could occur if mitigation or adaptation are seen as policy ends in themselves and not the 
way to achieve climate-related goals, for instance if the goal is to maximize non-climate co-
benefits.  At smaller scales, adaptation may be the more cost effective approach to deal with 
short term climate damages with the level of mitigation strongly determined by the amount of 
local co-benefits to be received as well as by a desire to pursue a norm of global 
stewardship.
12
  That adaptation is a private good in relation to the implementation agent is a 
key factor in understanding national-level motivations, which for many countries will be to 
adapt rather than mitigate.
13
   
                                                 
12
 A number of ―how-to‖ guidebooks exist on the best practices for adaptation targetted to policymakers at 
smaller-scale jurisdictions – for small island states (Tompkins et al. 2005), local jurisdictions in Canada 
(Bizikova et al. 2008), U.S. development aid planning (USAID 2007), and adaptation planning at the U.S. state 
level as in California (California Natural Resources Agency 2009). 
13
 Chapter four examines interactions between mitigation and adaptation in the context of the evolving 
international climate regime. 
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2.3.3.  Tradeoffs and Interactions 
Mitigation and adaptation will affect each other in implementation, and this will 
affect overall climate change outcomes (Wilbanks et al. 2003; Buob and Stephan 2008; 
Urwin and Jordan 2008).  A basic characterization is that mitigation and adaptation are 
strategic complements and economic substitutes (Bosello 2008).  Table 4 summarizes 
instances of complementarity, substitutability, and synergies between the two responses, 
depending on the context. 
First, investments in either mitigation or adaptation will affect the level of benefits 
received from investments in the other strategy.  On the positive side are the ―win-win‖ 
synergies via which positive climate-related mitigative and adaptive benefits are acquired 
from a single investment.  They are positive climate-related externalities, as distinguished 
from non-climate co-benefits.  These positive synergies are a policy bonus that could be 
exploited whenever possible, just as negative synergies are a drawback that should be 
avoided if feasible.  Yet such effects, in either direction, are weak and probably insignificant 
when compared with the independent effects of both mitigation and adaptation (Klein et al. 
2007).   
Implementation of mitigation and adaptation also affect each other’s strategy 
productivity.  If the two are economic complements, then lower mitigation costs leads to 
more mitigation which leads to more (cheaper) adaptation.  If mitigation and adaptation are 
economic substitutes then increasing investment in one response lowers the marginal 
productivity of the other.  Ingham et al. (2005) find mitigation and adaptation to be economic 
substitutes in the large majority of cases, meaning that they are interchangeable in a portfolio 




Table 4.  Mitigation and adaptation as complements and substitutes. 
  Complements Substitutes 
1.  absolute level of benefits (lowered damages and risk) 
definitions Positive synergy:  Implementation of either 
strategy raises the level of benefits accrued  
from the other strategy.   
 
Negative synergy:  Implementation of either 
strategy lowers the level of benefits accrued  
from the other strategy.   
examples a) planting trees absorbs carbon and  
    alleviates extreme weather 
b) low-till/no-till agriculture absorbs  
    carbon and hedges against drought 
adaptation on mitigation (via small feedback 
effects):   
a) adaptation infrastructure requires CO2- 
    intensive concrete 
b) increased energy intensity of agriculture 
    in adaptation releases more GHGs 
c) higher air conditioner use in more  
    frequent heat waves raises energy usage 
 mitigation on adaptation:  none 
2.  marginal productivity of benefits   
definitions Lower costs of mitigation leads to more  
mitigation which leads to more (cheaper) 
adaptation. 
Increasing investment in one strategy lowers the 
marginal productivity of benefits of the alternate 
investment.   
examples Unclear;  occurs only under the strong 
assumption that the cost of each strategy has an 
effect on the marginal cost of the other strategy.   
the large majority of cases (Ingham et al. 2005) 
3.  budget allocation / resource scarcity   
definitions Funding is non-zero sum and can be cross- 
listed across both strategies with no loss in 
efficiency. 
Budget allocation is zero sum and funds can only 
be appropriated for one purpose.  With a fixed 
budget, increasing investment in one strategy 
lowers investments in the other.  
examples Facilitative adaptation that includes general 
capacity building and institutional development 
improves the effectiveness of both strategies;  
they are in effect both strategies rolled into one.   
A fixed amount of funding can only be 
appropriated either to one agency for mitigation 
technology research and development (such as 
the Dept. of Energy), or to another for adaptation 
(such as the Corps of Engineers for reservoir 
upgrading), but not to both simultaneously.   
The IPCC AR4 examines four types of relationships between mitigation and adaptation policies, labeling them 
as follows:  adaptation affecting mitigation, A→M;  mitigation affecting adaptation, M→A;  explicit tradeoffs 
between mitigation and adaptation, ∫(M,A);  and situations when policy actions not necessarily related to 
climate change may have simultaneous effects on both mitigation and adaptation, A∩M (Klein et al. 2007).  In 
the IPCC’s approach, A→M and M→A apply to the examples of positive and negative synergies in row number 
one above.  This dissertation focuses on ∫(M,A) as the key relationship, both in terms of budget scarcity and 
policy effects.     
A third area of tradeoffs is in resource scarcity with fixed budgets.  If budgeting were 
non-zero sum, then money allocated to addressing climate change would see positive results 
via both strategies (such as with general institutional capacity building).  However, it is more 
realistic to view these resources in zero-sum budgetary competition with each other, where 
scarce financial resources devoted to one investment strategy will not be available for the 
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other (Ingham et al. 2005; Tol 2005).  This economic scarcity dictates that at any one time a 
finite level of resources is available to redistribute in order to achieve Pareto superior welfare 
outcomes, and any allocation comes with an opportunity cost from foregone alternative uses 
of the same resources (Friedman 2002c);  the ―policy pie‖ cannot be expanded as it is limited 
either by a finite political willingness to address climate change or finite financial resources.  
If the policymaker was starting with mitigation, adding a new policy option (adaptation) 
within these bounds will necessarily redistribute the portfolio and lower the use of the 
original policy (mitigation) (de Bruin et al. 2009b; Felgenhauer and de Bruin 2009).   
To date, the binding constraint on global climate policy has been this political 
willingness by society to devote resources to climate change instead of to other uses (whether 
they be other pressing policy problems or simply more consumption), rather than on the 
technological or physical limits of either of the mitigation or adaptation strategies.
14
  Fig. 4 
depicts these competing climate policy approaches.  If the focus is exclusive to climate 
change and excludes non-climate co-benefits, then the allocation would proceed along two 
steps.  First, climate change is weighed against all other societal problems, and an amount is 
chosen to devote to it alone.  Then, from that ―single bucket,‖ climate change response 
resources are allocated across the five possible strategies.  Broadening the focus to include 
non-climate co-benefits complicates the comparisons that can be made across policies.  The 
more that non-climate co-benefits are a part of each response, the more that the responses 
will compete directly and independently with all over policy problems.     
                                                 
14
 When it is stated that the current level of technology limits our ability to address climate change (and that we 
therefore need to develop new and more advanced technology), what is really meant is that technology at its 
current price limits our ability to deal with climate change.  Technological capacity eventually will limit our 
climate policy capacity, but only after political willingness to address the problem has been exhausted.  
Technological and temporal limits to climate policy are discussed more fully in Section 2.4.1.   
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Fig. 4.  The allocation of resources across climate policy options.   
 
In modeling mitigation, adaptation, and R&D policy options, Bosello (2008) finds them to compete against 
each other for resources.  Dowlatabadi and Morgan (1993) provide a similar set of funding options, including 
geoengineering instead of R&D.  Barrett (2008) also considers geoengineering:  “We need a portfolio of 
approaches, one that changes the mix as we learn more about climate change and our ability to address it.”  
Geoengineering is shown in dashed lines to indicate the (so far) relatively low level of policy attention that it 
has received.   
Comparing mitigation and adaptation as responses that are traded off against each 
other in a joint allocation requires a common unit of measurement.  In a first-best world with 
perfect foresight (i.e., no uncertainty), the levels of the two strategies are jointly determined 
by their discounted net benefits, with funding then allocated in a ratio to match this ratio of 
net benefits (rather than policy costs).   
The net discounted benefits of mitigation (and hence, the policy’s optimal level) are 
driven by its costs subtracted from the value of damages that are avoided, which in turn is 
driven to a degree by the costs and effectiveness of adaptation (Yohe et al. 2010).  The more 
we are able to adapt, or expect that we will be able to adapt in the future, the less valuable 
mitigation becomes.  If we learn in the near term that adaptation projects are not as useful as 
we had hoped in reducing damages, then mitigation becomes the more valuable response.  In 
this way, adaptation is a delaying tactic where its value is not in reducing the demand for 
valuable 
information on 
the proper scale 
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mitigation, but in increasing the length of time until mitigation investments will eventually 
have to be made.
15
 
Each response will exhibit different rates of diminishing marginal returns in 
implementation.  Adaptation’s benefits pay out more quickly, but its effective limits for each 
damage sector are reached earlier as well.  In early periods the benefits from adaptation are 
immediate and depend on the efficiency of the adaptation technology in reducing damages in 
specific sectors.  In later periods the benefits from mitigation depend on climate sensitivity.  
These inter-temporal characteristics of the strategies will affect the allocation decision, as the 
benefits of mitigation pay back much further into the future than do those for adaptation.
16
 
The damages of climate change do not occur in isolation but are paired with our 
response to them, so that what we observe are the net damages after the effects of any climate 
policies have had a chance to be felt.  For adaptation, what is witnessed by the victim of 
climate change damages is not a separate level of gross unadapted damages along with a 
separate level of adaptation, but instead the net damages after adaptation has occurred.  These 
damages are driven by warming, which only starts to slow several decades in the future with 
any mitigation that happens today.  All but the longest-lived investments in adaptation will 
have useful lifespans that are shorter than the time it takes for this mitigation to take effect.  
Thus, unless mitigation technology is invented that dramatically improves and speeds its 
effectiveness (rapid ―air capture‖ technology, for example), decisions on shorter-lived 
adaptation investments will be unaffected by decisions on mitigation levels.  Instead, the 
                                                 
15
 I appreciate helpful discussions with Gary Yohe on these points.   
16
 Cox and Stephenson (2007) suggest that one way of addressing this chronological gap in benefits payout in 




incentives to adapt will be driven by more immediate concerns:  1) the near-term global 
warming commitment, 2) correcting for current under-adaptation, 3) redirecting investment 
flows away from maladaptive purposes, and 4) providing significant non-climate co-benefits.  
None of these four drivers are affected by mitigation.  Thus, except for the longest-lived 
adaptations, mitigation today does not delay our decision to adapt today, and if we are able to 
mitigate more this does not affect today’s adaptation decision.   
Thus, differing policy time lags, as well as uncertainty and the possibility to learn and 
reduce that uncertainty, mean that the substitution between the two policy approaches is not 
perfect.  This line of argument has support from economic modeling work where adaptation 
is characterized both as a flow under certainty (de Bruin et al. 2009b), as a flow under 
uncertainty (Felgenhauer and de Bruin 2009), as a stock (Bosello 2008), and as a flow and 
stock (chapter three).  Especially in early periods, the use of adaptation affects the optimal 
mitigation levels much more than does the use of mitigation affect optimal adaptation levels, 
as mitigation does little to affect near-term damages and therefore does little to lower the 
need for adaptation.
17
  The elasticity of mitigation to adaptation rises with time because 
optimal mitigation has to start earlier in time relative to adaptation (Bosello 2008).   
2.4.  The Conscious Policy Decision to Adapt:  What Matters for an Adaptation 
Construct? 
Unlike the aggregated adaptation that has been presented to this point and which is 
used in most current IAMs that integrate mitigation and adaptation, adaptation is of course 
not a global aggregate of all possible strategies, technologies, and damage sectors, but instead 
a large set of discrete policy and investment choices for a wide range of specific situations.  
                                                 
17
 Bosello (2008) finds that mitigation is ten times more responsive to adaptation than vice versa. 
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The challenge in providing useful insights to policymakers is twofold.  First, frame 
mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs in a way that policymakers can understand, and second, 
be able to integrate adaptation into IAMs in a way that both more realistically captures how 
adaptation is actually implemented.  This chapter addresses the first part of the challenge, 
while chapter three begins to address the second.  Analytical traction on integrating 
adaptation into climate change policy assessments with mitigation can be made by clarifying 
and describing the construct that matters most with adaptation and public policy analyses.  
Two areas are important to consider – the technological and temporal limits of each strategy 
and the behavior and flexibility of each strategy under uncertainty.  The focus here is on 
improving upon previously unfocussed conceptualizations of adaptation.   
2.4.1.  Technological and Temporal Limits of Each Strategy 
Our responses to climate change have limits, some of which can be changed and 
some that are strictly fixed.  Both mitigation and adaptation are limited by technological 
constraints and the costs of using that technology, the latter of which contributes to the 
political willingness to pay to use that technology.  Over time all of these limits may be 
changed through both improvements in technological productivity and changing societal 
attitudes.  Other limits are immutable, such as the physical and chemical laws that govern 
climatic and environmental systems.  To the extent that adaptation is more dependent on 
societal norms, practices, and development pathways, it has more mutable limits to its 
implementation.
18
  To the extent that mitigation success is more dependent upon the 
                                                 
18
 Adger et al. (2009) discuss the mutable view of adaptation limits.  They postulate that:  1) these limits depend 
on the policy goals of the adaptation, as underpinned by diverse values;  2) adaptation need not be limited by 
uncertainties associated with foresight of future climate change;  3) adaptation is limited by social and 
individual factors such as risk perception, habit, social status, and age;  and 4) systematic undervaluation of 
involuntary loss of places and culture disguises real and experienced but subjective limits to adaptation (Adger 
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technology employed and the inertia of the earth’s carbon cycle, it has more rigid limits to its 
implementation.   
Three key differences distinguish the limits of the two strategies:  1) how the response 
relates to the type of damages over time,
19
 2) the technological mechanism of the response to 
these changing damages, and 3) the damage profile of the affected sector.  For mitigation, 
while the applied technology will change, the technological mechanism or ―prescription‖ is 
always the same – reduce GHG emissions.  The relevant question for policymakers is when, 
how much, and by what technology.  The policy costs and benefits will change but mitigation 
as a response has characteristics that are essentially unchanging whether it is applied now or 
in fifty years, or whether the damages are high or low.  It is a ―panacea‖ (Craig 2010) that 
addresses all climate damages even with the huge complexities in both determining its 
appropriate level as well as creating the new technologies necessary to feasibly reduce those 
damages.  Mitigation’s effects are clearly apparent when compared against an alternative 
BAU scenario, i.e., how many tons of CO2e GHGs were avoided with that mitigation 
investment?   
In contrast, adaptation as a response mechanism changes as these three characteristics 
change.  Adaptation is complicated because the question is always changing, depending on 
                                                                                                                                                       
et al. 2007; ibid).  The optimistic view on adaptation limits is that humans have always adapted, and the 
multitude of adaptation types available is vast and covers the full capacity of the human brain to respond to new 
situations, dangers, and expected threats.  The pessimistic view of adaptation and its limits is that while humans 
have always adapted it is also true that environmental stressors can overwhelm a society’s ability to adapt and 
cause it literally to collapse (Diamond 2005).  Also, humans have never experienced the speed of climate 
change that is expected to occur over the next century.   
19
 This is different than the timing effect discussed above, in which the benefits of mitigation only come several 
decades into the future (as limited by both the technology used and the inertia of the climate system), and the 
benefits of adaptation can come as quickly as when the project is completed or the policy is implemented. 
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these factors, and hence the ―medicine‖ is always evolving as well.20  If all three are held 
constant – the type of damages over time, the technological response mechanism, and the 
affected sector – then a straightforward static decomposition of adaptation and resulting 
damages can be made as in Fig. 5.  Gross climate damages are split into adaptable and non-
adaptable damages, with adaptation levels chosen to address adaptable damages.  The 
remaining damages to which we choose to adapt are the net of residual damages;  the net 
benefits of adaptation are the avoided damages minus the policy cost of adaptation.   
Fig. 5.  Static representation of gross climate damages, the chosen adaptation level, and net 
damages, with gross damages, the adaptive technological responses, and affected sector held 
constant.   
 
Source:  Adapted from Fig. 2 in Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009).   
Of course the adaptation decision is not made on the static choice depicted in Fig. 5, 
as adaptation allows for a larger set of response types that are specific to a sector and 
constrained by a combination of technical and societal limits to its implementation.  Such 
thresholds can be defined as ―a state in sensitive ecological or physical systems beyond 
which change becomes irreversible‖ (Hulme et al. 2007).  As global warming increases over 
                                                 
20
 Health care is the appropriate metaphor here, from Table 2.   
gross climate damages 







unavoidable consequences of 
climate change, including the risk 




time these limits will be approached and eventually exceeded, after which the implementing 
agent must either switch adaptation types or abandon the investments.
21
  The effect of rising 
damages causing an adaptive threshold to be breached is depicted schematically in Fig. 6.   
Fig. 6.  The dynamic decision to adapt, based on the net benefits and technological limits of the 
response.   
 
Adaptation continues until its marginal costs equal its marginal benefits, at point C.  For each technology, 
increasing spending on adaptation is characterized by rising marginal costs and falling marginal benefits.  The 
gross benefits of adaptation – space ABCD – come in the form of reduced climate damages.  When adaptation 
is implemented the gross damages drops to net damages by the area DEFG, where DEFG = ABCD.  When the 
net adaptation benefits (benefits minus costs;  triangle ABH) drops to zero, then use of that particular 
adaptation technology or method is stopped, and another technology must be chosen if adaptation is to be 
continued.   
                                                 
21
 As an example from Australia, Jones (2000) used agricultural irrigation data to project when adaptation works 
below some critical threshold of water supply and fails after the threshold has been crossed.  In the analysis, 
farmers face a rising probability of passing a critical climate threshold when the farmer’s maximum water 
allocation is surpassed in half of the years;  if it surpasses this rate it is assumed that the farmer cannot adapt.  
With this threshold assumption, farmer adaptation is found to be feasible in the first half of the century while 
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Even if temperatures are perceived to rise at a constant rate, it is not just the level but 
the character of damages that will change in readily apparent ways.  Hence the adaptation 
response must change too, not only in response to diminishing marginal benefits in the face 
of rising damage levels but also because the damage types are changing as well.  Adaptation 
must be tailored specifically to both the sector and the damages being suffered at that 
temperature range.  In this way the baseline for adaptation is always changing, and the 
economic value of mitigation will depend upon the specification of this baseline (Yohe et al. 
2010).
22
  As damages increase investments are made for each damage area from the cheapest 
to the more expensive, within the constraints of that adaptation technology, until it becomes 
cost-prohibitive.  When the effectiveness of an adaptation response is reached, a new more 
costly type of adaptation is adopted.  Several iterations and switching among adaptation types 
can be imagined as the policymaker progresses up an ―adaptation response ladder‖ for each 
damage type, as shown in Fig. 7, which is the repeated implementation of the decision 
depicted in Fig. 6.  Eventually a threshold is crossed when the limits of adaptation are passed, 
either because the technical feasibility of the adaptation is exceeded, or because the least-cost 
adaptation for these damages is too expensive (it fails a cost-benefit analysis because it is 
more costly than the benefits provided).  This is the dividing line between continued 
protection of a climate-sensitive asset and the decision to retreat and abandon it.  Once the 
capacities of all types of adaptation investments are either exceeded or become too 
expensive, then the next response is some combination of relocation and abandonment of the 
asset.   
                                                 
22
 Another way of saying this is that the changing shape of the damage curve will have a strong effect on the 
appropriate adaptation response.  While it may affect the amount of optimal mitigation, it will have little to no 
effect on the chosen technology of the mitigation response.   
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Fig. 7.  Progression up a “ladder of adaptation responses” with increasing damages and a changing 
damage type along with its changing  paired adaptation response.   
 
The adapting agent follows the lowest cost curve in relation to the damages until another technology becomes 
available.  As an example from the agricultural sector, a farmer has a set of adaptation options and 
technologies available, A1-4, where A1 is intensification of irrigation, A2 is changing crops, A3 is switching to 
more drought-resistant seed varieties, and A4 is a continuation of farming, but in a new and less desirable and 
productive area.  For this final adaptation, the farmer can abandon the land and re-establish operations 
elsewhere, but the transition and absolute costs of such a move are higher than leaving farming altogether.  
Therefore the farmer chooses the least-costly option and agriculture in that area ends while he tries to find 
another way of life and source of income.  Not depicted are the inevitable transition costs of switching from 
one adaptation type to another.   
We can imagine a version of Fig. 7 for all climate damage sectors.  A set of adaptive 
measures exists for each damage type, and adaptation can only be analyzed in conjunction 
with the ―system‖ which must be adapted (Reilly and Schimmelpfennig 2000).  The 
implementation and benefits of adaptation are also highly specific to the sector in which they 
are reducing damages (while for mitigation only the implementation is sector-specific).  
Within each sector then, each adaptation type has its own:  1) cost effectiveness (or 
no policy:  gross (unadapted) 
damage costs without 
adaptation 
time 
policy:  costs of adaptation + 
net (residual) damages, for four 
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―efficiency‖ as used by Dumas and Ha-Duong (2008)) in terms of dollars invested per unit of 
damages or risk avoided, and 2) limits to effectiveness, when the adaptive investment 
becomes useless in preventing future damages.   
Climate change investments in both mitigation and adaptation strategies will be made 
repeatedly over time.  But those for adaptation simultaneously allow for and also demand 
more flexibility on the desired longevity of the investment’s effects as well as the technology 
that can be paired with the damages.  Knowing exactly when along the progression of 
damages (or where on the damage curve) the switch from one adaptation strategy to another 
occurs requires knowledge of the available technology and adaptation for each damage 
sector.  It is this repeated nature of climate policy investments, particularly with adaptation, 
that makes the strategy limits relevant.   
2.4.2.  Behavior and Flexibility of Each Strategy Under Uncertainty 
Behavior and flexibility of the strategies under uncertainty is the second area to 
consider when thinking about joining adaptation with mitigation in a coherent response.  
Multiple uncertain natural, social, and technological parameters and variables interact to 
create uncertain climate change outcomes.  This uncertainty pervades all aspects of climate 
change response decisions – costs, benefits, timescales, and the response efficiency at 
reducing damages and risk – and it remains a challenge to overcome when trying to apply 
cost benefit analysis at the global scale.
23
  Uncertainties will be lowered over time as learning 
                                                 
23
 Tol (2003) demonstrated that a global cost benefit analysis may not be an appropriate tool of policy analysis 
for climate change, as it is possible that the variances of costs and benefits of global mitigation are infinite if 
any one region suffers negative growth due to catastrophic climate damages.  Yohe (2003) hypothesized that if 
policy makers applied international economic aid as an alternate policy tool – in addition to mitigation – then 
such negative growth could be prevented, a hypothesis that was supported by later modeling work (Tol and 
Yohe 2007).   
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occurs about the society-climate-policy system, in an iterative Bayesian process.  This 
learning will allow climate policy to be revised over time as new information guides the 
proper scale of the response (Webster 2002).  The relevant knowledge to be gained is over 
two general areas:  How damaging is climate change, and how effective are our policies at 
lowering these damages?  Climate change will increase both the mean and variance of 
climatic variables, raising both the level of damages and the likelihood of climatic extremes 
(Folland et al. 2001).
24
  Were mitigation and adaptation identical in their key characteristics 
then the learning that occurs from implementation of both strategies could have a symmetric 
and additive effect on the knowledge that is acquired and applied to new policy investment 
decisions.  But the uncertainties associated with mitigation and adaptation are qualitatively 
different, and in policy-relevant ways, in three general areas:  1) when the uncertainty of the 
response strategy enters the society-climate-policy system, 2) the mechanism for the 
resolution of this uncertainty, and 3) the timing and clarity of the uncertainty resolution.   
In the first area, Fig. 8 depicts the ―cascading pyramid of uncertainties‖25 in the 
society-climate-policy system and shows how the uncertainties related to mitigation and 
adaptation enter at different points.  The widths of the shaded bands illustrate not absolute 
uncertainty levels but rather relative increases in uncertainty as the effects of GHG emissions 
work through the system and conclude with climate change damages.  Total system 
uncertainty increases at each stage as the number of possible pathways compounds.  
                                                 
24
 It may be difficult to discern whether suffered damages represent a changing variance or a changing mean, as 
damages will likely be felt in the form of extreme events rather than as part of a smooth and gradual climb of 
mean damages.  Katz and Brown (1992) find that if an extreme event is more than one standard deviation from 
the mean, then a change in the variance will affect the frequency of extremes more than will a change in the 
mean.   
25
 The phrase is from Schneider and Lane (2006), and has been addressed previously as the ―cascade of 
uncertainties‖ (Jones 2000) or ―uncertainty explosion‖ (Henderson-Sellers 1993).   
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Mitigation investments, tempered by their effectiveness at reducing emissions, are one driver 
of GHG emissions scenarios, along with population growth, economic growth, and the GHG 
intensity of the economy.  Adaptation is in two forms.  At a regional or national level comes 
facilitative adaptation (id., Tol 2005) to reduce general societal climate vulnerability and thus 
affect regional impacts scenarios.  At the sectoral level come targeted adaptation investments 
that are specific to particular damage sectors.  As with mitigation, the investment efficiency 
with which both types of adaptation achieve their goals (the benefits-costs ratio of avoided 
damages per cost of policy investment) is also uncertain. 
Fig. 8.  Uncertainty propagation through the society-climate-policy system, with mitigation and 
adaptation policies entering at different points.   
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Adaptation has a close relationship to damages – climate change occurs and the net 
damages are visible after the adaptive response is made.  The relevant uncertainty is resolved 
with the implementation of the adaptive investment, and with relative speed and clarity.  
Thus a more policy applicable distinction for adaptation types than the chronologically-based 
anticipatory, reactive, or remediative investments (related to when the investments occur in 
relation to when the damages occur, as in Fig. 1), is a distinction that is based on when the 
uncertainty about damages and our ability to adapt to them is resolved.   
Alternatively, mitigation operates on the causes of climate change and functions with 
a much stronger inertia than does adaptation, which is constrained only by more flexible 
socioeconomic inertias (Bosello 2008).  The relevant uncertainty with mitigation is not 
resolved with implementation but with model estimates of climate sensitivity, and only with 
full clarity several decades into the future.  Thus mitigation and damages have a much more 
tenuous relationship.   
That the type of new knowledge acquired from implementing mitigation and 
adaptation policies is different supports the contention that adaptation decisions will have a 
much stronger effect on mitigation decisions than vice versa.  Learning from ongoing 
improvements in probabilistic climate prediction models will inform future mitigation 
decisions.  Learning about the effectiveness of different mitigation strategies on reducing 
GHG emissions will also occur, both through the actual implementation (learning by doing) 
and through research and development (Popp 2004).  But knowledge of how mitigation 
affects damages only comes completely in several decades with the realization of damages.  
As today’s mitigation decisions provide no information on today’s damages, these decisions 
have no influence on today’s adaptation.  Today’s adaptation decisions do, however, affect 
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today’s damages and thus affect the value of today’s mitigation.  For adaptation, uncertainty 
is clarified from witnessing the level of damages that occur as paired with the appropriate 
adaptation, with knowledge gained on the effectiveness of the adaptation investment.  In 
other words, knowing how much we need to (and are able to) adapt today can affect 
mitigation decisions, but knowing how much we can (or need to) mitigate provides much less 
information for today’s adaptation decision.   
2.5.  Disaggregating Adaptation Investment Choices Over Time 
The argument to this point asserts that an important prerequisite to properly 
describing a climate change mitigation and adaptation response portfolio is the realistic 
characterization of adaptation options that are available to decision makers.  In addition to 
mitigation, three types of adaptation are available to policymakers:  short-lived ―flow‖ 
adaptation, new long-lived and committed stock adaptation, and an option to raise the 
capacity of pre-existing stock investments in order to delay the inevitable and relatively more 
expensive new stock investments to the future.  I describe these three types of adaptation in 
this section, and in the following I show how they can be incorporated with mitigation in a 
decision-making under uncertainty framework.   
2.5.1.  Three Adaptation Options 
1.  Short-lived “flow” spending.  Such funding buys adaptation responses that are 
cheap, quick to implement and return benefits, and with a smaller coping range.  The benefits 
are ephemeral;  the lifetime of this spending cannot be extended through retrofitting and 
instead must be repeated.  Flow adaptation is flexible in that it can be ramped up or down 
relatively quickly within both the parametric limits of the applied technology as well as the 
maximum extent to which that technology can be applied.  It is also relatively reversible, not 
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because the money once spent is recoverable but because such sunk costs are low so the cost 
of changing a decision about having spent the money is also low.
26
  For modeling purposes, 
flow adaptation is a continuous variable even though the spending will come in discrete 
bursts in application.  Flow adaptation can be seen pejoratively as a ―coping‖ (Kelly and 
Adger 2000) or ―triage‖ mechanism (Craig 2010) that alleviates some damages but comes 
with no expectation that these benefits will continue after the spending stops.  In the opposite 
and favorable sense, flow spending allows us to fill in the gaps of our adaptation needs at will 
and as needed, supplementing existing infrastructure or policy mechanisms.  It occurs under 
relative certainty on the level of damages faced and the amount of spending that is needed to 
alleviate these damages.  Reliance on these types of investments is unsustainable, however, 
because they are subject to technological and quantitative limits.  For each sector and damage 
level such measures will eventually become obsolete as their adaptive limits are exceeded, 
and they will have to be replaced by some version of a long-term stock investment.   
The prototypical example of flow adaptation is beach renourishment, the practice of 
regularly resupplying eroding shorelines with imported sand.
27
  In agriculture it can involve 
simply ―doing more‖28 – opening the taps for more irrigation (if the water is available), 
adding more fertilizer, or using more pesticide – or it can mean more sophisticated, ongoing, 
and evolving behavioral changes such as experimenting with integrated pest management, 
altering crop planting dates, or changing the type of crops that are grown.  In the health 
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 Arrow and Fisher (1974) laid the groundwork for a decision making framework with irreversibilities, where 
an irreversible investment is one that is infinitely costly to reverse.   
27
 Alternatively, beach renourishment can also be modeled as a repeated capital stock accumulation problem 
(Smith et al. 2009). 
28
 Jonathan Wiener provided this example. 
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sector it could mean a wider distribution of medicines that treat the symptoms of climate-
related diseases, or cheap prophylactic measures such as mosquito nets.  Higher frequency 
heat waves could be alleviated through the subsidization of air conditioners for vulnerable 
segments of the population.  And damages from extreme events such as more frequent floods 
can be lowered by a case-by-case emergency response.   
This last example illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of such spending;  
think of using sandbags for flood control.  They work at providing some protection, are easy 
to apply, and can be used when necessary at the needed location and in the needed amount.  
Such an approach is done in relative certainty and with little regret at having spent the 
resources.  But sandbagging is also a clearly temporary approach that is completely 
inadequate as a semi-permanent long-term adaptive response.  Flow adaptation is thus more 
appropriate for spikes or troughs in climatic variability, rather than as a response to a 
permanently changing climate damage mean.     
2.  New long-lived adaptation stock investments.  In contrast to short-lived spending, 
these are large-scale, expensive, and long-lived infrastructural investments with a high 
adaptive capacity that declines over time due to a combination of capital depreciation and 
rising mean climate damages.  Compared with short-lived spending, such investments are 
likely to be made only episodically, as triggered politically by the occurrence of extreme 
events that raise the public consciousness of climate change and give legitimacy to large-
scale governmental intervention by opening a temporary ―policy window‖ for significant 
policy changes to be made (Kingdon 1995; Adger et al. 2005).  Stock adaptation is 
―committed‖ as it cannot be changed significantly once built (though it can be retrofitted, 
which is the third type of adaptation).  On the scale of these three adaptation types, this 
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adaptation is irreversible, as the opportunity cost of resources that are committed to an 
adaptation that can never be used for some other purpose.  This type of investment has a long 
lifespan, up to the length of time that it takes for the effect of present-day mitigation 
investments to be felt, i.e., several decades.  Stock adaptation is limited by both the 
technology of the response as well as the designed adaptive capacity of the stock.  In 
modeling stock adaptation on a global scale it can also be treated as a continuous variable, 
even though individual policy decisions to invest in large stock projects will be discrete and 
binary (build or do not build).   
The usual example of new adaptation stock is the building of shoreline barricades or 
seawalls to hold off rising seas and protect coastal assets such as roads, bridges, and ports.  In 
the health sector it can be a long-term investment in the development of new vaccines for 
climate-related diseases or in the creation of increased health care capacity and new 
hospitals.  For farmers, stock adaptation includes capital investments in new harvesting 
equipment that is capable of harvesting different crops under new conditions.  The water 
sector represents perhaps the most costly and longest-lived of climate-exposed and 
adaptation-related capital stock, whether it be systems for sewerage, drainage, irrigation, or 
drinking water provision, as provided by a system of dams, reservoirs, levees, canals, and 
pipes.   
Rational adaptation with imperfect foresight is presumed here, meaning that all 
completely new adaptation stock will have design tolerances that are calibrated to respond to 
the expected but uncertain changes in both the mean and variance of climate damages, as 
matched to the expected lifetime of the investment.
29
  As was noted for Fig. 3, such 
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 Doug Crawford-Brown provided helpful discussion of this point.  
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incorporation of adaptive capacity to address future damage expectations does not mean that 
all of these damages will be eliminated.  Instead it means that the policymaker chooses the 
desired level of adaptation services for that sector and then designs the investment with that 
damages/adaptation trajectory in mind.  If a climate change response is meant to be a long-
lived investment, then a rational investor will want it to perform to expectations over its 
lifetime subject to the investor’s risk preferences.  Indeed the argument for adaptation 
mainstreaming is that future adaptation needs can and should be incorporated into today’s 
adaptation investment decisions, no matter how long is the expected lifetime of the 
investment.   
Two approaches are available to incorporate future expectations of climate change 
into new stock construction.  The first is to do this when the stock is built.
30
  Examples are 
laying larger-diameter pipes than would normally be needed during the rebuilding of water or 
sewer systems (and at a relatively low additional cost),
31
 or building new dams or reservoirs 
that have larger capacities.  A strongly risk-averse version of this comes from Hallegatte 
(2008), who argues that because the range of possible future climates is both large and 
uncertain, especially when mapped over infrastructure lifetimes, ―future infrastructure should 
be made robust to most possible changes in climatic conditions,‖ instead of optimizing over a 
model-projected probability distribution of expected climatic outcomes.  Of course the 
danger of adopting such an extremely risk-averse approach is an outcome with wasteful 
overbuilding of adaptive capacity that never provides benefits, either because:  1) the 
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 Fankhauser et al. (1999) assert that these precautionary investments in the design of new capital will often be 
cheaper than either retrofitting or fast depreciation, even under uncertainty.   
31
 My thanks are to Kenneth Strzepek for this example.   
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stronger climate damages do not occur during the lifetime of the investment, as the 
adaptation stock has already depreciated away, or 2) the type of stock built was the wrong 
type of adaptive response to the damages that are actually suffered.
32
 
The second way to incorporate climate change damage expectations into new stock is 
to build the new climate-exposed stock now, with a lower adaptive capacity but fitted and 
prepared for future upgrading if and when it is needed.  This mimics a real options 
approach,
33
 which allows for the collection of better information from delaying the 
investment and avoids the loss of irrecoverable investments should they turn out not to be 
needed (Dobes 2009).
34
  By the real options approach, the possibility of a delay in the 
investment is the equivalent of a financial call option with real value.  The value of this 
option to invest at some point in the future instead of investing today – and thus the 
investment decision – depend in turn on degree of uncertainty over the future value of the 
project (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  Such preparation of new stock now for later upgrading 
makes sense if the preparatory steps are relatively cheap, and if it makes the later upgrading 
cheaper than it would have been had there been no preparation.  One example is setting aside 
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 The ultimate example of the second case of a failed overinvestment in committed stock is that of the French 
national defenses against a German invasion prior to World War II – the Maginot Line.  This example is from 
Jonathan Wiener.   
33
 A true real options approach requires that the outcome variables be independent of each other over time, 
which is not true with climate change policy.  However, the basic premise that value could be created from both 
the option to delay and to learn during that delay remains sound with climate change policy.  My thanks are to 
Mort Webster for raising this point.  On the mitigation side, most studies have found that the small but positive 
probability of catastrophic damages negates the wait and see argument and points towards a more precautionary 
approach that incorporates our risk aversion to such catastrophic damage levels.  Real options analysis has been 
applied before in analyzing the capital investment decisions of a private power generation firm in the face of 
uncertain climate policy as represented by a carbon price (Blyth et al. 2007), and for analyzing climate change 
mitigation policies (Anda et al. 2009).  Listokin (2008) provides a full discussion of policy and learning under 
uncertainty along with an examination of the real options approach as compared to other approaches under 
uncertainty. 
34
 Dobes (2009) calls for taking a military approach of ―fitted for but not with,‖ whereby systems can easily 
incorporate more adaptation upgrades in the future if necessary, but not now.   
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land for flood protection now without building the protective infrastructure.  The goal of 
flood protection also allows decisionmakers to ―over-build‖ a foundation for a wall or a dike 
that is catered to current conditions only, with the capability to support a higher wall if 
necessary in the future.  Other examples include obtaining right-of-way options for future 
development, designing "pre-fit" water supply infrastructure to allow for later upgrading 
(Dobes 2009), and in the area of vaccine research maintaining a minimum scientific research 
capacity that could be ramped up at a later date if needed. 
Which of these two approaches is utilized will depend on the interplay of several 
factors:  1) the probabilistic expectations of future climate damages, 2) the decisionmaker’s 
tolerance for risk, 3) the engineering attributes of the adaptive infrastructure (whether or not 
it allows for future capacity add-ons as with the real options approach), 4) the level of 
financing that is available, and when it is available, and 5) the flexibility (versus rigidity) of 
the financing cycle (whether long-term decisions can be revisited or not).  The risk averse 
approach of ―climate proofing‖ competes with a view that such extremely forward-thinking 
investments are a waste, especially as we can design and make cheaper structures now that 
could be upgraded in the future (Dobes 2009).  However, real options thinking may only 
apply to the examples listed above and have limited applicability to a larger set of adaptation 
areas.  For example, with the water pipe case, upgrading at a later date is akin to a complete 
rebuilding, so it makes sense to build extra capacity now especially if it is relatively cheap.   
*  *  * 
If the choice to this point were only between short-lived flow adaptation spending or 
long-lived new adaptation stock investments, then the rational decision maker conducts a 
risk-adjusted probabilistic benefit-cost comparison between the two investment types, 
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maximizing the discounted expected value of an uncertain net benefits distribution (Morgan 
and Henrion 1990a).  This allocation choice is then updated for each short- and long-lived 
investment decision as learning occurs about all of the factors that affect the net benefits 
payout.   
Investment pathways could take several routes.  One option is that flow adaptation is 
conducted until either the rate of damages becomes too rapid for that particular strategy to 
address or the limits of that adaptation strategy have been exceeded.  At that point a switch is 
made either to a new type of flow adaptation, or to a new long-lived stock investment, or 
both.  As stock adaptation investments are relatively more costly they may only occur in the 
expectation that the temperature change is permanent (and not a temporary variation) and 
that the new investments would be able to handle a wide range of temperatures as they 
continue to rise.  Indeed, in modeling mitigation with adaptation as a stock, Bosello (2008) 
assumes that no planned adaptation started before 1990.   
However, this choice of two adaptation options ignores the large amount of pre-
existing climate-exposed stock, which is already providing adaptive services vis-à-vis 
climate change even if the vast majority of it was constructed before climate change came 
into the public consciousness.  As climate change is a problem of transition from an old 
approach to making investments in climate-exposed stock to a new, non-stationary regime in 
which this climate-exposed stock is subject to changing damages, much of the question for 
policymakers is about what to do with this existing stock.  This leads then to the third 
adaptation option – the retrofitting of pre-existing stock.   
3.  Retrofitting/capacity building.  Retrofitting of existing climate-exposed and 
adaptation-related stock can extend its lifetime of providing adaptation services by delaying 
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the date when new stock must be purchased and built, or increase the current stock’s adaptive 
capacity, or both.  As noted, Dumas and Ha-Duong (2008) estimate that as much as a quarter 
of global capital stock is exposed to the climate.  This current climate-exposed adaptation 
stock is assumed to be productive now but it will not be productive enough to address future 
climate change damages.  In the face of a changing climate the goal is to increase both the 
lifetime and the adaptive capacity of the investment in response to a rising damage load.  
Retrofitting occurs either with the addition of new technology to the current stock (with or 
without the replacement of the old technology) or by changing the capacity parameters of the 
original technology.  For the former this could mean upgrading a water treatment facility’s 
applied technology;  for the latter it could mean simply adding a few more feet of height to 
the walls of a water reservoir.  For the purposes of this analysis, retrofitting is an option that 
is assumed to be cheaper than building new stock.  It is also assumed that retrofitting 
provides less adaptive capacity than would new stock.  In many cases it may of course be 
cheaper to build completely new stock than to retrofit the old stock.
35
  In this case the 
retrofitting option can be put aside and the choice simplifies to one of spending on flow or 
new stock adaptation.   
Fig. 9 brings the retrofitting option into the adaptation decision.  With depreciating 
adaptation capital stock and different climate damage scenarios, retrofitting existing stock 
can increase its lifetime, capacity, or both.  The adaptive capacity of current adaptation stock 
is represented by the dashed line.  Both a static and a changing climate are represented by the 
two solid lines, with expected variance in climatic outcomes covered by the shaded areas.  
Assuming full adaptation levels (no under-adaptation), adaptation stock provides over-
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 Richard Andrews noted this point.   
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capacity in the early part of its designed lifespan, which depreciates over time to zero.  If the 
climate is not changing, then the usefulness of the stock depreciates to point a, when its 
engineered design is perfectly matched to the existing, unchanging climate (there is neither 
over-capacity nor under-capacity).  Through further depreciation this point is passed and the 
adaptation stock continues to suffer falling capacity to absorb the damages from the climate.  
If damages are rising from a changing climate, this point of crossover from over-capacity to 
under-capacity occurs earlier, at point b.  Finally, if the decision is made beforehand to 
retrofit current adaptation stock, its capacity moves to the path of the dotted line with its 
increased capacity.  With the retrofitting investment, subsequent capital depreciation under a 
changing climate results in a delay in reaching the crossover point to under-adaptation to 
point c. 
Fig. 9.  The adaptive capacity of adaptation stock along with depreciation, in both static and dynamic 
climates.   
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Fig. 10 presents the three policy options for adaptation discussed here in conjunction 
with a mitigation policy.  Listed in this order, the three adaptation tactics are ranked in order 
of lowest to highest adaptation capacity, costs, and investment lifetime.   
Fig. 10.  Flow, retrofitting, and new stock adaptation options with expected damages under a 
mitigation policy.   
 
The expected damage probability distribution can be either with (as shown) or without a mitigation policy, as 
depicted earlier in Fig. 3.  For simplicity, short-lived flow adaptations is shown for three repeated periods only, 
and retrofitting and new stock investments are shown only once.  Retrofitting of the new stock when it is older 
in the future is another option for later periods that is not depicted.  As shown, new adaptation stock has a 
higher adaptive capacity than both old stock and old stock that has been retrofitted.  Flow adaptation is able 
to erase adaptation deficits on an “as needed” basis but with a limited capacity.   
As noted, Fankhauser et al. (1999) find that the challenge is to keep capital stock 
designed to meet climatic conditions that are changing continuously and in an uncertain way.  
The authors propose that there are two ways to do this over time:  1) increase the rate of 
capital turn-over, or 2) increase the flexibility and robustness of existing capital to a wider 
climate damages and the 
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to those damages 
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range of climatic damage scenarios.  By the typology above, option one is new adaptation 
stock and option two is retrofitting (while flow adaptation is separate).  For existing capital 
they recommend rapid capital turnover (as encouraged by faster depreciation rates), if that 
capital is either expensive to retrofit to new climatic conditions or relatively easily moveable 
to new locations where a second-hand market could develop over different climatic zones.  
Alternatively, scrapping would be premature and should be avoided if the existing capital can 
be relatively easily retrofitted for more flexibility and robustness.  
A tension exists between deciding to adapt early and accrue the benefits of 
anticipatory adaptation and deciding instead to get the benefits of putting off the costly 
investment.  The ―adapt early‖ arguments can be listed.  Because it is in general better to stay 
one step ahead of damages by having protective measures in place before the climate 
damages occur, anticipatory adaptation can be more cost effective than its opposite, namely, 
emergency or remediative adaptations that are driven by natural disasters and the need to 
correct what has already happened.  Costs could also be large if investments in large-scale 
stock are put off for too long to the point that the present stock fails catastrophically.  The 
existence of large non-climate co-benefits can alter the discounted net benefits calculus to 
reflect the pursuit of other non-climate goals that policymakers may want to achieve sooner 
rather than later.  Relatedly, the timing of economic cycles could also alter the investment 
timing decision if construction of large adaptation projects is cheaper during a recession or is 
a source of job creation.
36
 
Adaptation investments should be tuned to address our expectation of future damages 
within the designed capacity lifetime of the adaptive investment and in consideration of the 
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 This point was raised by Richard Andrews.   
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tolerance for damage risks within the affected area.  I argue in this chapter that despite the 
benefits from anticipatory adaptation, more expensive adaptation can be delayed to the future 
if the retrofitting option exists now.
37
  All three types of adaptation spending represent costs 
we would rather avoid, and if not avoid then delay.  The value in retrofitting current capital 
stock that is exposed to the climate is by allowing for a delay in spending on costly new stock 
adaptation.  If we are fully adapted to a stationary climate the time value of money will 
always push for a delay in the financial outlay.  Rushed anticipatory adaptation risks creating 
wasted over-investment in under-utilized adaptive capacity, which may depreciate faster than 
climate change damages rise to meet this capacity.  The argument for delaying costly 
adaptation spending is that investment projects are irreversible to the extent that their costs 
cannot be recovered, these projects can be delayed, and information about the effectiveness 
of the investment will likely be revealed during the delay.  Through delay, a quasi-option 
value is created, which is the expected value of information gained by delaying an 
irreversible decision (Arrow and Fisher 1974; Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Boardman et al. 
2001a).
38
  ―Essentially, the point is that the expected benefits of an irreversible decision 
should be adjusted to reflect the loss of options it entails‖ (Arrow and Fisher 1974).  The 
policy assumption here is that all decisions can be revisited and reassessed – and revised, 
                                                 
37
 Much stock will be built without the explicit goal of adapting to climate change, but will nonetheless be 
exposed to the changing climate.  To the extent that such exposure is felt, then the new stock can either 
incorporate future adaptation needs or be fit for future retrofits, depending on the cost.  My thanks are to 
Richard Andrews for discussions on this point.   
38
 The option value OV, is the option price OP, minus the expected surplus E(S).  The option price is the amount 
that individuals are willing to pay for policies prior to the realization of contingencies;  it is an ex ante welfare 
measure without knowing which contingency will actually occur.  The expected surplus is the expected value of 
each outcome based on the probabilities (Boardman et al. 2001b).   
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cancelled, or repeated – at any level of frequency.  While decisions can be changed, 
investments (apart from a salvage value) cannot always be recovered. 
2.5.2.  Decision Analysis Under Uncertainty 
Two policy portfolio allocation decisions present themselves.  First, what is the 
appropriate balance over time between mitigation and aggregated adaptation, and second, 
what is the appropriate allocation over time among flow, stock, and retrofitting adaptation?  
As a step toward thinking about mitigation and adaptation in a more coherent manner, 
adaptation can be conceived in a framework that utilizes a portfolio decision under 
uncertainty as in Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009).
39
  Fig. 30 depicts such an expanded two-
period decision tree, with multiple policy strategies, uncertainties, and sources of learning to 
reduce that uncertainty.  In decision period one the policymaker has a choice to allocate 
resources across the four policy variables of mitigation M, new adaptation stock NAS, 
retrofitting of old adaptation stock RA, and flow adaptation spending FA.  After the 
investments have been made, learning that is both endogenous and exogenous to the policy 
investment decision occurs over three types of information:  1) the net benefits of all types of 
adaptation (NAB), 2) mitigation costs (MC), and 3) climate sensitivity (CS).  The three 
shaded bands show the applicability of that uncertainty to decisions on that particular 
response strategy.  After the new knowledge has been acquired the investment decision in the 
second period is made as a resource allocation over the same four policy areas, and then the 
payoffs of that policy portfolio can be calculated.   
                                                 
39
 In that study, uncertainty was over climate sensitivity, and learning about CS was exogenous to the level of 
investment made.  The authors found that as CS is a parameter with an outcome felt only many decades in the 
future uncertainty on CS has a larger effect on optimal mitigation levels than it does on optimal adaptation 
levels (Felgenhauer and de Bruin 2009). 
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Fig. 11.  Four policy responses to climate change as an investment portfolio allocation decision 
under uncertainty.   
  
For simplicity the tree is truncated after the second investment decision is made.  Morgan and Henrion 
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Fig. 11 continues the argument that different types of uncertainties are relevant to 
decisions about the levels of the four policy variables, and new information is gained over 
time to reduce these uncertainties.
40
  In describing them it should be noted that I assume the 
uncertainties to be independent of one another, i.e., learning about the costs of mitigation will 
not affect the level of uncertainty that remains about the net benefits of all adaptation 
responses.  Three uncertainties are relevant, listed here in order of the increasing length of 
time for their resolution.   
First, uncertainty about the net benefits of all three adaptation types will affect the 
decision on all future adaptation as well as mitigation.  The learning is endogenous to the 
adaptation investment decision as it depends on the actual implementation of adaptation to 
see both how much it costs and how well it performs at lowering damages (its investment 
efficiency).  The net adaptation benefits thus depend on a pairing of the rate or severity of 
damages along with the ability of adaptation to reduce these damages.  It should be noted that 
if the damages are low, then we do not learn as much about how efficient the investment was, 
because it was not strenuously ―tested‖ through implementation.  We only learn about the 
efficiency and limits of the adaptation investment if those limits are approached, and full 
certainty occurs only after the point when those limits are breached.  Thus, if we assume that 
the net benefits of new adaptation stock are greater than the net benefits of older stock that is 
retrofitted, which in turn are higher than those of flow adaptation spending, then these three 
types of adaptation may provide increasingly more information in the order of their falling 
adaptive capacities.   
                                                 
40
 Yohe et al. (2010) find that for the damage sector of sea-level rise with uncertainty, the provision of 
actuarially fair insurance is an essential component of efficient adaptation.   
61 
 
Second, uncertainty about the costs of mitigation will affect both future mitigation 
levels and the future levels of new long-lived adaptation stock.  The costs of particular 
mitigation investments can be ascertained once they are built.  But developing, building and 
diffusing the technology throughout the economy can take decades (e.g., new nuclear power 
plants or new carbon capture and sequestration technology retrofits to existing coal-fired 
power plants are examples).  So this is not a parameter that measures the lifetime of the 
investment but rather the timing of when we learn about how much the mitigation will cost.  
If retrofitting investments are designed with lifetimes equivalent to that of new stock then 
they will also be affected by the new information from learning about mitigation costs.  
Because such investments operate on similar time scales, they will depend on similar 
uncertainties.  Note also that the uncertainty is not over the net benefits of mitigation (as with 
adaptation before) but over the costs of the mitigation.  Uncertainty over mitigation’s costs 
will be resolved before that over its net benefits.   
Third, as CS is a parameter with relevance far into the future, uncertainty about it 
affects investments either with long-lagged effects (mitigation) or long lifetimes (new 
adaptation stock).  New estimates of CS are made from exogenous scientific research and not 
from the implementation of any policy.  Certainty about CS is achieved only when planning 
for it becomes irrelevant, when the atmospheric CO2 concentrations have already doubled.    
As noted for Fig. 10, the retrofitting option does not go away in the future once 
climate change adaptation has been incorporated into all new investments and policy 
decisions.  The climate will continue to change and learning about the future will continue as 
well.  As the climate-adapted stock ages and reaches its design limit the same question will 
arise again on whether or not to retrofit it or replace it with new climate-adapted stock that is 
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better tuned to conditions for the following fifty years.  We are not moving from one 
stationary regime to another different but still stationary climate regime, but instead to a 
regime where the climate will continue changing and in a non-linear fashion.   
It is worth examining to the extent that is possible without a model how the three 
uncertainties over NAB, MC, and CS in the decision tree of Fig. 11 affect decision outcomes, 
as compared with the certain case.  With certainty in all policy variables and climatic 
parameters, the decision is as described before as an allocation of resources across policies 
based on their ratios of discounted net benefits.  Table 5 is a matrix of outcomes from eight 
possible uncertainty scenarios, as based on the decision tree.  In the table, the terms 
―optimistic‖ and ―good‖ imply either that climate change is not as severe a problem as 
previously thought or that the policies to address it are more beneficial or cheaper, while 
―pessimistic‖ and ―bad‖ imply the opposite.  Shaded cells on the left hand side of the table 
indicate bad outcomes for any of the uncertain parameters.  Unambiguous policy choices are 
in bordered boxes on the right hand side of the table.   
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Table 5.  Matrix of outcomes of eight possible scenarios over three uncertain parameters and four 
response policies, in a two-period decision under uncertainty framework.   
 
As is apparent from the table, our ability to make unambiguous predictions about the 
direction of policy levels is limited to general cases and is not possible for individual types of 
adaptation if done in conjunction with mitigation.  Relative to the policymaker’s expectations 
in the first decision period, the most optimistic outcome of learning happens in scenario 
number one, where net adaptation benefits turn out to be higher, mitigation costs lower, and 
climate sensitivity lower as compared to initial expectations.  The most pessimistic outcome 
is the opposite, where net adaptation benefits are lower, mitigation costs are higher, and the 
climate sensitivity is higher than expected.  Between these two bounds are six other scenarios 
of mixed ―good‖ and ―bad‖ uncertainty resolution outcomes.  With either of these two 
extremes, in determining the direction of policies it is unclear whether the effect of cheaper 
NAB MC CS FA RA NAS ATOT M all policy
1. most optimistic higher lower lower ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
2. higher lower higher ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↑
3. higher higher lower ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↓ ↔
4. lower lower lower ↔ ↔ ↔ ↓ ↔ ↔
5. higher higher higher ↔ ↔ ↔ ↑ ↔ ↔
6. lower lower higher ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↑ ↔
7. lower higher lower ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↓
8. most pessimistic lower higher higher ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
= "bad" value outcome = unambiguous policy choice
uncertain variables and parameter:  climate response policies:  
NAB = net adaptation benefits FA = flow adaptation spending
MC = mitigation costs RA = retrofitting adaptation
CS = climate sensitivity NAS = new adaptation stock
ATOT = total adaptation effort
M = mitigation
all policy = total spending on ATOT + M
2 of 3 
parameters 
are "good"
2 of 3 
parameters 
are "bad"
uncertainty resolution policy revision
period two policy decision, 
relative to the period one policy 
decision for that particular strategy
compared to period one, 
uncertain values in period 





(more expensive) policy responses will trump the fact that climate change is a less (more) 
serious problem.  From this, it is also not possible to discern relative changes in either flow 
or stock adaptation (work on this question using an IAM is done in chapter three).     
Particular unambiguous cases can be described, however.  In scenario 2 the total 
policy emphasis on climate change will rise, as the problem is worse than thought but the 
mitigation response is cheaper and the benefits of adaptation are larger (while scenario 7 is 
the opposite and the total policy response will fall).  However, for either scenario 2 or 7 it is 
unclear in what proportions mitigation or total adaptation will rise or fall more, respectively.  
For mitigation, it unambiguously falls in scenario 3 as the net benefits of adaptation are 
higher, the costs of mitigation are higher, and the severity of the climate problem is lower.  
As scenario 6 is the exact opposite in terms of uncertainty outcomes, mitigation 
unambiguously rises.  For the total level of adaptation, it unambiguously falls in scenario 4 
because the net benefits of adaptation are lower, the costs of mitigation are lower, and the 
severity of the climate problem is also lower (the opposite is true in scenario 5, so it rises).    
Given the interactions with mitigation costs and the fact that mitigation and overall 
adaptation efforts are substitutable, comparing the different levels of the three adaptation 
types can only be done with the level of mitigation held constant.  Under these ceteris paribus 
conditions what matters in the allocation of resources among adaptation types is the rate of 
rising damages as related to the limits and, relatedly, lifetimes, of the adaptation types.  This 
is depicted in Fig. 12, under both certainty and uncertainty over the rate of damages.  As with 
the other policy portfolio allocation decisions the resulting policy is not an all-or-nothing 
choice in favor of one over the other two types, but rather an emphasis on one policy type 
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over the others.  The assumption here is that the adaptive capacities are such that stock > 
retrofitting > flow.      
Fig. 12.  Adaptation policy choices by types, as based on the rate of climate damages over time and 
the limits and lifetimes of the adaptation investments, under certainty (part A) and uncertainty (part 
B).   
 
With complete certainty in part A the policymaker makes decisions based on what is 
known will happen in the future, with the goal of minimizing costs without suffering 
damages that overwhelm the adaptation.  If the rate of damage increase will be that of line 
C1, then the cheapest and most flexible adaptation type – flow spending – will be emphasized 
in an adaptation policy portfolio, as its limits will not be exceeded in the relevant timeframe.  
Similarly, if the rates of damage increase are either lines C2 or C3, then the emphasized 
adaptation will be retrofitting of old stock or the construction of new adaptation stock, 
respectively.  In this certain world all adaptation would be anticipatory and made at the 
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Under uncertainty about the speed of future climate damages (part B), the risk is one 
of either:  1) under-adaptation, with unnecessary damage costs and the risk of irreplaceable 
assets being lost forever, or 2) over-adaptation, with wasteful over spending on adaptive 
investments that may never bring any benefits within the lifetime of the investment.  The 
policymaker has initial expectations about the rate of damages E1-3 and bases the adaptation 
decision on those expectations.  After the adaptation is made the true climate damage rate is 
revealed to be mild (R1), medium (R2), or severe (R3).  If the adaptation decision was by 
chance made such that expected damages matched the realized damages (E1→R1, E2→R2, or 
E3→R3) then the policymaker is perfectly adapted to those damages for that time period.  
However, if the expectation was for a mild damage scenario that in reality turned out to be 
severe, E1→R3, then there is large under-adaptation, which can be corrected in the next 
period with new stock investments but with the loss of whatever is irrecoverable due to the 
under-adaptation in the first period.  This demonstrates the flexibility of adaptation in general 
in that it can be ―ramped up‖ relatively quickly from period to period.  Conversely, if E3→R1 
then there is large over-adaptation for that period, and the opportunity cost takes the value of 
the wasted investment amount.  The equivalent response to this over-investment does not 
exist, however, as stock adaptation cannot be physically ―ramped down‖ without dismantling 
it at a loss.  To a large extent then the policymaker is in this case stuck with an investment 
that may recover some costs in the following period if damages rise to meet its capacity, or it 
may continue to be a wasted investment if damages continue in the following period to be 
below  
As is applicable to the case of under-adaptation, an important factor in this risk-
adjusted costs-minimizing decision is the shape of the damage profile if and when the 
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adaptation capacity is exceeded.  If the adaptive investment that is already in place still 
provides benefits even when its capacity is exceeded, then the additional new damages are 
incremental.  An example would be a reservoir dam that is overtopped due to an extreme 
precipitation event – it still provides flood protection up to its original capacity even though 
additional flooding will occur downstream from the water that the reservoir cannot hold 
back.  But if exceeding the adaptive capacity of an adaptation response causes a complete 
failure of that adaptation investment then damages will spike.  Examples of catastrophic 
adaptive failure would be the failure of coastal barriers to prevent shoreline assets from 
completely washing away, or a complete loss of a season’s crops that are planted from seeds 
that were modified for climate change.  In these cases the adaptation has stopped working, 
nor will it work in the future if the damage trend continues.  The possibility of these 
catastrophic adaptation losses will increase the risk-aversion of the policymaker to avoid 
these adaptation limits. 
Coupled with the characteristics of the damages that come with adaptation failure are 
the characteristics of what can be lost due to climate damages, either because of adaptation 
failure or because we are just incapable of adapting in that sector.  Damages by definition are 
costly but many are temporary one-time losses such as floods or crop failures.  Other losses 
due to climate change are irreplaceable such as man-made cultural landmarks like Venice or 
natural assets like vulnerable coral reefs.  Irreversibility of the damages increases the 
negative consequences of any adaptation failure.  While we would of course want to 
anticipate and avoid reversible damages, a failure to do so is less costly than failing to protect 
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unrecoverable assets through adaptation.
41
  For irrecoverable natural assets, adaptation is for 
the most part ineffective, and thus the only viable response is mitigation.   
2.6.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This chapter joins the debate on integrating mitigation and adaptation in an effort to 
provide decisionmakers with a better understanding of the essential long-term question of 
how to balance the two different climate policies.  Public policy should be based upon sound 
conceptual foundations, and the focus here has been on how mitigation and adaptation should 
be conceptualized and represented for decision makers as two risk reduction policies 
integrated in an overall response to climate change.  The tactical implementation of climate 
policy responses is an issue of when, what type, and how much.  Explicit tradeoffs between 
mitigation and an aggregated version of adaptation – ∫(M,A) in the IPCC notation – are 
fundamental, but this chapter has argued that the proper framing of adaptation vis-à-vis a 
concurrent mitigation policy requires that focus be put on the temporal and technological 
limits of each strategy, as well as the flexibility of each strategy under uncertainty.  
Analytical traction can be made by disaggregating adaptation and viewing policy tradeoffs 
within a decision framework where the choice is among mitigation, flow adaptation 
spending, investments in new adaptation stock, and the retrofitting of currently existing stock 
to meet expected climate change damages.   
As stipulated here and elsewhere, an optimal response to climate change will include 
both mitigation and adaptation in a mixed portfolio, and in all decision periods a two-way 
                                                 
41
 The successful example of the Cape Hatteras Lighthouse in North Carolina, which was moved inland before 
being washed away at the eroding shoreline, shows that with adaptation we do not have to wait for the complete 
loss of an asset before deciding that now is the time to ramp up adaptation efforts.   
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budgetary tradeoff exists between both responses.  But in early periods learning new 
information that is relevant to adaptation decisions will affect decisions on mitigation levels 
more than will learning on information that is relevant to mitigation decisions affect 
decisions on adaptation.  Thus, a rationally chosen mitigation level will be influenced by 
present-day adaptation levels and our learning on how effective they are at reducing 
damages.  With an analysis timeframe shorter than the time that it takes for mitigation’s 
lagged effects to take hold, adaptation decisions should not be influenced at all by today’s 
chosen mitigation levels.  However, this one-way relationship only holds if:  1) the timeframe 
of analysis is relatively short, and 2) if the relevant policy budget for climate change is 
unlimited.  As the longevity of the adaptive investment increases, the first condition will be 
violated and optimal mitigation and adaptation levels will depend upon each other more in a 
tradeoff over the total damages that are reduced.  Condition number two is violated the more 
that climate change policy budgets are fixed, leading to zero-sum tradeoffs.  In these cases 
adaptation will be influenced by the budgetary tradeoffs with mitigation where any money 
allocated to the latter is money that cannot be spent on adaptation.   
With adaptation we are balancing between two ways to reduce the cost of responding 
to climate change.  On the one hand is the conversion to a new policy regime with adaptation 
more a ―part of the system,‖ where it is fully integrated into behaviors, decision making, and 
capital stocks, and is anticipatory to the damages that will happen (also known as adaptation 
mainstreaming).  On the other hand, as any adaptation spending represents a cost that we 
wish we did not have to pay (as defined here, adaptation to climate change produces nothing 
for the economy except minimizing climate change damages), we are simultaneously trying 
to delay that conversion as long as possible.  As argued here, neither of these two extremes of 
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a complete ―climate proofing‖ response nor a fully flexible wait-and-see approach are 
appropriate.  The policy approach developed here with different adaptation types provides 
policymakers with a more accurate representation of adaptation investment decisions in 
conjunction with mitigation 
With all else equal, it is better to correctly anticipate climate damages in advance than 
to react to them as they occur.  But even with such certainty about both damages and our 
ability to adapt to them, it is best to postpone such expenses and delay the anticipatory 
adaptation as far into the future as possible.  Under uncertainty the benefits of anticipatory 
adaptation are tempered by the risk of overinvesting in adaptive capacity, or investing in the 
wrong type of adaptation.  Thus the conclusion is that adaptation investments should be 
tuned to address our expectation of future damages within the designed lifetime and capacity 
of the adaptation investment, and in consideration of our tolerances for the risk of losing the 
protected asset.   
In the definition used here, retrofitting of existing climate-exposed adaptation stock is 
cheaper than building new adaptive stock but also provides a lower and shorter-lived 
adaptive capacity than would new stock.  If such a retrofitting alternative to the construction 
of new adaptation stock exists then it is the preferred choice – it creates an option value to the 
extent that the retrofit increases the capacity of current stock to adapt and in so doing delay 
the costly future investment.  The option value comes from the irreversibility effect where 
the risk of overinvestment in adaptation is lowered and resources are available for other uses 
for the time period during which they are not needed for adaptation.   
Finally, and following on Fankhauser et al. (1999), of all current climate-exposed 
stock we can imagine that a subset can be feasibly retrofitted to adapt to expected climate 
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change damages while the rest cannot and must eventually be replaced with new stock.  But 
this stock must be picked correctly – what to keep, and what to scrap.  Reducing uncertainty 
by learning about what portion of present-day stock could be retrofitted, and which cannot 
and should be scrapped earlier, would create better outcomes.  This suggests a value to be 
had from further research into the limits of adaptation, and whether exceeding these limits 



















CHAPTER 3.  MODELING ADAPTATION AS A FLOW AND STOCK 
ALLOCATION DECISION WITH MITIGATION 
3.1.  Introduction 
Economic scarcity of resources dictates that an allocation of emphases will be made 
between the two key responses to reduce the risks of climate change, mitigation and 
adaptation.  As noted, as much as a quarter of all global capital may be exposed to climate 
change risks (Dumas and Ha-Duong 2008), and protecting these assets through adaptation 
will require a significant portion of global output.  Conceptually sound modeling of 
adaptation measures in an overall climate-economy optimization model with mitigation is 
thus necessary. 
Several integrated assessment models (IAMs) of the economy and climate have been 
applied with a focus on determining optimal mitigation levels both in cost-benefit 
optimizations and in cost effectiveness analyses, as surveyed in Mastrandrea (2010).  
Independent analyses of optimal adaptation levels (neglecting mitigation) have been 
performed as well (Fankhauser et al. 1999; Mendelsohn 2000).  In conjunction with 
mitigation, policy-driven adaptation, especially when anticipatory or ex ante to the incidence 
of damages, may significantly reduce costs in comparison with business as usual (BAU) 
trends of reactive autonomous adaptation or ex post remediative adaptation.  Research has 
now begun to focus on the best way to incorporate policy-driven adaptation into existing 
IAMs where previously the only adaptation was autonomously driven.   
A number of climate-economy policy optimization models now incorporate 
adaptation to climate change in some form (listed in Dickinson 2007), a subset of which 
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include adaptation as an explicit decision variable.  Notable in this group are those based on 
the DICE model as developed in its current version by Nordhaus (2007a) or the DICE 
approach (Dumas and Ha-Duong 2008; de Bruin et al. 2009b; Felgenhauer and de Bruin 
2009).  The RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang 1996), which is the regional version of DICE, 
also has versions with adaptation as a policy variable to allow for the analysis of a 
geographically heterogeneous representation of mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs (Bosello 
2008; de Bruin et al. 2009a; de Bruin et al. 2010; Dellink et al. forthcoming).  Other dynamic 
optimizations with both strategies have been conducted using the following models:  PAGE 
(Hope et al. 1993; Hope 2006), FUND for the case of coastal adaptation to sea-level rise (Tol 
2007), and by Settle et al. (2007) using Stella software to simulate a theoretical model with 
mitigation, adaptation, and the risk of catastrophic damages.   
If such IAMs optimize under idealized conditions, then rational actors operate with 
complete and certain information and choose to adapt as well as mitigate while optimizing 
the balance of strategies over time.  Adaptation reduces the costs of climate change damages 
and, under assumptions of rationality, will be implemented proportionally to the level of its 
net benefits as compared to other policy options.  Adding the option to adapt to a model that 
previously included only the option to mitigate improves outcomes. 
Mitigation is a reduction in the rise of atmospheric GHG concentrations occurring via 
emissions abatement or carbon sequestration.
1
  The definition of adaptation is open to 
                                                 
1
 The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines 
mitigation as ―technological change and substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions per unit of 





  I use that of chapter two, where climate change adaptation is the 
set of actions taken to respond to a changing climate mean that:  1) improve welfare, 2) do 
not change the climate as the goal, and 3) would not have been taken were the climate mean 
not changing.  While mitigation and adaptation are both risk-reducing approaches to climate 
change, they are distinctly different in the timescales of their policy effectiveness and the 
characteristics of how their technology works to reduce damages, as well as their behavior 
under uncertainty.  Given these different policy characteristics between the two strategies, 
using a single policy variable to represent distinctly different adaptation measures for 
different types of climate damages may not accurately portray the tradeoffs between 
adaptation and mitigation, particularly under uncertainty.  In addressing this issue, I 
developed a conceptual framework in chapter two where the rational policymaker faces a 
decision under uncertainty on how much to allocate across a portfolio of four policies to 
respond to climate change:  mitigation, and three types of adaptation – flexible and short-
lived ―flow‖ spending, committed and long-lived new stock investments, and the retrofitting 
of pre-existing capital stock.  With this as motivation, this chapter takes a step toward the 
complete representation of the developed framework in model form by modeling adaptation 
as both a flow and a stock variable along with mitigation.  In so doing it adds to the nascent 
but growing modeling literature that characterizes adaptation with both flow- and stock-type 
attributes (Lecocq and Shalizi 2008; Bosello et al. 2010; Yohe et al. 2010).    
This chapter presents a new model in which adaptation is constructed as both a flow 
and a stock and optimized jointly with mitigation to maximize overall global welfare.  The 
                                                 
2
 The IPCC AR4 defines adaptation as ―adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities‖ (IPCC 
2007a).  Chapter two provides a more extensive discussion of adaptation definitions and constructs. 
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research objective is to represent policy-driven adaptation in a DICE-type climate-economy 
model with jointly-implemented mitigation in a way that more realistically represents 
adaptation spending decisions in practice and allows for meaningful comparisons between 
adaptation and mitigation, and thus obtain policy-relevant insights.  The model is named AD-
DICE S/F as it builds directly upon its AD-DICE predecessor (de Bruin et al. 2009b), but it 
provides new insights into how different types of adaptation may behave in conjunction with 
mitigation.   
In Section 2 I first review what is meant by flow and stock adaptation.  I then review 
previous joint analyses of mitigation and adaptation where adaptation has been 
conceptualized as a flow, as a stock, or both, in different model types and under certainty and 
uncertainty.  In Section 3 I describe how flow and stock adaptation are characterized within 
the new AD-DICE S/F model and how the stock adaptation is calibrated to AD-DICE results.  
Section four presents results from optimal policy decisions across climate change mitigation, 
short-lived flow adaptation spending, and investments in long-lived adaptation stock.  
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on different rates of depreciation for adaptation stock and 
different values for climate sensitivity (CS), with results reported for their effect on climate 
policy outcomes.  Sensitivity analysis is also done for multiple combinations of three 
parameters over several levels:  1) the allocation of flow and stock adaptation as factor inputs 
in the adaptation production function, 2) the elasticity of substitution between the two 
adaptation types, and 3) the existence of a capacity limit to flow adaptation.  In section five 
the implications of flow adaptation capacity limits under uncertainty are examined.  Section 
six concludes with policy recommendations.   
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3.2.  Background 
3.2.1.  Flow and Stock Adaptation 
With a flow and stock model, instead of just one homogenous adaptation instrument 
available to address climate change damages, the policymaker now has two.  Here I 
characterize the key differences between the two approaches, with some representative 
examples.
3
   
Flow adaptation is relatively cheap, quick to implement, and quick to return short-
term benefits.  It also has a smaller adaptive coping range, defined before in chapter two as 
the extent to which policy can adapt and reduce damages.  Flow adaptation is flexible in that 
it can be ramped up or down relatively quickly within the limits of the applied technology.  
In its purest sense flow adaptation is a continuous variable, but as applied it comes in discrete 
bursts of spending or application.  The spending is relatively reversible, not because the 
money once spent is recoverable but because such sunk costs are low so the cost of changing 
a decision about having spent the money is also low.  Flow adaptation can be seen 
pejoratively as a ―coping‖ (Kelly and Adger 2000) or ―triage‖ mechanism (Craig 2010) that 
alleviates some damages but comes with no expectation that these benefits will continue after 
the spending stops.  In a favorable sense, flow spending allows us to fill in the gaps of our 
adaptation needs at will and as needed, supplementing existing infrastructure or policy 
mechanisms.  It occurs under relative certainty on the level of damages faced and the amount 
of spending that is needed to alleviate these damages.  Flow adaptation is only permanent to 
the extent that it is repeated over time, and it is only sustainable to the extent that a 
combination of the technology and the amount of application can keep up with the damages.   
                                                 
3
 This section draws on chapter two, which has a larger discussion of flow- and stock-type adaptations.   
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One example of flow adaptation is beach renourishment to protect eroding coastlines 
with periodically resupplied imported sand (though it can also be modeled as a repeated 
capital stock accumulation problem (Smith et al. 2009)).  Another example from agriculture 
is ―doing more‖ – opening the taps for more irrigation (if the water is available),4 adding 
more fertilizer, or using more pesticide.  Alternatively it can mean more sophisticated, 
ongoing, and evolving behavioral changes such as experimenting with integrated pest 
management, altering crop planting dates, or changing the type of crops grown.  In the health 
sector, flow adaptation activities could include the wider distribution of medicines that treat 
the symptoms of climate-related diseases, or cheap prophylactic measures such as mosquito 
nets.  Higher frequency heat waves could be alleviated through the subsidization of air 
conditioners for vulnerable segments of the population.  Damages from extreme events such 
as more frequent floods can be lowered somewhat by a case-by-case emergency response.   
In contrast to flow adaptation, adaptation stock represents large-scale, expensive, and 
long-lived infrastructural investments with a high adaptive capacity that declines over time 
due to a combination of depreciation and rising mean climate damages.  Compared with 
short-lived spending, such investments are likely to be made only episodically, triggered 
politically by the occurrence of extreme events that raise the public consciousness of climate 
change and give legitimacy to large-scale governmental intervention by opening up a 
temporary ―policy window‖ for significant policy changes to be made (Kingdon 1995; Adger 
et al. 2005).  As defined, investments in stock adaptation are discrete and non-continuous, 
though when aggregated globally the decisions to invest in large stock projects will appear as 
if it is a continuous variable.  Stock adaptation is committed as it cannot be changed 
                                                 
4
 Jonathan Wiener provided this example. 
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significantly once built, though it can be retrofitted.  It is limited by both the technology of 
the response as well as the design capacity of that stock.  This adaptation is also irreversible, 
as the opportunity cost of resources that are committed to an adaptation that can never be 
used for some other purpose.  Finally, the long lifespan of this type investments in stock 
adaptation are assumed to be up to the length of time that it takes for the effect of present-day 
mitigation investments to be felt, i.e., several decades.   
Adaptation stock is typically exemplified by coastal barricades or seawalls to hold off 
rising seas and protect assets such as roads, bridges, and ports.  In the health sector, this 
means a long-term investment in the development of new vaccines for climate-related 
diseases or in the creation of increased health care capacity and new hospitals.  For farmers, 
new stock includes capital investments in new harvesting equipment that is capable of 
harvesting different crops under new conditions.  The water sector represents perhaps the 
most costly and longest-lived of climate-exposed capital, whether it be systems for sewerage, 
drainage, irrigation, or drinking water supply, as provided by a system of dams, reservoirs, 
levees, canals, and pipes. 
3.2.2.  Previous Integration of Mitigation and Adaptation in a Joint Response Portfolio 
3.2.2.1.  Static Representations  
Fankhauser (1996) lays out the basic problem of policy allocation by postulating a 
simple global model of tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation that minimizes societal 
welfare losses due to climate change.  The global policymaker chooses levels of mitigation 
and adaptation that minimize the sum of mitigation costs, adaptation costs, and residual 
climate damages.  Total mitigation and adaptation costs rise with the increased use of either 
strategy, while damage costs fall with both.   
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Kane and Shogren (2000) examine mitigation and adaptation using an endogenous 
risk framework in which society can choose its level of risk avoidance with a mix of 
mitigation and adaptation policies.  National level policymakers seek to maximize national 
wealth through both mitigating and adapting to reduce damages.  But damages will also 
depend on the unknown state of the climate system as well as the level of mitigation by other 
countries.  The authors find that more risk can either increase or decrease the marginal 
effectiveness of mitigation, which leads to respective increased or decreased mitigation.  If 
increased risk does not decrease the marginal productivity of adaptation, then more 
adaptation results;  otherwise the outcome on adaptation is ambiguous.  Ingham et al. (2005) 
use a simplified version of the Kane and Shogren (2000) approach to show how mitigation 
and adaptation are usually policy substitutes.   
3.2.2.2.  Adaptation as a Flow  
De Bruin et al. (2009b) modify the DICE model
5
 of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) to 
incorporate adaptation as part of the climate policy response.  In the AD-DICE model, 
                                                 
5
 The Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, developed originally by Nordhaus (1994), is a 
simple, forward-looking integrated assessment model of the world climate and economy.  Utility (social 
welfare), calculated as the discounted natural logarithm of consumption, is maximized via the policy control 
variable of GHG emissions abatement (mitigation).  In each time period, consumption and savings/investment 
are chosen endogenously subject to available income that is reduced by the costs of climate change (residual 
damages and mitigation costs).  Climate change damages are represented by a continuous damage function that 
depends on the temperature increase compared to 1900 levels, where damages rise exponentially with rising 
temperature.  Mitigation is represented on a [0-1] percentage scale, depicting the percentage reduction of GHG 
emissions relative to the baseline for that period.  As baseline emissions are always rising, even a rising 
mitigation level will not necessarily result in a drop in total emissions.  The mitigation cost function declines 
over time but the benefits of the policy are lagged far into the future due to the slow working of the carbon cycle 
(Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000).   
In DICE, adaptation is equated with all alternative actions that make economic sense when compared 
with mitigation (Nordhaus 2007b).  The adaptation rate is based on a rational policymaker’s assessment of the 
best alternative use of productive capital that is otherwise being allocated to mitigation.  Thus adaptation is 
implicitly included as part of the damage function, where adaptation has already taken place in an assumed 
optimal way (Cline 2006).  Such BAU adaptation occurs as free market actors respond to prices, where the 
remaining damages are those to which people choose not to adapt because of the prevailing market rate of 
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adaptation spending is represented as a flow, where the benefits of adaptation are felt 
immediately but have no lasting effect beyond that time period.  Using AD-DICE de Bruin et 
al. (2009b) confirm the results of Ingham et al. (2005) that an optimal response to climate 
change will contain a mix of both mitigation and adaptation.  They also show that:  1) 
adaptation reduces damage costs primarily in early years, while mitigation reduces damage 
costs in later years, and 2) including the additional policy response decreases the optimal 
level of the initial policy response.  In this situation, optimal mitigation levels are more 
sensitive to the addition of adaptation than vice versa.  
Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009) extend this AD-DICE work to explore tradeoffs 
between climate change mitigation and flow adaptation policies under both certainty and 
uncertainty with learning using a numerical two-period decision model.  Uncertainty was 
incorporated over a discrete probability distribution of five different expected climate 
sensitivities (CS),
6
 with the implications for optimal mitigation and adaptation levels 
explored.  Compared to the case where the CS is known with certainty, the addition of 
uncertainty about CS (but with the same expected value of the CS), leads to three insights:  1) 
before learning occurs, optimal levels of both mitigation and adaptation are lower under 
uncertainty than under certainty;  2) in this same early period, the levels of optimal mitigation 
and adaptation are most sensitive to their own respective policy costs (rather than gross 
climate damages or the costs of the alternative policy), with the mitigation level more 
dependent on adaptation costs than vice versa;  and 3) variance in CS – a parameter with 
                                                                                                                                                       
return (Nordhaus 2007b).  DICE thus captures adaptation, but only to the extent that the adaptation in practice is 
autonomous.  Policy-driven adaptation that could drive down total costs further is missing.   
6
 Climate sensitivity is a measure of the surface temperature increase that would result from a doubling of 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations.   
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long-term effects – affects optimal mitigation levels more than it affects optimal adaptation 
levels. 
Ingham et al. (2007) focus on the effect of uncertainty in modeling mitigation with 
two versions of adaptation.  In one model version adaptation acts just as if it were an 
additional mitigation effort, while in the other model version adaptation acts to reduce total 
damage costs.  In both cases including adaptation in a mitigation optimization with 
uncertainty and the possibility of learning reduces the irreversibility effect;  i.e., with future 
learning, the option to adapt reduces the near-term mitigation levels.   
3.2.2.3.  Adaptation as a Stock 
Dumas and Ha-Duong (2008) examine adaptation stock investments with efficiency 
ranges for adapting to climate change.  The efficiency of the investment in adapting rises 
with the temperature and then falls as the temperature continues to climb.  The authors find 
that this proactive adaptation is optimal even though there is over-adaptation in early periods, 
as the point is not to adapt to present damages but to those of the future.  Distinguishing 
between absolute adaptation costs and transitory or transitional adaptation costs, they find 
that transitional adaptation has a higher but one-time cost while absolute adaptation has 
lower relative costs.   
Bosello (2008) models the policy choice as one among mitigation, adaptation stock, 
and research and development (R&D), using a revised version of RICE.  The main difference 
with de Bruin et al. (2009b) comes from modeling adaptation as a stock rather than as a flow.  
As a stock, adaptation and R&D investments penalize capital accumulation in the long-term, 
while mitigation (as a flow in both models) only effects present output.  Therefore the 
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optimal mix of responses in this model is dominated in the first several periods by mitigation, 
until damages become more substantial (in 2040) and adaptation begins to dominate.   
3.2.2.4.  Adaptation as a Flow and a Stock 
Comparison of the approaches summarized so far makes it clear that modeling 
adaptation either as a flow or a stock has implications for policy outcomes.  Of course in 
practice adaptation will be a mix of efforts that mimic the flow and stock adaptation 
categories stipulated here.  To my knowledge, three previous research efforts have either 
modeled or examined adaptation in a way akin to a stock and flow approach, with mitigation.  
Differences between these efforts and the approach that is taken in the present chapter are 
discussed in Section 3.3.1 with the description of the AD-DICE S/F model.   
First, Lecocq and Shalizi (2008) elaborate on Kane and Shogren (2000) to develop a 
dynamic partial equilibrium model with mitigation, ex ante proactive adaptation (like a 
stock), and ex post reactive adaptation (like flow), and find the policies to be jointly 
determined.  Uncertainty on the location of the damages reduces the value of the proactive 
adaptation relative to reactive adaptation.  They also find that rainy day funds would allow 
for the future correction of present day misallocation of investments due to climate damage 
uncertainty.   
Second, Bosello et al. (2010) use the AD-WITCH optimization model to examine the 
choice among the climate responses of mitigation, anticipatory adaptation (stock), reactive 
adaptation (flow), and R&D (a stock of knowledge that improves the effectiveness of 
reactive adaptation), over different global regions.  As with other model results they find 
strategic complementarity between mitigation and adaptation in which outcomes are 
improved with the implementation of both strategies and preference is given to adaptation if 
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there is no possibility of catastrophic damages.  Although they do not report the full 
disaggregated pathways for the different adaptation types, important results are found with 
differences in the composition of adaptation types in rich OECD nations and relatively 
poorer non-OECD nations.  While the mix of anticipatory and reactive adaptation is found to 
be relatively equal over time in non-OECD nations, the mix in OECD nations is heavily 
weighted toward anticipatory adaptation.  The authors attribute this to two factors:  1) the 
level of economic development, where rich nations are able to afford expensive investments 
that will become productive in the future, and 2) climate vulnerability, where the damages of 
non-OECD nations are better addressed by reactive adaptation with the reverse the case for 
OECD nations.   
Third, Yohe et al. (2010) examine two types of adaptation to sea-level rise, with 
rough equivalence to the flow and stock options used here, respectfully:  1) an 
environmentally benign approach involving individualized home protection measures with 
relatively low levels of ongoing costs, and 2) an engineering response with a large up-front 
cost and ongoing maintenance  costs to follow.  They found that with both types of 
adaptation the provision of actuarially fair insurance improved outcomes and was an essential 
component of efficient adaptation.  For the stock-type engineering adaptation, increasing risk 
aversion raises the value of the adaptation and moves its date of economically efficient 
implementation closer to the present. 
3.3.  Model Description 
3.3.1.  Specification of Flow and Stock Adaptation, and their Combination 
Here I describe the equations of the stock and flow AD-DICE S/F model that are 
related to the two types of adaptation.  The relevant equations and parameters for mitigation 
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are the same as in DICE/AD-DICE (available in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)) with the model 
approach explained above in footnote 5).  The parameters, along with their reference values 
and sources are presented in Table 6.   
Table 6.  AD-DICE S/F reference case parameter values, as calibrated to approximate AD-DICE results 
for the case of optimal total adaptation with no mitigation.   




𝛾1  first and second parameters of the adaptation flow  
cost equation 
  0.115 
AD-DICE 




θ first and second parameters of adaptation stock  
production function 
  0.844436323 
calibration 
φ   5.470770434 
AS0 adaptation stock initial value   0.001 n/a 






ψ scaling parameter for efficiency of all adaptation   1.900831916 calibration 
δ 
relative distribution of flow adaptation as a factor 
share in the total adaptation product 
  0.5 n/a 
ρ 
substitution parameter between the two adaptation 
inputs 
 -0.11111 from σ  
σ 
elasticity of substitution between flow and stock 
adaptation 
  0.9 n/a 
α returns to scale for all adaptation types in total   1.0 n/a 
Sources:  All AD-DICE-related values are from the model creators (de Bruin et al. 2009b).  Unsourced values for 
parameters are assumed by the author, and some of these parameters are subject to later sensitivity analysis. 
Flow adaptation AF is a policy variable which, like mitigation, is on a [0-1] scale 
where zero represents no adaptation and one represents hypothetical (and impossible) full 
adaptation and elimination of all of the climate damages in that time period.  The 
specification and parameterization for flow adaptation is the same as that for ―protection‖ in 
AD-DICE (de Bruin et al. 2009b).  Flow adaptation reduces damages for the current time 
period t but has no lasting effects.  Adaptation flow costs AFC rise as follows: 
𝐴𝐹𝐶𝑡 = 𝛾1𝐴𝐹𝑡
𝛾2 .   (1) 
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Adaptation services can also come from a supply of adaptation stock AS that is 
replenished every period by the policymaker’s chosen amount of adaptation stock 
investments ASI, and depreciates at the rate DAS such that   
𝐴𝑆𝑡+1 ≤   1 − 𝐷𝐴𝑆 
10 𝐴𝑆𝑡 + 10𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑡 .   (2) 
This replenishment and depreciation behavior of the adaptation stock is identical to 
both the capital stock behavior equation in DICE as well as the adaptation stock behavior 
equation in Bosello (2008).  Adaptation stock provides adaptation services ASPROD through 
the adaptation stock production function, 
𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 =   𝑒
𝐴𝑆𝑡




where K is non-adaptive capital stock, and θ and φ are parameters for calibration.  The 
adaptation stock production function embodies two assumptions.  First, adaptation stock 
provides adaptation services with diminishing marginal productivity.  Second, AS will 
constitute some portion of K, even though AS is unproductive in the economy for all purposes 
except to reduce climate change damages.
7
  Thus, from equation (3), the productivity of 
adaptation services from adaptation stock is contingent on the depreciation rate of that stock 
over time, as tuned to the level of non-climate capital in the  economy.  Fig. 13 shows 
representative results from the stock adaptation production function with K fixed at various 
levels.   
                                                 
7
 As with flow spending in AD-DICE, this simplification ignores the non-climate change co-benefits that are 




In order to model interactions and tradeoffs between adaptation that is obtained from 
flow and stock spending, the two adaptation approaches are combined in a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) production function for a total level of adaptation services ADPROD,  
𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = 𝜓 𝛿𝐴𝐹𝑡
𝜌 +  1 − 𝛿 𝐴𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝜌  
𝛼
𝜌 , (4) 
where ψ is a scaling parameter for the overall efficiency of adaptation, δ is the distribution of 
relative input factor shares in the amount of total adaptation, ρ is the substitution parameter 
between the two adaptation inputs,
8
 and α is the returns to scale for adaptation where α < 1 
means decreasing returns to scale, α = 1 is constant returns to scale, and α > 1 is increasing 
returns to scale.  As the name implies, the degree of substitution between the two adaptation 
factor inputs is always the same with a CES production function.
9
 
                                                 
8
 The elasticity of substitution between adaptation types is σ = 1/1+ρ. 
9
 Two other adaptation production functions were explored and rejected in favor of the CES form in equation 
(4).  First, a straightforward linear combination, where ASPRODt = C1(C2AFt + C3ASPRODt), requires arbitrary 
values for the scaling parameters C1-3 that at this point have no support in the literature.  Second, a Cobb-
Douglas production function, where ASPRODt = A(AFt a  * ASPRODtb), with A as the scaling parameter and a 





























Fig. 13.  The adaptation stock 
production function in AD-
DICE S/F over several values 
of K, at one point in time, i.e., 




In each model period mitigation reduces gross climate damages GD from their level 
under a no-policy BAU scenario to a lower level of damages.  These damages fall further if 
changes are made to social and economic systems, i.e., adaptation.  The two types of 
adaptation act jointly to reduce these ―post-mitigation‖ damages to a further lower level of 
residual, or net damages ND, where   
𝑁𝐷𝑡 = 𝐺𝐷𝑡 ∗  1 − 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 .   (5) 
In the model the benefits from both flow adaptation and stock adaptation are felt 
immediately.  Unrealized gross climate damages are reduced by a mix of the two adaptation 
responses to a lower level of realized net damages.  The model chooses levels that are 
optimal within the DICE framework, i.e., adaptation does not occur if its benefits do not 
exceed its costs. 
Total economic output Y is lowered by the new level of (lower) net damages, along 
with adaptation flow costs AFC and mitigation costs MCOST,   
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡 ∗  1 − 𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 − 𝐴𝐹𝐶𝑡  1 + 𝑁𝐷𝑡  , (6) 
where Q is production.  Investments in adaptation stock are akin to investment in normal 
productive capital, and are thus not available for consumption C:   
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑡 .   (7) 
Total adaptation costs are the sum of spending on adaptation flow efforts and 
investments in adaptation stock, and are assumed to be always positive.  The net benefits of 
                                                                                                                                                       
This function restricted the ability to conduct sensitivity analysis and explore various model assumptions.  
Nicholson (1995), Chiang (1984), and Friedman (2002b) provide background on the latter two production 
functions.   
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each adaptation strategy are the portion of damages that are avoided from that adaptation 
type minus the policy cost of the adaptation.   
The AD-DICE S/F model developed here is different from other modeling of 
adaptation as both a stock and a flow in the following ways.  While Lecocq and Shalizi 
(2008) emphasize a chronological distinction between spending resources now for damages 
in the future (proactive ~ stock adaptation) and spending resources to cope with events at the 
time they occur (reactive ~ flow adaptation), the approach to delineating stock and flow 
adaptation taken here instead emphasizes the distinction over the longevity of the adaptive 
investment.  And in Lecocq and Shalizi (2008) the proactive adaptation does not lower any 
damages that occur now, while in the present model the stock adaptation can work over all 
periods of its lifetime.   
The primary difference between the approach taken here and that of Bosello et al. 
(2010) is one of model lineage, where the authors base AD-WITCH on the WITCH model 
while AD-DICE S/F is based on AD-DICE and ultimately DICE.  This difference is also 
reflected in the global approach of this chapter rather than the regional approach in Bosello et 
al. (2010).   
In Yohe et al. (2010) the engineering stock is specific to the damage sector of sea-
level rise, and the focus is more on the effect that insurance as a public policy has on both 
types of adaptation strategies.  The focus of the present effort is on the pathways of flow and 
stock adaptation over time, over different assumptions, and especially under conditions 
where limits to the capacity of flow adaptation exist.  Furthermore, unlike in Yohe et al. 
(2010), the adaptation stock of this model does not incorporate ongoing operations and 
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maintenance costs;  rather the costs associated with stock are ongoing adaptation stock 
investments that add to the volume of adaptation stock that provides adaptation services.   
3.3.2.  Calibration 
The new model was calibrated to the flow adaptation (protection) levels resulting 
from AD-DICE when mitigation is held at zero, using a two step procedure.  First, θ and φ, 
the two parameters of the adaptation stock production function of equation (3), were 
calibrated by minimizing the sum of squared differences between the AD-DICE results and 
stock adaptation.  The initial level of adaptation stock AS0 is set to 0.001 for model 
tractability.
10
  Second, assumed values of the total adaptation production function (Table 6) 
were used to calibrate it with both flow and stock adaptation by varying the scaling 
parameter and minimizing the sum of squared differences.  The total combination of flow 
and stock adaptation was constrained below the hypothetical 100% adaptation level in all 
model runs.  In this way the new stock and flow model has output results that are based on 
the flow adaptation results of AD-DICE but with two adaptation policy control variables 
available instead of one. 
Reference case runs were made with flow and stock adaptation forming equal relative 
input factor shares (δ = 0.5) of the adaptation production function ADPROD.11  Fig. 14-Fig. 
                                                 
10
 Bosello (2008) chooses an initial adaptation stock of zero.  Both a zero initial stock and the very low one of 
this chapter run counter to the argument in chapter two, that a large amount of capital stock already exists that 
actively provides adaptation services even if the vast majority of it was built without any planning for – let 
alone awareness of – climate change.  There it is argued that a more realistic way to think about adaptation 
spending choices for policymakers is among a portfolio of flow adaptation, new adaptation stock that is 
designed to encounter a range of future uncertain climates (and hence damage scenarios), and (possibly 
cheaper) retrofitting of pre-existing climate-exposed adaptation stock to extend its life in the face of increasing 
damages and thus delay eventual investments in completely new adaptation stock.  The AD-DICE S/F model 
here does not address the retrofitting option and instead focuses on the tradeoffs among flow and stock 
adaptation, and mitigation.     
11
 In section 3.4.2 the effects of changing input shares are explored.   
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17 show results from the three calibrated AD-DICE S/F model versions:  1) a flow only AD-
DICE equivalent, 2) the stock only version, and 3) the calibrated stock and flow AD-DICE 
S/F.  The first two versions use linear adaptation production functions for a single adaptation 
response, and are shown in order to compare with the CES production function version of 
flow and stock adaptation in the final model.  Calibration was performed over 40 ten-year 
time periods with results displayed for only the first 20, which helps to explain some of the 
discrepancies in results for these four figures. 
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 depict the optimal levels of the policy decisions with different 
model versions.  Fig. 14 shows the resulting optimal adaptation levels without mitigation 
(part A) and with mitigation (part B), and Fig. 15 shows optimal mitigation with optimal 
adaptation.  In both cases, the stock-only results follow the flow only path, but at a higher 
level throughout, while the joint flow and stock results fall roughly in between.  Because the 
results for stock adaptation are derived directly from those for flow adaptation, we know that 
everything else is equal between the two outcomes except for the fact that stock adaptation 
lasts for several periods while flow adaptation lasts for only one period.  Thus, ceteris 
paribus, and assuming certainty over future damages, stock adaptation has an advantage over 
flow adaptation for the simple reason that it lasts longer in lowering damages, and this 
advantage causes the optimization model to employ it in much higher levels than equivalent 
flow adaptation.  As the flow and stock combined model is an equal mix (in the reference 
case) of both strategies, then its results fall between the two stock and flow extremes.     
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Fig. 14.  Optimal levels of adaptation with no mitigation (part A) and optimal levels of adaptation 
with optimal mitigation (part B), over three model scenarios.   
 
M* is optimal mitigation, AF* is an optimal adaptation flow response, and ASPROD* is an optimal adaptation 
stock approach.  Three scenarios over two model versions are shown.  “Flow only” (dotted line) is 
unconstrained flow adaptation and zero stock, using a linear production function for adaptation, which is akin 
to AD-DICE and to which the other two results are compared.  “Stock only” (dashed line) is unconstrained 
stock adaptation and zero flow, also using a linear adaptation production function.  “Stock and flow” (solid 
line) is the calibrated result with both adaptation types, using the CES production function.   
In Fig. 15, a close correlation is seen among all three model results in early periods 
that diverge in later periods, which reflects the concomitant levels of adaptation.  Higher 
adaptation levels as in the stock only model version are paired with lower mitigation levels;  
if adaptation levels are lower as with the flow only model version then mitigation levels are 


















A.  Optimal adaptation levels with no 
mitigation.
flow only:  M=0, AF*, ASPROD=0 -- AD-DICE 
equivalent (linear)
stock only:  M=0, AF=0, ASPROD* (linear)


















B.  Optimal adaptation levels with optimal 
mitigation.
flow only:  M*, AF*, ASPROD=0 -- AD-DICE 
equivalent (linear)
stock only:  M*, AF=0, ASPROD* (linear)




Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 display cost calibration results.  In Fig. 16, part A is total 
adaptation costs without mitigation (the sum of flow adaptation spending and adaptation 
stock investments), and part B is total adaptation costs if optimal mitigation is implemented.  
In early periods there is little difference across the models, while in later periods the stock 
only model has lower costs.  Again, this is likely due to adaptation stock’s advantage of 
simply lasting longer, along with the lack of operations and maintenance costs that are not 
incorporated in this model.  As with the calibration results for policy levels, the calibrated 
stock and flow model (solid line) has adaptation costs that fall between the flow only and 


















flow only:  M*, AF*, ASPROD=0 -- AD-DICE equivalent (linear)
stock only:  M*, AF=0, ASPROD* (linear)
flow and stock:  M*, AF*, ASPROD* (CES)
Fig. 15.  Optimal mitigation 
levels with optimal 
adaptation over the model 




Fig. 16.  Adaptation costs over three model scenarios with no mitigation (Part A) and with optimal 
mitigation (Part B).   
 
Fig. 17 shows the total policy costs without and with optimal mitigation, where total 
policy costs are the sum of flow adaptation spending, adaptation stock investments, 
mitigation costs, and the residual (net) climate damages that remain after both mitigation and 
adaptation have been implemented.  In comparing Fig. 17 with Fig. 16, it is apparent that 
most of the departure in total costs from the flow only AD-DICE equivalent model is due to 
the discrepancy in adaptation costs.  It is also clear that the policy costs of responding to 
climate change (adaptation in both forms, and mitigation) remain small compared to the cost 













A.  Total adaptation costs 
without mitigation.
flow only:  M=0, AF*, ASPROD=0 -- AD-DICE 
equivalent (linear)
stock only:  M=0, AF=0, ASPROD* (linear)













B.  Total adaptation costs 
with mitigation.
flow only:  M*, AF*, ASPROD=0 -- AD-DICE 
equivalent (linear)
stock only:  M*, AF=0, ASPROD* (linear)
flow and stock:  M*, AF*, ASPROD* (CES)
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Fig. 17.  Total policy costs (flow adaptation spending + adaptation stock investments + mitigation 
costs + residual climate damages), with and without mitigation.   
 
The calibration results of Fig. 14, Fig. 16, and Fig. 17 show that the new stock and 
flow model is a close but not exact match with its flow adaptation predecessor.  The 
calibration is also consistent with earlier modeling work (de Bruin et al. 2009b; Felgenhauer 
and de Bruin 2009), showing that adaptation and mitigation are policy substitutes.  Both act 
to lower damages, and the addition of a second response to a one-strategy response allows for 
lower levels of the original response.   
3.4.  Results 
Here I present results for the AD-DICE S/F reference case as well as sensitivity 

















flow only:  M=0, AF*, ASPROD=0 -- AD-DICE equivalent (linear)
stock only:  M=0, AF=0, ASPROD* (linear)







interactions among the allocation of flow and stock adaptation as factor inputs in the 
adaptation production function, the elasticity of substitution between flow and stock 
adaptation, and uncertainty about when the limits of flow adaptation may be reached.  All 
results that follow come from the final model version with the CES adaptation production 
function where the reported values of flow and stock adaptation levels are those calculated as 
outputs of the total adaptation production function, rather than as inputs.
12
  With the 
exception of Fig. 20 all results are for the optimal case with simultaneously implemented 
mitigation and adaptation, and use the parameter values in Table 6 unless noted.   
3.4.1.  Reference Case Comparisons with Mitigation and the Optimal Case 
Reference case levels for flow- and stock-derived adaptation and mitigation are seen 
in Fig. 18.  Mitigation and adaptation are depicted on the same [0-1] scale even though they 
are not technically comparable in this way, as their respective scales measure different 
outcomes.  As the input factor shares of both adaptation types are arbitrarily chosen to be 
equal in the reference case, these results are that in name, as a reference with which to 
compare other permutations of the model.   
                                                 
12
 With the linear (additive) adaptation production function the adaptation flow and stock policy inputs are 
identical in their levels and relative proportions as the outputs, but with the CES adaptation production function 




The net benefits of a policy response to climate change are the value of the climate 
damages reduced from the policy, minus the costs of that policy.  Fig. 19 shows that the net 
benefits of total (flow + stock) adaptation are higher in early years while the net benefits of 
mitigation dominate in later years.  This is in line with what would be expected (and with the 
flow results of de Bruin et al. (2009b)), as the policy costs for both strategies are always 
incurred in the present while the benefits from adaptation are received in the near term and 



















Fig. 18.  Reference case 
optimal policy levels for 
mitigation and adaptation 
from both flow and stock 




The total policy costs of four policy scenarios over 20 model time periods (1995-
2185) are displayed in Fig. 20.  The policy argument for allocating resources to address 
climate change is visible, as total costs of the no climate policy/BAU scenario (1) are higher 
than those of a mitigation-only approach (2), an adaptation-only response (3), and the 
optimal response that uses both mitigation and adaptation together (4).  The optimal joint 
response has the lowest net damages and overall costs of the four policy scenarios.  An 
adaptation-only strategy (3) brings slightly lower total costs than does a mitigation-only 
strategy, as well as slightly lower net (post-policy) damages for the first 20 periods, as shown 
in Fig. 21.  The results of Fig. 20 parallel similar results in Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009), 
which finds the same ordering of policy scenarios in terms of costs.  As with the comparison 
of Fig. 16 and Fig. 17, the costs of all types of climate policies are completely overwhelmed 
















Fig. 19.  The net benefits of 
optimal policy levels in the 
reference case.  
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3.4.2.  Sensitivity Analysis 
Here I analyze the sensitivity of the model results to different assumptions about the 
depreciation rate of the adaptation stock, the climate sensitivity, the relative input factor 
shares of flow and stock adaptation within the adaptation production function, and the 
elasticity of substitution between flow and stock adaptation.  In the final part of this section I 
analyze the effect that a capacity limit on flow adaptation has on policy levels, under 
different assumptions of elasticity and input factor share allocation.   
3.4.2.1.  Depreciation rate of adaptation stock 
The advantage of stock adaptation is that it provides adaptation services over several 
time periods rather than just one.  Chosen optimal levels of adaptation coming from this 
stock were tested for their sensitivity to four different adaptation capital stock depreciation 
rates DAS, which would determine its effective longevity.  Fig. 22 shows how higher 

















Fig. 21.  Net climate damages 
under a mitigation-only 
strategy and an adaptation-





With higher depreciation, the stock’s lifetime is cut short, its effectiveness in adapting 
to damages over time is reduced, and its value as a climate response strategy relative to the 
other two strategies is diminished.
13
  Additionally, more investment is required in each 
period just to replace the stock that is lost.  As explored in chapter two and modeled in 
Dumas and Ha-Duong (2008), the stock lifetime can be expressed in terms of a level of 
efficiency in responding to damages that rises to the point when climate damages exactly 
match the design capacity of the adaptation stock, and then falls, all of which is tempered by 
depreciation.  Policymakers have the option to raise adaptation stock investment rates in the 
face of higher depreciation if that stock happens to be especially productive at reducing 
climate damages, or instead to raise adaptation flow levels or mitigation levels (or their level 
of suffered damages).  As depicted in Fig. 23, chosen levels of stock adaptation are more 
                                                 
13
 An additional run with the adaptation stock depreciation rate set to 100% produces results that are not notably 
different than those for the 50% depreciation rate.  The 100% depreciation rate does not convert the stock 
portion of the model’s adaptation into a flow, as the adaptation stock investment levels are always higher than 































DAS = 10% (reference)
DAS = 20%
DAS = 50%
Fig. 22.  Adaptation stock 
levels over four adaptation 




sensitive to changes in the depreciation rate of stock than are the levels of mitigation, while 
flow adaptation levels are virtually insensitive.   
Fig. 23.  Flow adaptation, stock adaptation, and mitigation levels over four adaptation stock 
depreciation rates.   
 
3.4.2.2.  Climate sensitivity 
Climate sensitivity (CS) is a measure of the global surface temperature increase that 
would result from a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations.  The uncertain parameter is 
based on the current best estimate of climate models with results projected into the future, as 
no present-day observational evidence exists, and the parameter is thus amenable to 
sensitivity analysis.  The model was run in the optimal case (with mitigation) over three mild, 
medium, and high values for CS, with results for the levels of flow and stock adaptation 

























levels of a higher CS require a stronger adaptive response.  Flow and stock adaptation move 
up roughly in tandem, while most of the policy change occurs with mitigation.  This parallels 
modeling results from Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009), which found mitigation to be more 
sensitive than adaptation to changes in CS.  Following on the work in chapter two, mitigation 
can be seen as the long-term policy response, stock adaptation as the medium-term response, 
and flow adaptation as the short-term.   
As CS is a very long-term parameter it makes sense that its effect on adaptation is to 
raise the total level only and cause no visible shift of preference toward one adaptation type 
or the other.  However, as seen in Fig. 25, the relative proportion of net benefits that come 
from stock adaptation falls, both over time and with the rising CS.  (As expected, the net 
benefits of both adaptation types rise with higher implementation and higher CS, where 
adaptation net benefits are equal to the amount of avoided climate damages from that 
adaptation minus the cost of that response.)  The reason for the change over time in the 
relative shares of flow and stock components seems to be an artifact of the initial conditions 
of the model and the arbitrarily chosen input factor share ratio for the two adaptation types.  
As with Fig. 24, if two additive policies start at different levels but rise together in tandem, 
then their relative share within the total adaptation product will change as well.  The reason 
for the falling share of stock adaptation with rising CS may be because a higher CS makes 
damages more imminent, thus lowering stock adaptation’s advantage in adapting over the 


















































CS = 4.5 (harsher climate)
Fig. 24.  Optimal levels of 
mitigation and flow and stock 
adaptation under three 
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flow



























































CS = 4.5 (harsher climate)
Fig. 25.  The net benefits (in 
the optimal case with 
mitigation) from stock and 
flow adaptation (left side 
axes), and the percentage of 
these net benefits coming 
from stock adaptation (right 
side axes), under three 
different climate sensitivities.    
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3.4.2.3.  Allocation of flow and stock adaptation as input factors in the adaptation production 
function 
Recall from equation (4) that δ is the relative distribution of flow adaptation as an 
input factor in the total adaptation production function ADPROD.  Climate change will create 
a set of damages over different damage sectors, damage types, and localities.  To the 
policymaker deciding on an adaptation funding allocation, δ is the proportion of those 
damages that are more amenable to a flow adaptation response rather than one from stock 
adaptation.  In this way, δ is not the policymaker’s chosen budget allocation but is rather 
determined exogenously by the nature of the damages as they relate to adaptation types.  It 
would seem to be largely outside of the policymaker’s control.  Uncertainty about δ will only 
be reduced by experiencing climate damages, adapting to them, and then learning which type 
of adaptation worked best in reducing those damages.  The reference modeling case to this 
point has been equal shares for both adaptation types, δ = 0.5.   
With this uncertainty about δ, sensitivity analysis was conducted to include additional 
distributions of the input factor shares, where δ = 0.2 (with an emphasis on stock adaptation) 
and δ = 0.8 (with an emphasis on flow adaptation).  The results are presented in Fig. 26.  The 
model allocates adaptation (and mitigation) resources in an optimal distribution of where 
they would be used most effectively.  Parts A and B show roughly symmetric and opposite 
allocations across flow and stock adaptation, depending on the relative factor share.  Total 
adaptation (part C) is highest when the type of damages are most amenable to a stock 
adaptation approach, and thus stock adaptation is emphasized.  When flow adaptation 
responses dominate, the total adaptation levels are lower but rise in later periods to approach 
the total adaptation levels when the shares of input factors are equal (δ = 0.5).  Mitigation 
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results (part D) are opposite to those of part C, where higher chosen adaptation requires less 
mitigation, and vice versa.    
Fig. 26.  Levels of four policies under three different relative factor shares for flow adaptation δ , 























































δ = 0.2 (stock emphasis)
δ = 0.5 (equal weighting)
δ = 0.8 (flow emphasis)
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3.4.2.4.  Elasticity of substitution between the adaptation types 
In practice, many climate damages will not exhibit characteristics that point to the 
exclusive use of a stock or flow adaptation response to diminish their effects.  Instead some 
interchangeability could be expected to exist where either a flow or a stock response can 
reduce damages.  The elasticity of substitution σ (where σ = 1/1+ρ, as derived from 
equation (4)) measures how easy it is to substitute one input for the other while keeping the 
output constant.  In this case the two inputs are flow and stock adaptation and the output is 
the total level of adaptation services.   
Fig. 27 shows climate policy levels over three input factor shares and two elasticities 
of substitution – the reference case σ  = 0.9 and the higher σ = 1.2.  Mitigation is held to its 
reference results to allow for a comparison of adaptation outcomes under the reference and 
higher elasticities.  If stock adaptation is emphasized as an input as in part A, then under a  
higher elasticity stock adaptation levels are raised and flow adaptation levels are lowered.  
The same is true if both adaptation types are allocated equally as in part B, where the higher 
elasticity of lowers chosen flow adaptation while raising the chosen level of stock adaptation.  
In the case of a flow adaptation emphasis (part C), the effect of a higher elasticity of 
substitution between adaptation types is barely visible and in fact starts by slightly lowering 
flow adaptation and raising stock adaptation before reversing the effect for both strategies 






Fig. 27.  Adaptation flow and stock levels over two elasticities of substitution between the 
adaptation types (σ  = 0.9 and σ = 1.2) and three adaptation factor share allocations (δ = 0.2, 0.5, 
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The point here is that, keeping the role of mitigation fixed, different elasticities of 
substitution between adaptation types will affect their chosen optimal levels, as tempered by 
the type of damages that are being faced.  Parts A and B of Fig. 27 show that increasing the 
substitutability between the two adaptation strategies reinforces the tendency dictated by the 
initial factor share allocation within the adaptation production function.   
3.4.2.5.  Capacity limits of flow adaptation 
Reflecting the characterization of adaptation developed in chapter two, adaptation 
responses have maximum capacity limits that depend on the technology that is applied and 
the damage sector.  In this section I explore the effect that a binding and relatively low limit 
on flow adaptation can have on both mitigation and stock adaptation levels.  This adaptive 
capacity limit, denoted by the parameter FAVDAMLIM, could be reached when one of the 
flow adaptations discussed earlier in section 3.1 does not fail catastrophically but rather fails 
to alleviate any more additional damages than it already does.  Because it is expressed as an 
absolute level of damages rather than as a rate or percentage of adaptive capacity, the limit 
marks the technological rather than economic upper bound of the flow adaptation.  This also 
means that the threshold may be reached at different points in time along the sequence of 
policy decision periods, depending on all factors in the model that affect overall damages.   
Overall policy flexibility is reduced when one of the previously available response 
strategies is constrained.  When faced with this limit, the optimizing policymaker of the 
model can reallocate policy resources among the remaining stock adaptation or mitigation 
options, or alternatively tolerate higher levels of suffered net damages.  The results of these 
explicit and implicit policy tradeoffs are presented with δ = 0.2 in Fig. 28 and with δ = 0.8 
in Fig. 29.   
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Fig. 28.  Adaptation, mitigation, and damage levels, as sensitive to two elasticities of substitution 
















flow, no adaptation limits
flow, FAVDAMLIM = 0.025
stock, no adaptation limits






































1995 2045 2095 2145
time
δ = 0.2 (stock emphasis) 
111 
 
Fig. 29.  Adaptation, mitigation, and damage levels, as sensitive to two elasticities of substitution 

















flow, no adaptation flow limits
flow, FAVDAMLIM = 0.025
stock, no adaptation flow limits







































1995 2045 2095 2145
time
δ = 0.8 (flow emphasis) 
112 
 
The key point apparent from both figures is that with the relatively lower elasticity of 
substitution, a capacity limit on the flow adaptation strategy causes the optimizing 
policymaker to compensate with both higher mitigation and higher suffered damages.  
Adaptation that is derived from investments in adaptation stock does not adjust to pick up the 
slack created by the deficient flow adaptation, and instead it falls.  With a higher elasticity (σ 
= 1.2) between the two adaptation types it is easier to exchange one response for the other.  
Stock adaptation now adjusts positively to take up much of the slack left by the limited flow 
adaptation.  This behavior pattern for adaptation levels is the same in both Fig. 28, with the 
emphasis on stock adaptation, and Fig. 29, with the emphasis on flow adaptation.  The lesson 
is that more flexibility in one aspect of adaptation (a higher elasticity of substitution) can 
help to compensate for lowered flexibility in another area of adaptation (limited flow 
adaptation).   
This tendency in policy adjustment is not the same for mitigation and damage levels.  
With an emphasis on stock adaptation in the total adaptation production function (δ = 0.2, 
Fig. 28), mitigation barely moves higher when the flow adaptation limit is reached and the 
elasticity happens to be high.  There is also much less upward movement in net climate 
damages, though the slight rise is understandable because of the reduction in policy 
flexibility.  Such movement in mitigation and damage levels seems to reflect the fact that 
adaptation has been able to rise in response to the flow limit, rather than fall. 
The story is different if the emphasis in the total adaptation production function is 
instead on flow adaptation (δ = 0.8, Fig. 29).  In this case, with a lower elasticity between 
adaptation types, a limit on flow adaptation causes mitigation levels to bump up against their 
theoretical limit of 100% mitigation (M = 1.0), and damages rise significantly as well.  This 
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is due to the result that stock adaptation is falling along with the falling flow adaptation that 
was limited.  However, if the elasticity is higher then adaptation stock is able to adjust and 
rise to compensate some of the flow adaptation deficit.  With δ = 0.8, the type of damages 
that the policymaker faces are predominantly those that are best reduced by flow adaptation.  
If that dominant flow adaptation strategy is strictly limited then all other approaches will 
have to compensate strongly, which they do (stock adaptation, mitigation, and remaining 
suffered damages).  In other words, as would be expected, the limit on flow adaptation is a 
more serious problem when flow adaptation responses dominate, than when they do not.     
The characteristics of the climate damages to be faced is determined by nature, and 
the input share of flow adaptation in the adaptation production function is not receptive to 
policy influence.  The elasticity of substitution will also be constrained by engineering or 
other technological limits to adaptation investment interchangeability.  The results of Fig. 28 
and Fig. 29 suggest however that if adaptation technologies could be developed that are more 
interchangeable and responsive to a larger set of damage types, then such technologies could 
substitute for other technologies when they inevitably fail.   
3.5.  Extensions to Uncertainty 
Based as it is on DICE, this model with stock and flow adaptation depicts a first-best 
world of complete certainty in which there is no possibility of over- or under-allocation to 
any policy option, be it explicit mitigation or adaptation spending or the implicit policy 
choice of doing less and instead suffering higher climate damages.  In all cases of limits on 
adaptation flow capacity depicted in Fig. 28 and Fig. 29, the policymaker knows the exact 
level of the damage threshold, and exactly when the upper capacity bound will be hit by the 
adaptation technology employed.  As shown, optimized levels of flow adaptation continue 
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upward even though the technology’s upper capacity limit will be reached, and stock 
adaptation responds at that time in a direction that depends on the elasticity of substitution.  
The optimized mitigation pathways, however, respond in advance to the impending 
adaptation constraint.  Uncertainty over the upper capacity bound of flow adaptation 
(expressed by the parameter FAVDAMLIM above) would change these policy pathways.   
As argued in chapter two, different uncertainties are relevant to mitigation and 
adaptation, which are clarified at different rates, with different levels of resolution, and via 
different mechanisms of resolution.  Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009), using a revised 
version of AD-DICE to model mitigation and adaptation levels with respect to uncertainty 
over climate sensitivity, found what is seen in Fig. 24 above, that CS is a parameter with 
long-run effects and is thus more influential on mitigation than to adaptation.  The 
uncertainty that matters with respect to adaptation is the net benefits of the policy, and less 
applicable are the medium term uncertainties like mitigation costs or longer term 
uncertainties as CS.  The research here suggests that an additional uncertainty is relevant, 
namely, at what damage level will particular adaptation limits be breached?  Dependent on 
this is the additional uncertainty of when that capacity limit will be reached.   
Uncertainty over adaptation limits can be explored further within a decision-making 
under uncertainty framework.
14
  In such a Bayesian analysis approach, prior information is 
updated and revised with new data and subsequent decisions are based on the new 
assumptions (Winkler 2003).  Because the policy question is one of sequential decision 
making under uncertainty we only need to decide what to do today, while future decisions 
                                                 
14
 This paragraph draws from Felgenhauer and de Bruin (2009). 
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can be revised as we learn more (Webster et al. 2007).
15
  To carry this out at an exploratory 
level and analyze the effect of an uncertain limit on flow adaptation capacity, a two-period 
decision tree is laid out in Fig. 30 (as with Fig. 11 in chapter two).  Three policy choices are 
available over spending on flow adaptation, stock adaptation (as an adaptation stock 
investment), or mitigation.  The policymaker is aware that flow adaptation capacity is finite 
but is unaware at what level the capacity ends, and investment decisions are made based on 
an expectation of the flow limit.  After this allocation is made across the three options, the 
policymaker learns more about whether the adaptation flow limit is higher or lower than was 
previously expected.  Based on the new information, the second investment is made and the 
net benefits of the policy portfolio allocation can be calculated.
16
 
Table 5 and the discussion of it with Fig. 12 in chapter two demonstrate that climate 
policy choices under uncertainty are set to match the expectation of their need, with the risk 
that policy is either too weak or too strong set at tolerable levels within the policymaker’s 
level of risk aversion.  The same is true here in Fig. 30, where the uncertainty is over the 
maximum level of flow adaptation capacity, rather than with uncertainty over net adaptation 
benefits, mitigation costs, or climate sensitivity.    
 
                                                 
15
 Climate policy has been modeled as a sequential decision under uncertainty before (eg., Hammitt et al. 1992; 
Webster 2002; Yohe et al. 2004; Webster et al. 2008; Felgenhauer and de Bruin 2009).   
16
 If the adaptation flow limit is hit during the first investment period, learning has still occurred, but not from a 
conscious investigation of adaptation technologies or research into better estimates of damage and adaptive 
capacity trajectories.  Rather, the learning has occurred by first-hand observation of the flow adaptation that has 
started to fail (stopped providing additional adaptive services).  Knowledge is imparted because the uncertainty 
has been eliminated.  But this new knowledge does not provide an opportunity to act in advance of a the 
impending adaptation flow limit because the limit has already been reached. 
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Fig. 30.  Three policy responses to climate change as a portfolio decision under uncertainty over two 
policy investment periods.    
 
For simplicity, the tree is truncated after the second investment decision is made.  Morgan and Henrion 
(1990b) lay out the methods for setting up a decision tree.   
Fig. 31 continues with the focus on flow adaptation with limits.
17
  It shows 
schematically how uncertainty over the level of maximum flow capacity affects the 
                                                 
17
 A separate examination of the effect of a stock adaptation capacity limit (and breach) could also be 
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uncertainty over when this limit will be reached.  Under certainty in part A, three 
representative flow adaptation implementation pathways are shown:  rapid (#1), medium 
(#2), and slow (#3).  As argued in Fig. 11 from chapter two, the rate of flow adaptation 
implementation will depend primarily on the rate or severity of climate damages, which 
determine the net adaptation benefits of all adaptation types.  Flow adaptation then responds 
up to its capacity limits, along with stock adaptation and mitigation.
18
  If both the flow 
adaptation pathway and its limit are known, then the timing of when this limit is hit is known 
as well, at the certain points C1-3.   
As used here, the limit on flow adaptation capacity is an engineering or technological 
question, determined by a particular usage level of the adaptation in combination with 
damages.  In part B of Fig. 31, with uncertainty over this limit, each of the three original flow 
adaptation implementation pathways will have uncertain timeframes during which the 
adaptation will begin failing to adapt to any further damages.  The figure shows a one-way 
causal relation between the flow limit level and when that limit is breached (i.e., if the flow 
limit is known, then there is no uncertainty about when it will be hit, as the flow adaptation 
level is a conscious, and certain, policy decision).   
 
                                                 
18
 Other exogenous non-climate policy influences, such as population and economic growth, are assumed to be 
held constant.   
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Fig. 31.  The joint effect of a capacity limit of flow adaptation and the slope of the flow adaptation 
implementation pathway on when the capacity limit is reached, under certainty and uncertainty.     
 
The approach is similar to one that looks at the effect on mitigation pathways with a 
small but positive probability of future catastrophic climate damages (Keller et al. 2004).  On 
the one hand, failures of adaptation in particular damage sectors will not be as damaging as 
the catastrophic damages that result from a rapid melting of the Greenland ice sheet or a 
slowdown and/or stoppage of the Atlantic Ocean thermohaline circulation (Oppenheimer 
2005).  Adaptation’s scope is not so large, and if one adaptation technology fails other types 
of adaptive responses can be employed, whether they be other types of flow adaptation, stock 
B.  Uncertainty 

























































adaptation, or behavioral changes.  In this sense it can be argued that failures of adaptation 
are less serious than catastrophic failures of mitigation.  On the other hand, while the 
probability of climatic catastrophe in the near term is positive but small, the probability that 
particular adaptation approaches will hit their capacity limits is also positive and yet not 
small.  These limits will likely be witnessed before any catastrophic climate effects occur.   
The analysis here suggests that further research into both the technological capacity 
limits of adaptation, as well as how these uncertain adaptation thresholds interact with levels 
of alternative adaptations, mitigations, and suffered damages, could have immediate policy 
implications.  Unaware that flow adaptation limits loom over the horizon, the policymaker 
would mistakenly implement less mitigation now (as mitigation and adaptation are 
substitutable) along with a suboptimal mix of flow and stock adaptation that does not 
accurately reflect their discounted net benefits over a timeframe with one of the strategies not 
working anymore.  If instead the policymaker knows that a flow adaptation limit exists (but 
not its level), then mitigation levels can be hedged upward to compensate for lower expected 
adaptation capabilities.  Notably, simply knowing that a flow adaptation limit exists would 
not necessarily push the adaptation balance toward stock adaptation at the expense of flow 
adaptation.  Rather, the policymaker can now guide the flow adaptation pathway to a point 
such that it fails within a desired (uncertain) timeframe, as with part B of Fig. 31.  This could 
mean either a fast or a slow implementation path, depending on the net benefits that are 
accrued from both types of adaptation.  In this way, ―extending the life‖ of a flow adaptation 
strategy is not truly extending its life but delaying its death by slowing down its 
implementation.   
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3.6.  Conclusions 
This chapter presents results from a new DICE-based integrated assessment model 
that characterizes adaptation to climate change as either short-lived flow spending or long-
lived adaptation stock investments, and models these options along with mitigation.  This 
modeling work is based on the general argument that policymakers would be aided by 
thinking about adaptation in terms of flow and stock investments.  In practice this means 
consciously discriminating between those approaches that will have long-running effects and 
those that are temporary and will need to be repeated often.  Three conclusions can be drawn 
from this research.   
First, ceteris paribus, and under complete certainty, stock adaptation has a distinct 
advantage over flow adaptation for the simple reason that it lasts longer in lowering damages, 
and this advantage causes the optimization model to employ it in much higher levels than 
equivalent flow adaptation.  As the flow and stock combined model is an equal mix (in the 
reference case) of both strategies, then its results fall between the two stock and flow 
extremes.     
Second, in the near term (i.e., no mitigation), policymakers can do little to change the 
character of climate damages that they will face, and the portion that will be more amenable 
to a flow adaptation approach rather than a stock adaptation approach.  Interchangeability 
between the two adaptation types (the elasticity of substitution) may be more receptive to 
human influence.  Most notably if this elasticity of substitution is higher it allows policies to 
compensate for each other more easily in the presence of a fixed limit on flow adaptation 
capacity.   
Third, a concluding exploration of the implications of uncertainty over such a flow 
adaptation limit finds that further research into both the technological capacity limits of 
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adaptation, as well as how these uncertain adaptation thresholds interact with levels of 
alternative adaptations, mitigations, and suffered damages, could have immediate policy 






















CHAPTER 4.  INTERNATIONAL ADAPTATION FINANCING AS PART OF A 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME:  TRADEOFFS IN PARTICIPATION AND 
COMPLIANCE TO ACHIEVE MITIGATION GOALS 
The conflict is following the familiar lines that led to the crackup in Copenhagen.  
Wealthy countries are insisting on deep and verifiable cuts in emissions from major 
developing countries like China and India, while the poorer nations are asking the 
rich countries to do more to reduce their own pollution and come up with more 
money to help the rest of the world adapt to the changes wrought by a century of 
unchecked carbon gases from the industrialized world. 
   – The New York Times, Oct. 8, 2010 (Broder and Rosenthal 2010). 
4.1.  Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was the first version of an evolving international treaty that attempts to 
slow and reverse the growth of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and eventually achieve 
stabilized atmospheric concentrations.  Global CO2 emissions from fuel consumption 
continue to grow (IEA 2009), and with Kyoto set to expire in 2012 the fifteenth meeting of 
the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 15) in Copenhagen produced no viable 
replacement treaty, and the COP 16 scheduled for Cancún faces similar hurdles.  As one 
point along an iterative process, the positive legacy of Kyoto could be as a stepping stone to 
an improved and ultimately binding international climate change regime.   
Kyoto is essentially a mitigation
1
 regime with adaptation playing a minor role, as it is 
based on the UNFCCC and its ultimate objective of ―stabilization of greenhouse gas 
                                                 
1
 The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines 
mitigation as ―technological change and substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions per unit of 
output…  implementing policies to reduce GHG emissions and enhance sinks (IPCC and Verbruggen 2007).  
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concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system‖ (UNFCCC 1992).  In the years since Kyoto was drafted 
in 1997, the approach to climate change policy has developed within a risk management 
framework and expanded to include adaptation as a major additional and complementary 
response option (Yohe and Strzepek 2007).   
The IPCC AR4 defines adaptation broadly as any ―adjustment in natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates 
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities‖ (IPCC 2007a).  Including such adaptation in the 
portfolio of responses within an international climate change regime is justified for several 
reasons.  First, in economic modeling exercises the inclusion of adaptation in addition to 
mitigation has been shown to be globally optimal, in both the single-actor case (de Bruin et 
al. 2009b) and multi-actor cases (Hof et al. 2009), and such results suggest that mitigation 
and adaptation should be negotiated jointly at the international level (Lecocq and Shalizi 
2008).  Conceptually, mitigation and adaptation are complementary strategies to manage the 
risk of climate change, both with different costs, uncertainties, timeframes, policy tradeoffs, 
and effects on overall risk (chapter two;  Yohe and Strzepek 2007).  Second, adaptation has a 
close and complementary relationship with economic development (McGray et al. 2007).  
The promotion of adaptation to climate change thus promotes the sustainable development 
agenda to the extent that the two general policies are related.  Third, adaptation aid financing 
paid from industrialized nations to the poorest of the developing world fits neatly within the 
polluter-pays ethical framework, under which those responsible for environmental damages 
caused by cumulative (historical) GHG emissions compensate the victims of that pollution.  
Finally, adaptation aid that meets the four UNFCCC requirements that were stipulated at the 
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December 2007 COP 13 in Bali – predictability, additionality to official development 
assistance (ODA), adequacy for expected needs, and equity according to the polluter pays 
principle (UNFCCC 2007c) – is demanded by climate-vulnerable developing nations as part 
of any future viable international climate change agreement.  Thus the full development of 
adaptation financing at the international level has the potential to bring many benefits, both 
peripheral to climate change as well as closely linked to the achievement of international 
climate change goals.   
An increasing role for adaptation has attracted strong support from governments and 
NGO advocates.  Indeed what can be called an ―adaptation agenda‖ has grown steadily in 
prominence since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, as pejorative views of adaptation 
have given way to a realization that it will be needed.  Recent efforts to promote a more 
robust role for adaptation have been underway with the Nairobi Program (UNFCCC 2008b) 
and more importantly with the Bali Action Plan from the COP 13 (UNFCCC 2007c) with its 
restatement of developed country obligations on adaptation.
2
 
Prior to the COP 15 in Copenhagen it was clear that what had been pledged to that 
point, in addition to what would otherwise be expected under current adaptation financing 
arrangements, would fall short of expected needs in the most vulnerable countries.  
Correcting this perceived adaptation financing shortfall became a strong demand by 
developing nations during the negotiations.  The COP 15 ended with the Copenhagen 
Accord, in which developed countries pledged to mobilize $30 billion over 2010-2012 and 
$100 billion per year by 2020 to fund climate change needs in developing countries ―with 
                                                 
2
 The Bali Action Plan put forth adaptation as one of the five key pillars of international climate policy going 
forward, along with mitigation, technology transfers, financing, and a consensus long-term climate policy goal.   
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balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.‖  Funds are to come from a wide 
variety of sources, with a ―significant portion‖ to flow through the new primary financing 
mechanism for the UNFCCC, the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC 2009a).  But 
the Copenhagen Accord is not an official COP decision – the full membership did not vote 
on the document and instead merely took note of its existence – and thus it is not legally 
binding (Schalatek et al. 2010).  Nor have the structure and operational details of the fund 
and its adaptation financing flows yet been determined.  The state of international climate 
adaptation financing remains uncertain.  Indeed, the international financing of adaptation, 
―… is complex, and one of the most controversial topics of discussion in the ongoing climate 
negotiations‖ (Dellink et al. forthcoming).  Little reason for optimism exists on achieving a 
comprehensive post-2012 agreement at the next climate summit in December, 2010 in 
Cancún (Harmeling et al. 2010).   
As national representatives continue negotiations on a possible successor treaty two 
key hurdles must be overcome in order to create an environmentally effective global climate 
change regime.  Successful international environmental agreements have both the level of 
participation and compliance by a significant majority of relevant national parties that is 
necessary to reach environmentally meaningful targets (Barrett 2008).  Under these criteria 
the Kyoto Protocol has not been environmentally effective.  As the COP 15 approached, a 
number of broad proposals for a post-Kyoto international climate architecture were floated 
(Victor 1999; Wiener 2002; Aldy et al. 2003; Barrett 2003a; Torvanger et al. 2005; BASIC 
2006; Aldy and Stavins 2007; 2008).  Most of these, however, either do not mention 
adaptation or instead place it in a minor role relative to mitigation.  Several proposals were 
put forth on how adaptation could be more formally institutionalized at the international level 
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(Levina 2007; Bapna and McGray 2008; Brown and Vigneri 2008; Goulven 2008; Haites 
2008; Müller 2008; Porter et al. 2008; UNFCCC 2008a; Climate Funds Update 2009; GLCA 
2009).  Many of these adaptation financing ideas have been evaluated on various normative 
criteria (Harmeling et al. 2009; Spratt 2009).  However, to my knowledge no studies have 
specifically addressed the effect that the policy design of these proposals will have on the 
likelihood that an international climate change regime focused primarily on mitigation can be 
successful.   
The general research motivation of this chapter is that international adaptation 
financing (IAF) could have a positive influence on creating a viable international climate 
regime, yet this role has been largely unexamined.  The key question addressed here is the 
extent to which the design of the policy mechanism for IAF as part of a global climate 
change regime affects the success of that agreement, namely, its environmental effectiveness.  
With adaptation playing an increasingly prominent role in the evolving international climate 
policy regime, the general structure for how this new attention to adaptation will be 
incorporated into a post-Kyoto successor treaty is still unknown.  I analyze the ceteris paribus 
effects that the design of IAF practices and institutions could have on the effectiveness of an 
international climate change agreement that achieves its environmental goals.  At the 
international level the effect is felt to the extent that the IAF policy design either promotes or 
discourages both:  1) participation and 2) compliance by nation-states in the new agreement.  
Under each of these two necessary prerequisites to an environmentally effective agreement, I 
develop two criteria to analyze IAF proposals, and ask the following four questions about the 
policy and institutional design of the proposed adaptation financing mechanism: 
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Participation Incentives.  Based on national-level motivations in climate 
negotiations, I analyze if the IAF mechanism would tend to promote or inhibit the likelihood 
that the following types of countries would join an agreement: 
 Criterion P1 – the world’s richest and most industrialized states, the ones likely to 
bear the primary burden of both adaptation financing as well as mitigation in the near 
term, and  
 Criterion P2 – a bloc of two other groups of states:  a) the rapidly growing and large 
developing nations that are also large emitters of GHGs, as well as b) the world’s 
poorest and most climate vulnerable states (IAF recipients).  The former nations do 
not expect to receive much adaptation aid but are also not willing to undertake 
mitigation sacrifices on their own.   
Compliance.  Once a state chooses to participate in a binding international climate 
change treaty, I look at how the IAF mechanism would help or hinder the efforts of the 
participant to comply with its mitigation commitments, specifically in the areas of:  
 Criterion C1 – resource competition:  Does the IAF mechanism place adaptation in a 
zero-sum competition with mitigation for financial resources, or is there little or no 
resource competition effect?  
 Criterion C2 – policy interactions:  As the IAF policy is implemented, would its 
institutional design cause negative distortions that discourage mitigation investments, 
positive feedbacks that instead tend to promote mitigation, or neither interaction? 
This chapter investigates international financial transfers from the world’s richest 
countries to its poorest, for the purposes of adaptation to climate change.  Specifically the 
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focus is on the manner in which funds are raised and disbursed for adaptation, which will 
determine whether or not there is an interaction with mitigation.  Excluded in the analysis is 
bilateral adaptation aid that is within or in addition to existing ODA programs.  (A selection 
of these programs is listed in Table 11 in the Appendix).  Bilateral aid is assumed to be 
temporary, under the full control of the donor nations, and not falling under the umbrella of 
an international climate change regime.  Such bilateral aid is welcomed by recipient nations 
but it remains for them an unacceptable substitute for stronger, more permanent IAF under an 
international climate change regime.  In these cases the supply of resources available for 
climate change is limited by the political willingness of developed nations to contribute aid, 
and financial resources for adaptation and mitigation could compete in a zero sum game in 
which adaptation aid takes resources away from viable mitigation projects.
3
  Also excluded 
in the analysis are domestic adaptation resource flows within developing countries and 
―South-South‖ international flows (both of which are discussed in Bapna and McGray 
(2008)), as well as private charity donations.   
Other factors will of course exert a strong influence on the likelihood that a nation 
with particular attributes will both participate in and comply with an international climate 
change treaty.  For example, compliance will be affected by policy choices such as the 
stringency of the mitigation requirement and the timing of the deadline by which to comply, 
as well as more exogenous, longer term trends in technological improvement and the rates of 
                                                 
3
 This is not to say that in the absence of such a binding treaty that bilateral adaptation aid could not rise 
significantly and become the primary source of outside assistance to group three nations.  In fact it could be 
argued that the existence of bilateral aid is negatively associated with the likelihood that a new and binding 
climate change regime will emerge.  Countries that devote adaptation money in their own aid programs and to 
their own preferred recipients could be less likely to either donate more money to an international effort or to 
lose donor control over their current aid by ceding it to the new international regime.  Simply put, donor nations 
prefer to retain control over where their aid money goes.   
129 
 
economic and population growth.  For participation, the mitigation requirement and the size 
of the IAF transfers will have dominant policy roles.  Desires for both national prestige and 
national sovereignty will also present often conflicting influences on national-level 
motivations to participate.  The method of adaptation aid funding disbursement has the 
potential to affect both participation and compliance with an international climate change 
treaty.   
With these effects acknowledged, the institutional and mechanism design of IAF will 
play a strong role that has yet to be explored.  Using the four analysis criteria listed above, I 
look at how several broad types of IAF proposals affect the success of an environmentally 
effective post-Kyoto climate agreement.  Section 2 reviews current thinking on adaptation 
costs and international adaptation financing, and in Section 3 the criteria for policy analysis 
are developed.  I review 22 proposals for international adaptation financing in Section 4, and 
in Section 5 I evaluate these proposals over the four developed criteria and discuss some 
policy recommendations, while Section 6 concludes.   
4.2.  International Adaptation Financing (IAF) 
Climate change has costly impacts.  Some of this can be alleviated by adaptation, 
which in turn has a policy cost.
4
  As parties to the UNFCCC, developed nations are bound 
under international law to provide adaptation assistance to developing nations under Articles 
4.4, 4.8, and 4.9 (UNFCCC 1998).
5
  These requirements are not specific, however, and the 
                                                 
4
 The relationships among adaptation, damages, and climate policy cost are discussed further in chapter two.   
5
 UNFCCC Art. 4.4:  ―The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall 
also assist the developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.‖   
Art. 4.8 (summarized):  Developed nations shall consider funding, insurance, and technology transfers 
to meet the needs of developing country Parties, especially:  1) small island states;  2) states with low-lying 
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UNFCCC itself does not explicitly define adaptation.  Anticipated future global adaptation 
costs are difficult to pin down (Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008), and thus estimates for 
adaptation in the developing world fall over a wide range, as shown in Table 7.   
Table 7.  Estimates of total annual adaptation costs in developing countries.   
Applicable Year Adaptation Costs (billion USD) Source 
2007 9-41 World Bank (2006) 
2007 4-37 Stern Review (2006b) 
2007 >50 Oxfam International (2007) 
2015 86-109 UNDP (2007) 
2030 
27-66, where coastal zones = 4, human health = 5, water 
= 9, agriculture = 7, and infrastructure = 2-41 
UNFCCC (2007b) 
General sources:  Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) and Parry et al. (2009). 
According to one estimate, the adaptation funds that were raised or promised before 
the COP 15 would cover only 1% of total projected costs (Brown and Vigneri 2008).  A 
reassessment of UNFCCC adaptation cost estimates for 2030 finds them likely to be 
substantially under-estimated (UNFCCC 2007b; Parry et al. 2009).
6
  The challenge is that in 
stating adaptation is ―needed‖ in the developing world there is no common definition of what 
exactly these needs are, as they are normatively determined.  Furthermore, even if some 
nominal baseline for needs could be set the cost estimates over several damage sectors and 
temperature and socioeconomic scenarios still present large uncertainties.   
                                                                                                                                                       
coasts, forests prone to decay, areas prone to natural disaster, areas liable to drought and desertification, high 
urban air pollution, and fragile ecosystems;  3) ―countries whose economies are highly dependent on income 
generated from the production, processing, and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated 
energy-intensive products‖;  and 4) landlocked and transit countries.   
Art. 4.9:  ―The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least 
developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology‖ (UNFCCC 1992).   
Assigning binding legal responsibility for climate change damages remains a discussion of legal theory 
development that has not crossed over into the political arena (Verheyen 2002).   
6 
Three problems were noted with the UNFCCC adaptation cost study:  1) sectors such as ecosystems, energy, 
manufacturing, retailing, and tourism were not included, 2) some of the sectors included were only partially 
addressed, and 3) the method of adding on a ―climate markup‖ to business as usual (BAU) investment pathways 
in a world without climate change is (as argued) not the proper way to calculate adaptation costs when current 
levels of economic development already suffer from an ―adaptation deficit‖ (Burton 2004), i.e., they are sub-
optimal (Parry et al. 2009).   
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Current IAF is institutionalized within two mechanisms under the UNFCCC.  First, 
the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (KPAF), which raises revenues from a 2% levy on 
credits generated by projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), supports 
―concrete adaptation projects and programmes‖ within developing country parties (Huq 
2002; Mitchell et al. 2006).  Second, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) manages three 
funds that are replenished by voluntary contributions from states:  1) the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF), which addresses climate change adaptation;  technology transfers;  
energy, transport, industry, forestry, and waste management;  and economic diversification;  
2) the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), to pay the world’s least developed nations 
to prepare National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) that quantify national 
climate vulnerability (Mace 2006);  and 3) a new Strategic Priority on Adaptation under the 
GEF Trust Fund.  Outside of the UNFCCC, the World Bank has opened a portfolio of 
Climate Investment Funds, also funded by voluntary contributions, with the Pilot Program 
for Climate Resilience (PPCR) devoted exclusively to adaptation, though it has a sunset 
clause in 2012 (Harmeling et al. 2010).  Fig. 32 presents these adaptation financing sources 




Fig. 32.  Current international and bilateral adaptation financing sources and flows.   
 
Other international organizations include UNEP, UNDP, FAO, WHO, WMO, ADB, IUCN, and OECD, as well as 
international NGOs.  Not depicted are other climate-related funds that are geared toward mitigation via 
technology development, energy efficiency promotion, or deforestation abatement efforts (also known as 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Land Degradation (REDD)).  This group includes the Clean 
Technology Fund, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program, and Scaling-Up Renewable 
Energy Program for Low Income Countries (World Bank);  the International Forest Carbon Initiative (Australia);  
and the UN-REDD Programme (UNDP).  Sources:  Climate Funds Update (2009), Huq (2002), UNFCCC (2003), 
GEF (2005), Mace (2006), Haites (2008), Klein and Persson (2008), Newell (2008), World Bank (2008b; 2008a), 
and UNFCCC (2009a).   
4.3.  Policy Evaluation Criteria 
Nations must be motivated to participate in a treaty, and once participating to comply 
with costly environmental restrictions.  In this section, four criteria are developed on which 
to compare current proposals for international adaptation financing as they relate to both 
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4.3.1.  Participation Incentives 
Mitigation is a public good with globalized benefits and nationalized costs.  Thus, no 
meaningful mitigation will occur without a credible international climate treaty that can 
produce the necessary level of participation.  Karp and Zhao (2008) note that the details of 
the policy and institutional design of a treaty are irrelevant if nations do not both sign and 
comply with the agreement.  In numerical modeling experiments of a Kyoto-like global 
climate agreement with both participating and non-participating states, Nordhaus (2009) 
finds a high cost penalty for low participation rates.  And Burton et al. (2006) find that 
―substantial new mitigation commitments post-2012 may be politically feasible only if 
accompanied by stronger support for adaptation.‖  In all of these cases, however, the details 
of the IAF policy will influence whether or not a nation joins the treaty in the first place.  As 
I argue below, the way to analyze participation incentives is to focus on national-level 
attributes that are relevant to an international climate change treaty 
4.3.1.1.  Three Country Types 
Under an international environmental regime such as the Kyoto Protocol, climate 
change policy decisions are framed at the national level, and thus can be modeled in this way 
as well (Kane and Shogren 2000; Settle et al. 2007).  Though states are not ―calculating 
machines‖ (Kagan 2008), they will still have a national interest as it pertains to climate 
change – a preferred allocation of resources among mitigation, adaptation, or other policies at 
the international level, that is based on their expectations of the effects of climate change on 
their nation.  The international allocation of benefits translates into an allocation of benefits 
for each individual state.  It is not necessary to know the pathway via which this preference is 
created in order to assert that such a national interest is determined and put forth in 
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international negotiations as an official policy.
7
  As presented here, three key national-level 
characteristics will shape these motivations:  i) wealth;  ii) the size and growth rate of future 
GHG emissions;  and iii) vulnerability to climate change damages.  The essential global 
policy problem then can be summarized by looking at these three characteristics as shared by 
three mutually exclusive groups of countries:
8
   
Group one:  These are the world’s richest nations, which are most able to adapt and 
with large emissions that are expected to grow more slowly.  Group one is composed of The 
United States, Japan, Germany, The United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, South Korea, 
Canada, and Australia.  These countries are distinguished by their wealth, and are motivated 
by an interest in minimizing climate change damages through a combination of globally 
shared mitigation and adaptation.    
Group two:  This is the group of rapidly developing nations with lower per capita 
incomes that are among the world’s largest GHG emitters.  Group two is composed of China, 
India, The Russian Federation, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, Poland, Saudi 
Arabia, Argentina, Thailand, South Africa, Nigeria, and Ukraine.  These countries are 
distinguished by their large and growing emissions.  All nations are interested in economic 
growth and development.  But as compared to the nations of group one, those of group two 
                                                 
7 
Klein et al. (2003) are skeptical that nations would actually be able to discern an optimal mitigation and 
adaptation mix, as there may be multiple optima or even nonexistent optima.  However, this is a different 
challenge than a state being able to decide upon a negotiating position, whether it is optimal or not.   
8
 Torvanger et al. (2005) also divide the world into three country types in their proposal for a new climate 
change regime.  For their analysis of mitigation Richels et al. (2009) divide the world into:  1) the OECD minus 
South Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, 2) the so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and 3) 
all remaining countries.  The three country type approach is more sophisticated than other approaches that split 
the world into only rich and poor, North and South, or Annex I and non-Annex I nations.  Indeed, some have 
called for the abolishment of the Annex I and non-Annex I designations, as they no longer accurately reflect 
comparative responsibilities and capacities (Sterk et al. 2009).      
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would place a stronger emphasis on this continued economic growth, rather than on 
addressing climate change.  The members of groups one and two are presented in Table 8. 
Group three:  The world’s poorest nations, this group includes the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), which are defined by official UN status,
9
 and the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS), which also have UN status as small, geographically dispersed and isolated 
low-lying coastal countries with small but growing populations, limited resources, and 
ecological and social susceptibility to natural disasters (UN 1992).
10
  These countries are 
distinguished by their vulnerability to climate change and the resulting need for adaptation 
aid,
11
 and they are motivated by an interest in economic development and adaptation to 
climate change.  The membership of group three is shown in Fig. 33, showing where some 
countries meet the definitions for both LDCs and SIDS. 
As defined, all states that are not a member of the three groups belong to the ―rest of 
the world‖ (ROW).  ROW states are free to join with any number of climate-related 
coalitions during negotiations to promote their own interests.  But because they do not have 
extreme values for wealth, future emissions, or climatic vulnerability, their membership in 
                                                 
9
 LDCs meet four official UN-defined criteria:  1) a population less than 75 million;  2) a three-year averaged 
per capita income of $745;  3) low marks on a Human Assets Index based on population indicators of nutrition, 
health, education, and adult literacy;  and 4) low marks on an Economic Vulnerability Index based on 
population size, remoteness, merchandise export concentration, the GDP-share of agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries, homelessness due to natural disasters, the instability of agricultural production, and the instability of 
exports (UN-OHRLLS 2009b).   
10
 Most SIDs are islands, but ―low-lying coastal communities‖ in the definition allows for nations such as Belize 
to be included as well.  Most but not all SIDS are members of their advocacy organization, AOSIS (the Alliance 
of Small Island States).   
11
 The Copenhagen Accord states that ―Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable 




any of the negotiating blocs is not a crucial factor in that coalition’s success, nor is it crucial 
to the success of a binding international climate change regime (Wiener 2007). 
Table 8.  Groups one and two:  The world’s top 25 national GHG emitters. 
 
The GDP and GDP per capita rankings are of 225 countries that exclude North Korea as well as the EU and a 
world average.  Taiwan is among the 225, but is not shown because of its uniquely indeterminate status in 
international law;  were it included it would rank 19
th
 in GDP and 43
rd
 in GDP per capita.  Sources:  OECD 
(2009), G-20 (2009),  EU (2009), UNFCCC (2009b), Baumert et al. (2005), White House (2007), and U.S. Dept. of 
State (2009).   
The nations of groups one and two together comprise the world’s top 25 GHG 
emitters and are among the world’s richest countries in terms of GDP.  Of 225 globally 
ranked countries, all group one countries have a per capita income in the top quartile;  group 
two members are all spread across the second and third quartiles with the exception of 
Nigeria, which is in the fourth quartile (but does not meet the LDC definition).  As divided, 
Group 1 Group 2 GDP
GDP per 
capita OECD Annex I
Non-
Annex I
United States 1 10 X X X
China 2 125 X X
Japan 3 39 X X X
India 4 163 X X
Germany 5 36 X X X
United Kingdom 6 32 X X X
France 7 38 X X X
Russian Federation 8 72 X X
Brazil 9 101 X X
Italy 10 42 X X X
Mexico 11 82 X X X
Spain 12 37 X X
South Korea 13 49 X X X
Canada 14 25 X X X
Indonesia 15 153 X X
Iran 16 84 X
Turkey 17 98 X X
Australia 18 22 X X X
Poland 20 68 X X
Saudi Arabia 22 59 X
Argentina 23 80 X
Thailand 24 118 X
South Africa 25 103 X X
Nigeria 32 176 X
Ukraine 39 127 X





there is close but not perfect correlation across the group memberships and associations with 
the OECD and the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex I and II.  All group one states are OECD 
members and all group two states are not, with the exceptions of Mexico, Turkey, and 
Poland.  All group one countries are listed in Annex I, with the exception of South Korea;  all 
group two countries are in Annex II, with the exceptions of Russia, Turkey, Poland, and 
Ukraine.  Group two also includes two subsets of countries that are seen as the most powerful 
players among ―emerging‖ economies:  1) the previously mentioned BRIC countries of 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and 2) the so-called Basic Group of China, India, Brazil, 
and South Africa, with Indonesia possibly joining (Chamberlain 2010; Simamora and 
Nurhayati 2010).  Finally, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, which was 
initiated under the George W. Bush Administration with a meeting in 2007 (White House 
2007) and formalized and continued under the Barack Obama Administration (U.S. Dept. of 
State 2009), is composed only of members from groups one and two, with a few additions.
12
   
                                                 
12
 The first Bush meeting included the EU, as represented by Portugal, and the UN (White House 2007);  the 
first Obama meeting included the UN as well as Denmark, as host of the COP 15 (U.S. Dept. of State 2009). 
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Fig. 33.  Group 3 – poor, vulnerable, or both:  UN-designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 
Small Island Developing States (SIDs).   
 
Excluded are 14 SID-status territories that do not have UN membership, such as Puerto Rico, on the 
assumption that the administering country (the United States in this case) will provide its own adaptation aid 
directly.  Somalia is an LDC but not a party to the UNFCCC (Bapna and McGray 2008).  The Maldives will 
graduate from LDC status in 2011 (UN-OHRLLS 2009b).  Sources:  UN-OHRLLS (2009a; 2009c).   
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Understanding international climate change politics through the perspective of these 
three groups promotes the further examination of how including adaptation in a global 
climate change regime will affect the success of the treaty.  From this overview it is clear that 
there is no precise way to divide nations according to the relevant characteristics that will 
motivate their negotiating positions on global climate change policy.  But as groups one and 
two have a high degree of overlap with other pre-existing groupings, and as the LDCs and 
SIDS of group three are the primary designated recipients of adaptation aid, we can say that 
with high probability these states would be among the most relevant actors in an international 
climate change negotiation. 
3.1.2.  National-Level Incentives 
The effects of global climate change are heterogeneous, and a nation’s vulnerability 
to these damages is composed of its exposure to the climate and its capacity to address 
damages when it changes.  Climatic exposure is a function of both the geophysical attributes, 
geographical location, and ecological conditions existing within a state, as well as the extent 
to which that society’s institutions and infrastructure are exposed to the climate (Pielke Jr. 
and Sarewitz 2005).  It is based on the good fortune or bad luck of where a country is situated 
geographically, where that society has actually chosen to physically place its valuable assets, 
and the nature of its institutions.  Adaptive capacity, in turn, is a function of both institutional 
development and national wealth (Burton et al. 2006), where the richer the state, the better 
able it is to absorb climate change damages.  In this way the damages from a changing 
climate can affect a society through two routes:  via the level of gross damages experienced, 
or via weak national-level institutions that are unable to address even mild climate damages.  
These relationships are illustrated in Fig. 34.   
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Fig. 34.  Illustrative world climate vulnerability scale composed of national adaptive capacity and 
climate exposure.   
  
The upper left quadrant encompasses the least vulnerable nations while the lower right quadrant includes the 
most vulnerable states.   
Climate change has disproportionately negative effects on poorer countries, primarily 
because of their geography and secondarily because they lack the capacity and resources to 
adapt (Mendelsohn et al. 2006).  Conversely, while rich countries will likely suffer a greater 
total amount of climate change-related losses (because they have more assets to be damaged), 
the damages will be smaller relative to the size of their economies, and these countries will 
have a greater capacity to adapt.  Poor countries will suffer greater damages on a per capita 





















Hallegatte et al. (2007) find that the economic impact of climate-induced extreme events on 
developing nations can have long-lasting effects, as depicted in Fig. 35.  By this hypothesis, 
climate change in industrialized nations is merely a permanent added cost (and welfare loss) 
that is not significant enough to alter the development path.  Conversely, for developing 
nations, climate change has the potential to alter (and permanently lower) their future 
economic development path.   
Fig. 35.  Comparing industrialized and developing nations facing extreme climate change damage 
events.   
  
Source:  Author depiction of research in Hallegatte et al. (2007).   
It is a tenet of international relations theory that countries act upon their self-
perceived national interests.  National-level incentives to emphasize mitigation or adaptation 
in a policy response portfolio will depend on the expected costs and benefits of each strategy.  
On the motivation to adapt, self-interested nations will be strongly incentivized by their 
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perceived climate vulnerability, and the incentives for near-term adaptation can be much 
stronger than those for mitigation, depending on the relevant timeframe, discount rate, and 
expected damages.  Adaptation is a private good where the benefits of investment accrue to 
the implementing agent, as opposed to the public good of mitigation where investment 
benefits are dispersed globally.  This fact, combined with those situations where adaptation is 
cheaper than mitigation (Tol 2004; Hof et al. 2009), mean that many states will have a strong 
incentive to adapt rather than mitigate.  These national motivations must be taken into 
consideration when designing an international climate regime.   
The challenge is to harmonize the incentives of the rich, rapidly developing, and poor 
countries into a new stable climate coalition that is Pareto superior to the present stable 
coalition where everyone has agreed to do very little on climate change.
13
  It is in the 
interests of the world’s richest countries to achieve global participation in a mitigation 
regime in order to lower their expected climate change damages.  Conversely, the world’s 
poorest countries are more interested in present day economic development and adaptation in 
the future when it is needed.  Between these two country groups are the rapidly growing 
nations like China and India, which have more capacity to adapt but less reason to mitigate 
their GHG emissions, for fear of ruining their relatively recent economic growth.  
Stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations at a level below an assumed dangerous 
ceiling will only occur with significant emissions cuts by both the rich and the rapidly 
                                                 
13
 My thanks are to Mort Webster on this point.  A Pareto optimal, or efficient, allocation of resources is one 





 yet the poor and the rapidly growing countries correctly argue that much 
of the historical responsibility for the problem lies with the rich countries.   
This then leads to the two-part participation criterion.  Based on national motivations 
in climate negotiations, does the proposed policy and institutional design of the IAF 
mechanism promote or inhibit the likelihood that two key country types will join in the 
regime? 
 Criterion P1 – the world’s richest and most industrialized states, the ones likely to 
bear the primary burden of both adaptation financing as well as mitigation in the near 
term, and  
 Criterion P2 – a bloc of two other groups of states:  a) the rapidly growing and large 
developing nations that are also large emitters of GHGs, as well as b) the world’s 
poorest and most climate vulnerable states (IAF recipients).  The former nations do 
not expect to receive much adaptation aid but are also not willing to undertake 
mitigation sacrifices on their own.   
Employing the definition of politics as the art of the possible, the participation criteria 
look at what is politically feasible in terms of a binding agreement that has environmentally 
effective mitigation levels.  In this way the only burden sharing arrangement among nations 
that matters is one that is acceptable to both fast developing and industrialized nations (the 
top GHG emitters).   
                                                 
14
 ―A successful global effort to mitigate global climate change will require substantial cooperation between 
developed and developing countries.  Even as the bulk of the developed world is at some stage of enacting 
significant domestic regulations to meet global stabilization goals, growth in developing country emissions will 
easily thwart those goals unless a cooperative solution is found‖ (Hall et al. 2008). 
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The motivations to participate in an international climate change effort depend on the 
country type.  Group one (rich) will join if group two (growing) mitigates eventually and if 
payments to group three (poor) are minimized.  Group two will join and promise to start 
mitigating in a later period if group one mitigates now and pays ―enough‖ adaptation 
financing to group three.  Notably, group three mitigation is not necessary to a global 
agreement, but group two mitigation is.  To the extent that group two acts as advocate for 
group three in its IAF demands (as China does with its global income tax proposal with the 
G-77), then group three’s negotiating demands are promoted by group two.  For the analysis 
then I combine groups two and three in a negotiating bloc in which where group two acts on 
behalf of group three.  As described, participation of ROW states is not necessary for an 
agreement.   
4.3.1.3.  How IAF Would Incentivize Participation 
These three country types will come to the negotiating table with differing concepts 
of adaptation, and how a country group views adaptation in a future climate agreement 
depends upon how adaptation is framed (Horstmann 2008).  For example, is adaptation a 
development issue and its financing merely a new (and additional) form of ODA?  Is 
adaptation financing only that which is required under the UNFCCC, or is it a broader and 
stronger concept of legal obligation as compensation for past damages?  In the parlance of 
negotiations arithmetic the inclusion of adaptation into a negotiation dominated by the single 
issue of mitigation both enlarges the negotiation set and raises the likelihood that issue 
linkage can be utilized to achieve overall agreement.  In this case adaptation can be seen in 
the sense of Sebenius (1983), added as a new choice variable upon which to negotiate, along 
with those over mitigation, with potential for overall gains.  If states are not incentivized to 
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participate in an agreement, then the design of the treaty can restructure incentives.
15
  The 
incorporation of adaptation financing incentivizes participation to the extent that it can 
induce parties to take part in other treaty areas, namely, with mitigation.  If consideration of 
national-level incentives to mitigate or adapt could enlarge the room for a deal among 
different types of countries, and thus create a more effective international climate policy 
regime, then how exactly should the adaptation be incorporated?   
Fig. 36 illustrates one way in which this challenge could be overcome, by matching 
the incentives of the three state groupings with side payments.  In game theoretic terms, side 
payments are a way for players to change national incentives by influencing both the payoffs 
realized by others (and indirectly their own) with financial, in-kind, or technology transfers 
between negotiating parties (Barrett 2003c).  Strong asymmetries between negotiating 
partners ―enables side payments to sustain a vastly superior outcome compared to the 
agreement without side payments‖ (2003b).  Such differences are present with climate 
change, as the most climate-vulnerable states happen to be the poorest and they will suffer 
the highest climate damages (as a percentage of their economies).   
                                                 
15
 ―Unless a treaty changes incentives, countries are likely only to agree to a target they felt confident they 
would meet anyway‖ (Barrett 2003c).   
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Fig. 36.  Relationships among three country types in a potential international climate policy 
agreement with side payments.   
 
The feasibility of linking mitigation and adaptation efforts via adaptation side 
payments from the industrialized world to the developing in a grand post-Kyoto political 
bargain is an empirical question.  Buob and Stephan (2008) conduct game theoretic analysis 
of a two-stage non-cooperative climate negotiation between two self-interested, idealized 
Northern (industrialized OECD countries) and Southern (developing nation) players, with 
mitigation and adaptation as the two available policies.  The question is whether or not 
funding adaptation can be incentive compatible to induce mitigation by both players.  In 
stage one of the game the North decides to fund a certain amount of adaptation infrastructure 
in the South, unconditional on any mitigation promises by the South.  In the second stage – 
after the adaptation funding has been observed – the North and South both decide on how 
much to mitigate.  Under the assumption that mitigation and adaptation are strictly 
complementary (that the use of one strategy improves the marginal productivity of the other), 
Northern funding of adaptation in the South promotes both global mitigation and Northern 
welfare, but lowers Southern welfare.  Thus, the authors recommend a cooperative 
Group 1:  Rich and industrialized 
Group 2:  Fast developing 
$ for 
adaptation 
Group 3:  Poor and vulnerable 
$ for 
mitigation 
rest of the 
world (ROW) 
negotiating bloc with respect to Group 1 
147 
 
arrangement – an international treaty – where a social optimum results from higher levels of 
mitigation, adaptation, and welfare in both types of countries (ibid.). 
Using the AD-RICE
16
 IAM, Dellink et al. (forthcoming) investigate mitigation and 
adaptations at the global level.  They examine a Nash scenario where all regions are self-
interested, a semi-cooperative scenario where regions work to minimize the differences in 
regional climate change costs, and a fully cooperative scenario where regions work to 
minimize the differences in regional income.  They find that in the full cooperation scenario 
the incorporation of international adaptation transfers lowers overall mitigation levels 
slightly, yet provides a significant way to transfer income across regions.  Hence, by this 
analysis, it could encourage participation in a post-Kyoto follow-on treaty.
17
 
4.3.2.  Compliance 
States negotiate treaties with the intent to comply, otherwise they would not take the 
negotiations so seriously.  But a nation’s incentives to comply are different than those to 
participate.  Once an international environmental agreement is joined, the state may choose 
to continue complying, hedge its actions, or change policy altogether and withdraw from the 
treaty because the initial conditions for participation have changed.  Of the subset of states 
that choose to comply, some will meet the treaty requirements and others will fail to comply 
because they were unable to meet an overly ambitious goal.  The compliance criteria 
developed here looks at those states that intend to comply but may be at higher risk of failing 
because of the effects of the IAF mechanism design.  This compliance is inhibited if the IAF 
                                                 
16
 AD-RICE is an extended version of the regionalized RICE integrated assessment model (IAM) (Nordhaus 
and Yang 1996) with explicit adaptation and mitigation policy choices.   
17
 See also Hof et al. (2009) and de Bruin et al. (2010) on international adaptation side payments. 
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mechanism inhibits the nation’s efforts to mitigate, which puts it at a higher risk of not 
meeting its promised and required mitigation targets.  Compliance effects of IAF are 
analyzed on two criteria.   
Criterion C1 – Resource Competition.  Does the proposed policy and institutional 
design of the IAF mechanism place adaptation efforts in a zero-sum competition with 
mitigation for financial resources, or is there little or no resource competition effect?   
Economic scarcity dictates that at any one time there is a finite level of resources 
available to redistribute, and any allocation comes with an opportunity cost from foregone 
alternative uses of the same resources (Friedman 2002c).  In other words, there is a degree of 
competition for the same dollars between mitigation and adaptation, and the choice to devote 
limited policy resources to climate change means that they come at the expense of other 
pressing policy issues (chapter two).  All of these resource priorities are in zero-sum 
competition with other issues.  If, given preferences at a given time, there is a finite level of 
political willingness to address climate change, then that ―policy pie‖ cannot be expanded.  
The addition of a new policy option (adaptation) within these bounds will necessarily 
redistribute the portfolio and lower the use of the original policy (mitigation).   
The resource competition criterion characterizes the concern expressed by 
environmental advocates when adaptation originally gained recognition as a response 
strategy, that its rise in prominence would be to the detriment of mitigation efforts.  Global 
resources available to address climate change are not constrained by their physical or 
technological availability but by the political willingness to devote them to the climate 
change issue instead of other uses, whether they be other pressing policy problems or simply 
more consumption.  When we say that current levels of technology limit our ability to 
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address climate change (and that we therefore need to develop new and more advanced 
technology), what is really meant is that technology at our given standard of living limits our 
ability to deal with climate change.   
Results from climate and economy IAMs predict that in principle this crowding out is 
not a problem, as the inclusion of adaptation as a risk-reducing policy response allows for a 
lower global mitigation level to achieve a given level of social welfare.  However, such 
results apply to an idealized policy world where mitigation is already set to an optimal level.  
If mitigation is instead at a level below even the lowest optimal estimates from IAMs, then 
mitigation will need to rise (or at least stay constant) even with the addition of adaptation to 
the policy mix, in order to achieve the original damage goal.   
That new adaptation money has the potential to crowd out other legitimate 
international policies has already been recognized in adaptation’s relationship with 
sustainable economic development.  Calls for adaptation mainstreaming (incorporating 
climate change expectations into all future development decisions) are paired with the 
concern that delivering aid in this way will cause its total level to fall short of the UNFCCC’s 
additionality requirement, that any future adaptation aid be in addition to pre-existing ODA 
commitments by developed nations.  The fear is that ODA could be recast as adaptation aid 
with the result either that:  1) ODA stays at its current levels and the recasting into adaptation 
is simply a name change that leads to no increases in actual adaptation aid, or 2) climate 
change adaptation is promoted at the expense of ODA and economic development goals.   
Criterion C2 – Policy Interactions.  As the IAF policy is implemented, would its 
institutional design cause negative distortions that discourage mitigation investments, 
positive feedbacks that instead tend to promote mitigation, or neither interaction? 
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The challenge of climate change can be framed in two policy-equivalent ways.  In 
one approach, global GHG emissions are a negative externality of economic activity that 
inflict uncompensated damages on parties other than the emitters.  From a different 
perspective, the earth’s total carbon sinks, particularly the world’s atmosphere, is a global 
public good that is capable of absorbing a certain amount of emissions before becoming 
degraded and causing damages for all.
18
  Price or quantity policies can address the problem 
from either approach, by pricing the externality into the emissions production or 
consumption decision, or by promoting the amount of the public good up to socially optimal 
levels.  For instance, under ideal conditions,
19
 a Pigouvian environmental tax is optimal if it 
is set equal to the marginal damages (Sterner 2003).  The optimality condition does not 
stipulate where the tax revenues are spent (a separate question), and they can be redistributed 
to the population either as cash, invested in related environmental projects, invested in 
unrelated projects, or targeted to victims as refunds in compensation for their losses.
20
  This 
result is applicable to polluter pays policy proposals for IAF that tax carbon emissions and 
use the funds for damage compensation.  Under certainty, outcomes from Pigouvian taxation 
can be achieved by the equivalent quantity measure (Weitzman 1974) such as via a cap-and-
trade auction.   
Policy can be distorted when additional policies with different goals are also 
implemented.  For example, for IAF proposals that are based on the continuation or 
expansion of adaptation levies on existing mitigation mechanisms, Brown and Vigneri (2008) 
                                                 
18
 Weimer and Vining (2004) elaborate upon this policy equivalency.   
19
 Ideal conditions consist of ―fully informed, honest, welfare maximizing regulators and appropriate concepts 
of property rights‖ (Sterner 2003).   
20
 However, compensating the victims of environmental harms with the revenues actually reduces overall 
efficiency as it distorts victim behavior (Baumol and Oates 1988).   
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note that ―a levy placed on international trading may act as a deterrent to market activities 
and have the potential to reduce overall liquidity in the carbon market.‖  Through such 
taxation of mitigation efforts to promote adaptation, adaptation piggy-backs on mitigation 
efforts and puts a drag on its effectiveness;  a ―good‖ is promoted by taxing another ―good.‖  
The phenomenon could apply wherever these methods are used to raise funds, at the 
international or domestic levels.   
No one is deluded that an international climate change treaty that can be adopted 
would result in a global optimum mitigation level, and it is assumed here that these 
mitigation levels will remain below what both natural scientists and economists propose as a 
minimum level.  Therefore, in this suboptimal world, I look not at how the addition of 
adaptation could cause deviations from optimality, but at how adaptation financing could 
induce further negative distortions of a policy variable of which more is better (mitigation). 
4.4.  IAF Proposals 
Proposals for a new IAF mechanism within a climate change treaty multiplied with 
the approach of the COP 15 in Copenhagen.  These policy ideas defy ready categorization 
into coherent groups of policies that are distinguished by their characteristics, and the 
tradeoffs that matter for mitigation cover multiple policy attributes.  For simplicity I 
summarize the 22 IAF proposals in Table 9 by dividing them into groups of existing 
financing mechanisms, expansions of this existing structure, new tax-based financing 






Table 9.  Summary of policy options for international adaptation financing in developing countries.   
Proposed IAF  
Policy Mechanism Proponent(s) Notes 
Existing  
 
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation 
Fund (KPAF) 
n/a continued 2% add-on levy on the sale of proceeds from the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM);  managed by the 
Adaptation Fund Board 
Special Climate Change 
Fund (SCCF) 
n/a multilateral aid managed by the GEF 
Least Developed Countries 
Fund (LDCF) 
n/a multilateral aid managed by the GEF 
GEF Trust Fund n/a multilateral aid under the GEF's Strategic Priority on 
Adaptation (SPA) 
Strategic Climate Fund 
(SCF) 
n/a multilateral aid under the World Bank's Pilot Program for 
Climate Resilience (PPCR) 
Expansion of Existing     




3-5% levy on the sale of proceeds from the CDM 




expansion of the CDM add-on levy to also include a 2% levy 
on Joint Implementation (JI) and emissions trading   
auction of assigned 
amount units (AAUs) 
Norway auction of 2% of AAUs for international emissions trading;  
alternatively, a 2% tax on the issuance of AAUs (GLCA 2009) 
New:  Tax-Based     
global currency transaction 
tax – Tobin Tax 
(Nissanke 2003; 
Hillman et al. 2007) 
(after James Tobin) (Nissanke 2003; Hillman et al. 2007) 
air travel tax – International 





formerly the International Air Travel Adaptation Levy (IATAL) 
(Müller and Hepburn 2006) 




(Stochniol 2008)  would apply to Annex I countries only (Stochniol 2008) 
air travel and shipping 
freight tax – Tuvalu Burden 
Sharing Mechanism 
Tuvalu Funds would go to the SCCF and LDCF via a new levy 
collection body under the COP (UNFCCC 2007a). 
GDP tax – GDP Fiscal 
Commitment 
China,  
Group of 77 
0.5% tax on Annex I Parties' GDP;  also known as the 
"Mechanism for Meeting Financial Commitments under the 
Convention."  Funds go to an Adaptation Fund and 
Multilateral Technology Fund, as managed by a new COP 
oversight board (Govt. of China 2008). 
global carbon tax Switzerland $2/tCO2;  exemption of $1.5t/CO2 per inhabitant;  would fund 
a new Multilateral Adaptation Fund (MAF) (Schwank et al. 
2007). 




Adaptation would form some part of pledges by developed 
countries to give $30 billion over 2010-2012 and $100 billion 
annually by 2020 to developing countries in need;  under the 
UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2009a). 
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This financial derivative is a capital market-funded bond for 
immediate aid projects, backed by future ODA and climate 
change aid commitments.  Also known as the "International 
Financial Facility" for climate, it would be managed by the EU 
and World Bank (Haites 2008; GLCA 2009). 
separate Adaptation 
Protocol with multiple 
funding mechanisms  
(Torvanger et al. 
2005; Parry et al. 
2008) 
In one version money would go to a new Consolidated Fund 
for Adaptation via a global defined contribution;  also known 
as the Climate-Wise Development Agreement (Torvanger et 
al. 2005; Parry et al. 2008). 
Adaptation Fund, 
Technology Fund, and 
Insurance Mechanism – 
AOSIS proposal 
AOSIS contributions assessed beyond ODA commitments via both a 
global defined contribution and a carbon market tax (AOSIS 
2007). 
auction of AAUs from EU-
ETS 
EU auction of allowances for international aviation and marine 
emissions, as well as 100% of the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme (GLCA 2009). 
World Climate Change 
Fund 
Mexico global defined contribution based on a formula of GHG 
emissions, population, and GDP (Govt. of Mexico 2008). 
IMF donated special 
drawing rights (SDRs) 
(Soros 2002; Haites 
2008) 
International Monetary Fund SDRs allocated to developed 
nations would instead be allocated to developing nations;  
overseen by an independent oversight jury and the IMF 
(Haites 2008). 
global trading of damage 




Adaptation is fully integrated with mitigation within a new risk 
trading institution that trades both mitigation and adaptation in 
common units of reduced damages (Schellnhuber and Cornell 
2005). 
Previous analyses divided the proposals on distinctions across national budgetary allocations, national market-
based levies, or global market-based levies (Bapna and McGray 2008);  as international or domestic, diverse or 
concentrated, or dynamic v. static (Spratt 2009);  or as multilateral, hybrid, or international approaches 
(Müller 2008).  Existing IAF was depicted earlier in Fig. 32.  General sources:  Müller (2008), Haites (2008), 
Levina (2007), UNFCCC (2008a), and (Spratt 2009).   
Current IAF mechanisms are dominated by the only truly international and automatic 
process, the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (KPAF), which relies upon a 2% levy on all 
CDM projects.  The possibility for expansion of these current IAF programs lies primarily 
with the CDM, either by increasing the levy from 2% to 3% or 5%, or by expanding the 
scope of the levy to include projects under the Joint Implementation (JI) program.  Also 
present are the climate adaptation funds managed by the GEF and World Bank, but these are 
based on voluntary aid commitments.  As noted, current or proposed bilateral adaptation aid 
initiatives are not included in this analysis as such funding is completely outside of the 
governance system of an international climate change regime. 
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It is the new proposals for IAF that are the most ambitious and expansive.  They 
include sector-specific taxation of emitting industries such as international shipping and air 
travel, broad-based carbon taxes, income taxes on rich countries, formulaic burden sharing 
mechanisms based on defined contributions, and even a separate climate change protocol for 
adaptation.  Other proposals have been forwarded that integrate mitigation and adaptation at 
the international level but do not explicitly develop the IAF side of policy.
21
 
Another idea that is not yet fully developed is a climate policy regime that fully 
integrates both mitigation and adaptation in an international trading system that trades on 
both mitigation and adaptation in the common unit of avoided damages, rather than only 
trading on mitigation in units of CO2 equivalents or certified emissions reductions (CERs).  
Under the system a rich country could buy credits that would be used either for mitigation or 
adaptation abroad.  International GHG emissions trading has been studied extensively, and is 
a component of many post-Kyoto proposals.  As explored in chapter two, the link from 
mitigation to reduced global damages is not direct, and is instead routed through the price of 
carbon, its relationship to temperature, and finally through its relationship to damages, while 
adaptation instead has a direct effect on lowered damages.  Because adaptation cannot be 
measured in terms of GHG emissions, but mitigation can be measured in the terms of 
adaptation, i.e., reduced damages, then a jointly implemented mitigation and adaptation 
trading scheme would trade on damages and not emissions.  Such a system of damage or risk 
trading as has been explored in a non-climate change case (Wiener 2004) and mentioned 
                                                 
21
 One such related idea is a system of multiple climate change agreements focused on particular sectors and 
designed for the reduction of climate change risk, wherever those risk reductions may be achieved.  Such an 
arrangement could be more environmentally effective, and would also prevent negative synergies – if one sector 
failed at reducing emissions, it would not bring down the others (Barrett 2008). 
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briefly in the climate change case (Schellnhuber and Cornell 2005), but has not yet been fully 
explored.  The primary challenge to developing this framework is in measuring mitigation 
outcomes in terms of damages, in order that it could be compared more directly with 
adaptation in terms of a common scale of avoided damages.  This idea is explored more fully 
in section 5.5.3 of the conclusion.   
4.5.  Integrating IAF Into an International Climate Change Mitigation Regime:  
Evaluation of the Adaptation Financing Proposals 
The policy mechanism and institutional design of the 22 IAF proposals analyzed were 
assigned numerical scores over attributes from each of the four evaluation criteria.  The 
proposals were then sorted into relative score groupings for each criterion, allowing for a 
comparison of the tradeoffs inherent in each proposal that are relevant to national-level 
participation and compliance in a climate change regime. 
4.5.1.  Participation Incentives 
Scoring methodology for criterion P1 – participation of group one states:   
The effect that the policy design of the IAF proposal would have on the likelihood 
that wealthy group one countries participate in an environmentally effective post-Kyoto 
agreement was determined by summing the scores of four proposal attributes.  Higher scores 
(in parentheses) mean that the proposal would tend to encourage rather than discourage 
overall treaty acceptance by group one members:   
1) Scale – As organized in Table 9, IAF proposals are new (0), expansions of existing 
programs (1), or previously existing financing mechanisms (2).  The higher score for 
the status quo reflects the wariness of group one members toward ambitious new 
adaptation financing initiatives that fall outside the norm of current practice.  
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2) UNFCCC coverage – Similarly, if the proposed IAF mechanism remains under the 
auspices of pre-existing UNFCCC structures then group one members are more likely 
to accept it (1), rather than if it necessitates the creation of a new and unfamiliar 
international oversight body (0).   
3) proposal origin from group one – Group one states are more likely to accept a new 
IAF mechanism if it is officially proposed by one of their members (1), rather than if 
it is not (0).   
4) funding budgetary path – Group one donor nations would be more likely to accept the 
IAF mechanism if they retained some control over adaptation aid flows by having 
them first pass through their own national budgets before forwarding to the recipient 
nations (1).  Conversely, group one countries would be less favorable towards an 
arrangement where the donated funding goes directly from the national economies to 
an existing or new international body for disbursement to recipient nations, and 
bypassing the donor government (0).  Donor governments are not necessarily against 
a new and comprehensive adaptation treaty in principle, but they would like to retain 
control over their own funding to the extent possible.   
Scoring methodology for criterion P2 – participation of states from groups two and three:   
The IAF proposal design scoring methodology for the participation of groups two 
(growing) and three (poor and vulnerable) in an environmentally effective post-Kyoto 
agreement was done in a similar manner.  Scores across four IAF proposal attributes were 
summed, with higher scores (in parentheses) indicating that the proposal would tend to 
encourage rather than discourage overall treaty acceptance by members of groups two and 
three:   
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1) proposal origin from group two or three – As with criterion P1, national members of 
groups two and three are more likely to accept an IAF mechanism if it is officially 
proposed by one of their members (1), rather than if it is not (0).
22
  
2) scale – As a general goal, the negotiating bloc of groups two and three prefers to 
create an IAF structure that is permanently institutionalized, as opposed to current 
arrangements with their relatively temporary or ad hoc qualities.  Thus the scores here 
are new (2), expansion (1), and pre-existing (0).   
3) ―automaticity‖ – Climate vulnerable states and their advocates have insisted that any 
new IAF mechanism meets the UNFCCC’s four requirements that were agreed upon 
by the parties at Bali:  adequacy, equity, additionality, and predictability.
23
  The 
automaticity measure incorporates the predictability and additionality requirements.  
Predictability is a measure of the extent to which the funding can be relied upon for 
budget and project planning purposes.  For IAF aid, recipient countries would prefer 
that the funding amounts be binding, hard to evade and not voluntary.  Hence the 
scores are as follows:  voluntary and easy to evade (0), negotiated commitments or a 
defined contribution by donor states (1), and strict and/or treaty-based requirements 
that are hard to revoke (2).  The second component of the automaticity score is the 
funding budgetary path, where the adaptation aid recipient nations would prefer the 
opposite of the donor nation, i.e., that the funding does directly to an international 
                                                 
22
 The GDP Fiscal Commitment (GDP tax) proposal is assigned a score of 2, as it is co-sponsored by both 
China and the G-77.   
23
 Adequacy means that the amount of money raised by the IAF is sufficient to cover the climate change 
damages that are suffered by vulnerable states.  The term resists definition, however, given two large 
uncertainties:  i) the previously discussed wide range of adaptation cost estimates (Table 7), and ii) the amounts 
of money that could be raised from each IAF proposal.  Mechanism equity is a normative requirement with a 
definition dependent on the adopted moral framework.   
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body for disbursement (1) rather than via the donor nation’s budget (0).  The 
negotiating bloc of group two and three nations expressed concerns going into the 
COP 15 that monies channeled through multilateral development banks could have 
either unwanted conditionalities or administrative fees attached to the funds 
(Schalatek et al. 2010).  (The UNFCCC additionality requirement is meant to address 
this concern, that new IAF money is in addition to pre-existing aid pledges and 
arrangements.)  Thus, crucial to developing country participation is a feeling that they 
exercise some control over where and how the funds are to be used.   
The results for the participation criteria are presented in Fig. 37, along the dimensions 
that affect participation in a negotiations setting.  The left hand column of dark-shaded bars 
shows the comparative strength of preference by group one (rich nations) for that particular 
IAF proposal, across the low, medium, and high terciles, and rising towards the center from 
left to right.  On the right hand side is the equivalent set of preferences for the group two 
(growing) and three (vulnerable) negotiating bloc, in light-shaded bars, rising towards the 
center from right to left.  The horizontal gap between the bars represents how far apart (or 
close) the negotiating positions of the two parties are from each other, based on their 




Fig. 37.  Results for participation criteria:  Preference rankings for IAF proposals to encourage treaty 
participation, and the gap between negotiating positions for the two blocs. 
 
air travel tax -- International Air Passenger Adaptation 
Levy (IAPAL)
shipping fuel tax -- International Maritime Emission 
Reduction Scheme (IMERS)
air travel and shipping freight tax -- Tuvalu Burden 
Sharing Mechanism (TBS)
global currency transaction tax -- Tobin Tax
global trading of damage credits for mitigation and 
adaptation
separate Adaptation Protocol with multiple funding 
mechanisms 
auction of AAUs from EU-ETS
IMF donated special drawing rights (SDRs)
Adaptation Fund, Technology Fund, and Insurance 
Mechanism -- AOSIS proposal
GDP tax -- GDP Fiscal Commitment
World Climate Change Fund
global carbon tax
KPAF with higher CDM add-on levy
KPAF with JI tax expansion
auction of assigned amount units (AAUs)
adaptation bonds -- Global Climate Financing Mechanism
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (KPAF)
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)
GEF Trust Fund
Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)
relative strength of groups  
two and three preferences 
relative strength of 
group one preference   
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The results for participation show clear tradeoffs over IAF mechanism characteristics 
when the goal is the construction of a new stable climate coalition with participation by the 
necessary groups of countries.  Two conclusions can be drawn.  First, several IAF 
mechanisms will be embraced by one country grouping and wholeheartedly rejected by 
another, and vice versa;  no shared set of mutually most-preferred proposals exists.  With all 
else equal, group one countries prefer IAF structures that fall under their control, are a 
continuation of what has been approved and is happening already, and which are in general 
more conservative in their scope.  It is not surprising that the six IAF structures that are most 
preferred by the donor nations (and least preferred by aid recipient nations) are exactly those 
ones that already exist (listed at the bottom of the figure).  Conversely, the coalition of the 
fast growing and the climate vulnerable nations (groups two and three) prefer that IAF be 
broad in scope and with predictable revenues that are overseen by a new international 
institution.  This negotiating bloc most prefers either a global currency transaction tax, or 
some combination of the following:  1) the International Air Passenger Adaptation Levy 
(IAPAL), which would tax international airline tickets with exemptions for travel to and from 
LDCs;  2) the International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme (IMERS), which would 
tax freight shipping bunker fuel of ships from Annex I countries;  and 3) the Tuvalu Burden 
Sharing (TBS) mechanism, which is essentially a combination of the IAPAL and IMERS 
proposals with an additional burden sharing formula.  These proposals listed in the top four 
rows of the figure, also happen to be among those proposals least preferred by group one.  
The parties thus come to the negotiating table with opposing conceptions about best 
arrangements for IAF.   
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Second, areas of national interest overlap exist where parties may move to a mutually 
acceptable compromise solution.  As constructed, only states from groups one and two will 
mitigate or promise to mitigate in a climate treaty, while adaptation aid will only be provided 
by members of group one to those of group three.  It would be tempting then to dismiss all 
IAF proposals that score with low support from group one states, as without their 
participation the IAF becomes a useless unfunded mandate.  But this would be incorrect, as 
unlike with this ceteris paribus analysis, all climate-related goals can compete across the 
negotiating table where preferences over IAF interact with mitigation as part of a larger 
climate policy agenda.  Issue tradeoffs are inevitable as based on the strengths of preferences 
that the different negotiating blocs have for different policy goals.  Parties to a future climate 
change treaty have a large set of goals to achieve that is much broader than adaptation alone, 
and thus they do not have to stick to their rigid preferences on adaptation financing.  Of 
primacy for group one is the desire for eventual mitigation commitments by the growing 
countries.  For the growing/vulnerable coalition of groups two and three, there is the fear of 
abandoning treaty negotiations without a more comprehensive and institutionalized IAF 
mechanism in place, other than what already exists along with ad hoc bilateral adaptation aid 
from individual nations.  In order to achieve participation in a future binding international 
climate change treaty, each negotiation bloc will have to compromise. 
With compromise across multiple issues an option, a measurement of the highest total 
positive influence on group participation from both sides of the negotiating table becomes 
important.  This area of maximum total preference is highlighted in the bordered bars of Fig. 
37 to include:  1) the AOSIS proposal for an adaptation fund, technology fund, and insurance 
mechanism;  2) the Chinese proposal for a GDP tax (the ―GDP Fiscal Commitment‖) of 0.5% 
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on Annex I parties;  and 3) the Mexican proposal to establish a World Climate Change Fund 
with formula-based contributions.  All three are in the top tercile for positive support from 
the group two and three negotiating bloc, and in the middle tercile of support for group one.   
If this is the set with the highest total preference score, then a secondary set of three 
proposals listed below the ones with bordered bars – a global carbon tax, and the Kyoto 
Protocol Adaptation Fund with higher levies, either on the CDM or on JI – comprise those 
approaches for which there is mutually equal but ―lukewarm‖ support from both negotiating 
blocs.  Neither side would have to compromise much in the negotiation to achieve a deal 
with this IAF structure, yet nor is there much political impetus to push such a package as 
neither side is strongly in favor of the proposal.  Finally, even though the two sides are far 
apart on the IAF proposals that they most prefer (the bottom six in Fig. 37 for the donor 
nations and the top four for the recipient nations), the strength of their preferences could play 
a role in bringing agreement, if they were willing to compromise in other areas of the climate 
treaty.     
4.5.2.  Compliance 
If the design of the proposed IAF mechanism hinders mitigation efforts, via resource 
competition or policy interactions then policymakers should be aware of these possible 
unintended consequences that will lower the likelihood that states are able to meet their 
mitigation obligations.  Alternatively, if resource competition effects between mitigation and 
adaptation can be limited, and if the IAF mechanism actually has a neutral or even positive 
effect on mitigation efforts, then state compliance within a mitigation-focused treaty becomes 
easier.   
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Scoring methodology for criterion C1 – resource competition:   
Whether or not the new IAF policy mechanism tends to compete with the resources 
available for mitigation is determined solely by the automaticity score developed above, the 
sum of scores for the additionality and predictability of the new funding.  For this criterion, 
automaticity measures the extent to which the IAF resources are subject to the political 
whims and debates of the donor nation rather than being channeled directly into an 
automated process that is more insulated from domestic politics.  The assumption is that the 
more discretion that the donor nation employs over the adaptation funds, the higher is the 
chance that its government may try to reallocate or reduce mitigation funds, adaptation funds, 
or both, and thus lower the likelihood that the state will comply with its treaty obligations.   
Scoring methodology for criterion C2 – policy interactions:   
The metric of IAF policy interaction with mitigation is a multiple of scores for two attributes:   
1) the strength of the policy link with mitigation – Within the proposed IAF mechanism, 
are adaptation and mitigation efforts separate (0), weakly linked (1), or strongly 
linked (2)? 
2) the direction of the interaction – Does implementing the IAF discourage mitigation (-
1), have a neutral effect (0), or encourage additional mitigation (+1)? 
These two attributes are multiplied to get a score for the strength of the interaction effect 
between the two policies, and its direction, with a potential range over [-2,2]. 
The compliance criteria results are presented in Table 10.  For the resource 
competition criterion column (C1), proposals are displayed in two groups with solid circles 
denoting those IAF proposals with the least likelihood that adaptation competes with 
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mitigation resources and open circles denoting the highest potential for such resource 
competition.  For the policy interaction criterion column (C2), the proposals are split into 
terciles as with the participation criteria above, with solid circles (and borders) indicating 
those IAF mechanisms where the financing method encourages more mitigation, half circles 
showing that no effects are present, and open circles that the policy design of the IAF 
discourages mitigation.
24
   
Unlike for participation, the results from the compliance criteria exhibit fewer explicit 
tradeoffs.  Three IAF policy proposals – IAPAL, IMERS, and TBS – rank highest in both 
compliance categories with minimal resource competition and positive policy interactions.  
The automaticity of these three proposals reduces their susceptibility to political wrangling 
over adaptation’s relative emphasis with mitigation, and their taxation of emitting activities 
in turn promotes rather than discourages mitigation.   
Three additional IAF proposals have funding flows that are relatively insulated from 
competition with mitigation efforts – the global trading of damage credits for mitigation and 
adaptation, a global currency transaction tax, or a separate adaptation protocol with multiple 
funding mechanisms.  However the first of these is not yet fully developed as a proposal, and 
all three are among the least likely to be accepted by group one donor nations.  Four different 
proposals would tend to encourage additional mitigation though they score low on the 
resource competition measure:  the World Climate Change Fund, an auction of assigned 
amount units (AAUs), a global carbon tax, and an auction of AAUs from the EU-ETS.   
                                                 
24
 The GDP tax has a neutral to positive effect on mitigation.  GDP is related to GHG emissions because 
economic activity is correlated with emissions, but some economies are more emission-intensive than others. 
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Table 10.  Results for compliance criteria.   
 
IAF Proposal
air travel tax -- International Air Passenger 
Adaptation Levy (IAPAL)
shipping fuel tax -- International Maritime 
Emission Reduction Scheme (IMERS)
air travel and shipping freight tax -- Tuvalu 
Burden Sharing Mechanism
global trading of damage credits for 
mitigation and adaptation
global currency transaction tax -- Tobin 
Tax
separate Adaptation Protocol with multiple 
funding mechanisms 
World Climate Change Fund
auction of assigned amount units (AAUs)
global carbon tax
auction of AAUs from EU-ETS
GDP tax -- GDP Fiscal Commitment
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund
Adaptation Fund, Technology Fund, and 
Insurance Mechanism -- AOSIS proposal
IMF donated special drawing rights (SDRs)
adaptation bonds -- Global Climate 
Financing Mechanism
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)
GEF Trust Fund
Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)
KPAF with higher CDM add-on levy
KPAF with JI tax expansion
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (KPAF)
Key:  resource competion mitigation promotion
= little to no competition = in top tercile
= in middle tercile
= in bottom tercile
= stronger potential for 
resource competition
C2:  policy interaction -- Does 
adaptation encourage or 
discourage mitigation?
C1:  resource competition -- 




Notably, the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (KPAF) – along with the proposed 
revisions to it that would either expand its scope or raise its levy – score low on both 
compliance criteria, as the mechanism is relatively easy to avoid (it is a choice to employ the 
CDM) and the levy on the CDM to fund adaptation acts as a disincentive to take further 
actions on mitigation.  
4.5.3.  Tradeoffs and Alternative Incentives 
In the continued absence of a binding international climate change regime that 
follows Kyoto, we are left with the current situation:  inadequate overall mitigation levels 
with no binding future commitment from either rich states or fast growing states on future 
mitigation, low IAF levels, and existing adaptation financing mechanisms – the Kyoto 
Protocol Adaptation Fund, the World Bank and GEF funds, and now the Copenhagen Green 
Fund – that are structured more around the preferences of the donor nations rather than 
taking more consideration of the aid recipient nations’ preferences.  While the last of this 
group is new, it creates little movement from the current stable coalition in which group one 
nations are willing to help to pay for a low level of group three’s adaptation needs without 
any future commitment to reduce GHG emissions from group two.  Donor nations are of 
course free to provide aid at a level and in the way they wish, but if they are trying to gain the 
support of the aid recipient nations in negotiations for a climate treaty then these choices will 
be constrained.  The emergence of a binding post-Kyoto climate regime is not guaranteed, 
given the stability of the status quo, and no natural or pre-determined line of progress exists 
with international environmental issues such that it is only a matter of time before a climate 
treaty is born.   
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With the long-term policy objective of creating a new climate change regime, 
propitious results from this analysis would have revealed a set of IAF proposals that score at 
the top of all four participation and compliance criteria.  But such a set does not emerge.  The 
top compliance performers of IAPAL, IMERS, and TBS are all most preferred by the group 
two and three coalition and least preferred by group one.  Two of the three IAF proposals that 
scored well on participation also score near the top on compliance – the Norwegian auction 
of AAUs and the Swiss carbon tax.  The third, a continuation of the KPAF, scores poorly on 
compliance as noted above. 
Up to this point in the analysis, participation and compliance have been treated as 
equally necessary requirements, along with strong environmental targets, in the creation of a 
working international climate change policy arrangement.  The adoption of the 1992 
UNFCCC by 194 parties already demonstrates that it is comparatively easy to create a 
climate change regime with broad participation as long as the compliance requirements are 
minimal.  It may also show that the sequencing of participation and compliance matters.  If 
the development of international climate policy follows the path of other international 
environmental policy efforts, then it can start with a broad but weak treaty with a more 
binding protocol to follow.  As the treaty requires only participation and no compliance, the 
need for this participation becomes more important for the sole reason that it occurs first in 
the process. 
Overcoming the hurdles of a stable but ineffective climate regime requires finding 
ways to encourage negotiating parties to compromise, either by changing the necessary 
tradeoff choices or by changing their perceived interests in a way that would raise the 
likelihood of treaty acceptance.  It is an empirical question as to which of these two scenarios 
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is more likely to result in an agreement breakthrough:  1) where one negotiating party is 
strongly in favor of a proposal and the other party is strongly against, leaving open the 
possibility of trading on other issues and eventual compromise, or 2) where both parties have 
lukewarm support of the proposal but because of this they lack any incentive to trade on 
other issues or the political enthusiasm to push for the conclusion of a deal.   
With the focus on participation, two pathways present themselves for how such an 
agreement could be constructed.  The first is illustrated by this research, where group one 
members move more toward the preferences of the group two and three negotiating bloc in 
terms of the IAF structure.  The other path depends on the amount of funding, which is a key 
driver in the acceptability of IAF both to donor and recipient nations.  Much of the challenge 
would seem to be in convincing the developed donor nations to provide more IAF than they 
are currently willing while simultaneously convincing the aid recipient nations to accept less.  
For now it appears that the coalition of aid recipient nations and their group two advocates 
holds the negotiation advantage.  Group two is poised to continue its upward growth in GHG 
emissions and will not agree to future constraints until group one mitigates more as well as 
pays more IAF to group three.   
With the goal of creating a treaty, the institutional design of the funding mechanism 
can act to implicitly change these funding levels to more closely match the preferences of the 
negotiating blocs.  Certain mitigation technologies or adaptation approaches may interact 
with either positive synergies (planting trees) or negative ones (adaptation measures that 
require more energy usage) (Klein et al. 2007; Taylor et al. 2007).  The likelihood of broader 
participation could be increased for the donor nations of group one if adaptation projects with 
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positive mitigation side effects have those benefits credited towards a nation’s mitigation 
account.  This is done already with the mitigation-specific projects under the CDM.   
Perceived payoffs to aid recipient nations from IAF could change if attention is paid 
to the method of funding delivery.  This can take several forms:  1) cash transfers, grants, or 
loans to government budgets (Horstmann et al. 2009), 2) specific funding for ―hard‖ 
adaptation infrastructure projects, 3) support for ―soft‖ projects such as climate insurance 
(Jaeger 2004; Burton et al. 2006; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2008), and 4) mainstreamed 
adaptation aid that is nevertheless additional to pre-existing ODA.  The funding method will 
affect the efficiency of the adaptation investment (in terms of governance and oversight), the 
distribution of benefits for local recipients, and interactions with mitigation at the technical 
level of implementation (applicable to project targeting and on-the-ground implementation).  
As adaptation financial flows are scaled up, the recipients’ absorptive capacity – in the form 
of institutional, technical, or managerial capacity constraints – will start to affect and 
eventually limit the usefulness of the financial flows (Brown and Vigneri 2008).   
I argue in chapter two that treating adaptation as a single and uniform response, either 
within a conceptual framework or in an integrated assessment model, is not an accurate 
depiction of reality.  Especially when including adaptation in a joint approach with 
mitigation, distinguishing among three distinct classes of adaptation activities provides 
policymakers with a more realistic representation of climate change responses:  1) flexible 
and short-lived flow spending, 2) committed and long-lived new stock investments, and 3) 
retrofitting of pre-existing adaptation stock investments.  Applying this approach to ongoing 
negotiations on IAF in a post-Kyoto climate regime could better inform policy discussions by 
outlining the portion of adaptation aid that may be designed for ongoing but short-lived flows 
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rather than intermittent lump sum payments for specific stock adaptation projects.  Conscious 
planning for the budgetary flows of IAF would also promote the UNFCCC requirement for 
adaptation aid predictability over the relevant planning periods.   
Thinking about the appropriateness of adaptation investment types with adaptation 
aid could also help to leverage the significant non-climate co-benefits of IAF.  Taking the 
broad definition of adaptation from the IPCC (rather than the more restrictive one of chapter 
two that is limited to climatic effects only) may enlarge the negotiation space between IAF 
donor and recipient nations by better reflecting recipient nation motivations.  To the extent 
that any of the IAF can be seen as having significant non-climate co-benefits, especially 
those that coincide with development goals, then the recipient nation would see more local 
benefits.  In this way the UNFCCC additionality requirement could be met for adaptation 
specifically while the negotiators also discuss ways to increase the co-benefits of that aid.   
Aid recipient nations will also have preferences for the type of adaptation that is 
implemented.  As noted in chapter three, Bosello et al. (2010) find using the AD-WITCH 
optimization model that while relatively rich OECD nations would choose an adaptation 
policy mix heavily weighted to anticipatory (stock) rather than reactive (flow) options, the 
relatively poorer non-OECD nations would prefer a mix of the two strategies in roughly 
equal proportions.
25
  This finding fits neatly into the three country groupings developed here.  
It shows that if the preferences for the type of IAF funding delivery of aid recipient nations 
were known then such aid could be designed to match those preferences.  This targeting of 
                                                 
25
 As noted in chapter three, the authors attribute this result to two factors:  1) the level of economic 
development, where rich nations are able to afford expensive investments that will become productive in the 
future, and 2) climate vulnerability, where the damages of non-OECD nations are better addressed by reactive 
adaptation with the reverse for OECD nations.   
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IAF by adaptation type in response to expressed recipient needs could increase its implicit 
value to the recipient while costing little to the donor nations, because it is a decision to 
revise the funding timing rather than the total amount.   
Furthermore, ceteris paribus, donor nations would likely prefer project-based aid to 
better ensure accountability through easier monitoring.  Recipient nations would conversely 
prefer lump-sum transfers to ensure the maximum amount of flexibility to direct the funds 
towards adaptation-specific projects or other development-related projects as needed.  A 
middle ground between the two positions could be reached with IAF that is project-based but 
which also promotes predictability for the recipient nation on the portion of the aid that is of 
a regular flow nature and which part is for large stock projects.
26
 
Group three aid recipient nations are not expected to begin mandated mitigation 
efforts in any treaty in the near or medium term.  Even if they were fully satisfied with the 
adaptation aid arrangements in a new treaty, their participation does nothing by itself for 
global mitigation efforts, nor does it guarantee promises of future mitigation by their group 
two advocates.  However, a more satisfied set of group three nations eliminates both the role 
of advocate for group two states as well as the argument that group one members are not 
helping to pay for the climate damages that are due primarily to their past emissions.  Group 
two emissions are growing faster than those of group one, and the proportion of climate 
damages that is due to group two will grow in the future as well.  To the extent that more 
damages on group three nations are both ameliorated by group one-sourced IAF and 
increasingly attributed to a hesitancy by group two to mitigate, then group three motivations 
in climate negotiations could start to change.  From looking to group two for support, group 
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 My thanks are to Jonathan Wiener for discussions on these points.   
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three nations could instead start to press their former advocates to start mitigating as well.
27
  
It is a long-term path to be sure, but helping to satisfy group three concerns on adaptation aid 
can eventually encourage future mitigation by group two states.   
4.6.  Conclusions 
“The core questions – how much developed countries will reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions, what the rapidly industrializing countries will do to control their fast-
growing emissions, and how the poorer countries will be assisted in their adaptation 
efforts – remain untouched” (GLCA 2009).   
Despite recurrent claims before recent COPs that each is the last chance for action, 
international climate policy development remains an ongoing process subject to regular 
revision.  For now, ―No global mechanism exists to foster international cooperation on 
adaptation and to set priorities for the existing fund to function in a coordinated manner‖ 
(GLCA 2009).  Continuation of current status quo IAF mechanisms provides no diplomatic 
movement toward a post-Kyoto regime.  And as argued here, IAF in the form of national-
level bilateral aid is not a long-term solution to achieving a new, stable, and environmentally 
effective climate change regime, as it does not reach the level of committed funding 
necessary to encourage broad participation in such a regime.   
In this chapter I have examined several groups of international adaptation financing 
proposals for how they would interact with mitigation efforts, either by promoting or 
detracting from the emergence of an environmentally effective  post-Kyoto climate treaty.  
For Wiener (2007), the inescapable problem is ―how to produce a global public good, via 
national consent, among heterogeneous countries.‖  International adaptation financing can be 
an important policy lever to achieve this goal, and the policy design of such a mechanism 
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 All of this of course requires that group one member nations also start to significantly mitigate themselves.   
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will have important effects on the likelihood of achieving meaningful participation as well as 
treaty compliance by those nations that choose to participate.   
The analysis presented here is not a prediction of what we expect to see in ongoing 
climate negotiations but rather a guide to how the structure of an IAF mechanism could 
contribute to realizing a world with a binding climate treaty that has full participation by the 
relevant nations.  As it becomes clear that the role of IAF will continue to grow in ongoing 
climate negotiations, it becomes worth knowing which IAF approaches will encourage the 
emergence of an environmentally effective post-Kyoto agreement through additional 
mitigation efforts, and to acknowledge the drawbacks of those financing schemes that may 
discourage such treaty-based mitigation.  With some negotiating movement on the part of 
both parties, a new and stable climate coalition can be constructed that achieves the 
adaptation goals of the vulnerable nations and the mitigation goals of the rich nations.  
Tradeoffs over participation and compliance goals need to be considered as IAF is 
incorporated into the evolving international climate regime.      
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4.7.  Appendix 
Table 11.  Selected bilateral climate change aid initiatives and proposals that include adaptation.   
Donor Aid Program Source 
Japan 
5-year, $10 billion fund for climate-related activities, some of 
which cover adaptation;  the "Cool Earth Partnership" 
Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs of Japan (2008) 
European 
Commission 
The “Global Climate Change Alliance” has €139.6 million over 




"Adaptation to Climate Change Initiative" (adaptation aid 
primarily to Pacific island countries and East Timor) 
GLCA (2009) 
Spain 
a multi-year Strategic Partnership Agreement of close to  €400 
million towards UNDP projects on poverty and climate change 
UNDP (2009) 
Germany 
funding from auctions of domestic emissions allowances, the 
"International Climate Protection Initiative" 
Federal Environment 
Ministry of Germany (2009) 
United States 
International Climate Change Adaptation Program under the  




Some bilateral funds, such as the United Kingdom’s Environmental Transformation Fund – International 
Window, go directly into the World Bank Climate Investment Funds and are thus not counted here.  General 















Table 12.  Adaptation funding instruments as evaluated by different criteria from previous studies. 
 
 















new and additional:  over and above 
current ODA commitments 
X X X X X X 
predictable:  not subject to “domestic 
revenue problem”;  steady flow of 
revenues estimated in advance 
X X X X X X 





X X X 
equitable:  "common but 
differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities" (Art. 3.1 
UNFCCC 1992), or polluter-pays 
principle 
X X X X X   
efficiency / effects on competition X X X       
"sustainable" X       X   
governance X           
recipient absorptive capacity X           
ease of implementation   X         
co-benefits (or lack of co-costs)   X         
verifiability   X         
climate impact     X       
interference with national 
sovereignty;  political feasibility 
    X       
appropriate – neither grants nor loans       X     




CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION 
5.1.  Summary 
This dissertation clarifies the discussion about jointly implemented climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies, helping to bridge the gap between conceptual categories 
and modeling both for policy application at the national level as well as at the international 
level in climate policy negotiations.  The two-part analysis framework that runs through the 
dissertation is laid out in chapter two.  First, mitigation and adaptation comparisons and 
tradeoffs are most apparent to policymakers if the strategies are compared on both their 
investment lifetimes and strategy limits in relation to climate damages, as well as how they 
both behave under uncertainty.  Second, these comparisons between the two strategies are 
best understood when the adaptation response is divided into different investment types with 
different design capacities.   
The three essays of this dissertation make positive contributions to the climate change 
policy literature.  In chapter two I address the multiple challenges that greet any thinking 
about mitigation and adaptation, and present a coherent way to understand how these very 
different strategies address different aspects of the climate change policy challenge.  I argue 
the case that answering questions about mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs in joint 
implementation requires the reconciliation of these responses in those terms most applicable 
to the questions posed, where both investment lifetimes and strategy limits as well as policy 
behavior under uncertainty are the key areas of comparison.  The next step follows, that 
adaptation is understood in terms of short-lived and repeated flow spending, long-lived 
investments in adaptation capital stock, and the option to retrofit existing adaptation stock.   
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In chapter three I implement part of the framework in a new model to optimize for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, one of a few analyses that explicitly look 
at both flow- and stock-type adaptation as well as mitigation (Lecocq and Shalizi 2008; 
Bosello et al. 2010; Yohe et al. 2010).  I present the base case results of this model and find 
that the behavior of tradeoffs between flow and stock adaptation influences policy outcomes, 
especially when flow adaptation meets its capacity limits.   
In chapter four I analyze the mechanism design characteristics of 22 proposals for 
international adaptation financing, and how these ways of structuring this aid can affect the 
likelihood that a binding and environmentally effective international climate change treaty 
will emerge.  In my results I find that no set of proposals possess these characteristics that 
will most likely encourage both participation in a treaty and compliance with it once it is 
joined.  However, conscious management of the type of adaptation aid that is donated, along 
the lines of the flow and stock adaptation types here, may serve as a tool to change the 
perceived interests of adaptation aid donor and recipient nations and thus nudge international 
climate policy negotiations past the current stalemate.   
5.2.  Caveats 
The analysis framework developed here can be applied to questions about the 
comparison of mitigation and adaptation in joint implementation.  In adopting this approach 
other methods are necessarily rejected that are more appropriate for looking at different 
aspects of mitigation and adaptation.  For instance, an examination of adaptation decision 
making at the local level would be most informed with a case study approach.  The size of 
adaptation side payments from rich to poor nations within international climate negotiations 
can be informed by a game-theoretic approach.  And of course the two responses can be 
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analyzed independently by treating the levels of the alternative policy as an exogenous 
assumption.   
Knowing now the correct analytical tool to apply to the question, we must also know 
when the question itself can be posed.  The relevance of mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs 
and interactions – and thus the applicability of this framework – depends on the size of the 
existing governance scale.  As seen in Fig. 38, as the scale of governance rises from the local 
to the national to the global, the relevance of mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs rises as 
well.  For nations seeking to consider and manage the relationship between climate response 
strategies, the question is more relevant the more they can independently affect global GHG 
emissions levels.  The tradeoffs are most relevant globally if international cooperation exists 
to manage them.  But if this international cooperation is lacking then a self-interested 
international actor would completely ignore any provision for the public good of mitigation.   
As is apparent from the figure (and as argued in chapter two), at smaller, more local 
levels of climate policy, implementing an optimal set of mitigation and adaptation policies is 
neither tractable nor appropriate even if it were feasible.  Because of heterogeneous local 
adaptation needs and the minute effect of local mitigation on global GHG emissions, it is 
difficult to translate the lessons of a global optimization into usable policy lessons at this 
local level of implementation (Klein et al. 2007).  At this scale it is best to think of each 
strategy in isolation, evaluated on its own merits as felt locally.
1
   
                                                 
1
 This dissertation has not addressed autonomous, individual-level mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs.  At this 
smallest limit of a self-interested individual all climate change-related benefits come from autonomous 
adaptation, while zero climate-specific benefits accrue from personal mitigation (though there often may be 
personal co-benefits or ―no-regrets‖ mitigation steps at the individual level).   
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Fig. 38.  The relevance of public sector mitigation/adaptation tradeoffs to decisionmakers within 
that governance scale.     
 
Even though mitigation and adaptation balancing tradeoffs will not be on the local 
agenda for discussion, the framework developed here can still provide a useful way to think 
about policy implementation.  Expected local damage trends can be taken as exogenous, 
unmovable by any local mitigation decision.  The focus then is on what local mix of short-
term flow, medium-term retrofits, and long-term new stock adaptation investments are best 
suited to a locality’s needs.  Leaving aside retrofitting, if damages are clearly addressed by 
either a flow approach or a stock approach, then the locality has little flexibility on where to 
direct investments.  With some types of damages, however, the policymakers may have the 
option to try more of both approaches.  For example, do they decide to cope with minor 
seasonal flooding every year on a temporary and regular basis, or do they seek a more 
permanent solution?  With everything else equal, and given such a set of expected damages, 
much of the decision may depend on the ability to secure either long-term project financing 
for the stock adaptation or, similarly, a dependable and predictable revenue flow for the flow 















































for the direct comparison of adaptation approaches as based on their project financing 
attributes.  Local policymakers, after a process of stakeholder debate and negotiation, can 
then choose the adaptation project type that best achieves their goals, whether these goals are 
related to the climatic benefits of the policy or the non-climate co-benefits.    
One challenge to the approach developed here could be that it simplifies mitigation 
and adaptation interactions too far, mistakenly putting aside the complexities of climate 
change in order to achieve parsimony.  A limitation of this study (and area for future 
research) is that it does not emphasize the non-climate co-benefits of mitigation and 
adaptation, as I have used strictly climate-centric definitions for both strategies.  A full 
accounting of co-benefits payback schedules as well as the different potential beneficiary 
groups with interests in mitigation and adaptation for reasons that are unrelated to climate 
change would surely alter the chosen paths of each policy over time.   
Through this dissertation I have sought to avoid the trap of discovering truth merely 
by assertion.  What I am asserting here is not that the way of describing mitigation and 
adaptation tradeoffs developed here is a full and complete description of climate change 
policy.  Rather I am arguing that understanding mitigation and adaptation interactions can 
proceed further with this way of approaching the questions.    
In chapter two I develop the three flow, stock, and retrofitting adaptation types and 
present examples of each.  In doing so I am framing rigid forms of adaptation that do not 
exist as such clearly delineated categories in practice.
2
  This is perhaps why, as noted in 
chapter three, that while empirical studies have produced estimates of adaptation costs for 
specific damage sectors (e.g., as reported in UNFCCC (2007b),  Agrawala and Fankhauser 
                                                 
2
 My thanks are to Mort Webster for discussion on these points.   
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(2008), and Parry et al. (2009)), to my knowledge cost and capacity estimates for adaptation 
responses that are explicitly split between flow-type spending and stock adaptation 
investments (or retrofitting investments either for that matter) have yet to be developed.   
If such estimates are difficult to come by, it will be similarly difficult to capture an 
estimate of the elasticity of substitution between flow and stock adaptation within a total 
adaptation production function.  We do not know whether such a measure is relatively high 
(an optimistic scenario) or relatively low (a pessimistic scenario).  Yet we also know that a 
degree of interchangeability does exist between different adaptation types in producing total 
adaptation benefits, even though this ability will differ by damage sector and adaptation 
technology.  Any revisions to flow adaptation that make it last longer transform it into 
something more like adaptation stock, and likewise any revisions to stock adaptation such 
that its designed lifetime is shortened will make it behave more like a flow adaptation 
response.   
Finally, a healthy skepticism of models that address environmental concerns in 
general is warranted (Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis 2007), and critiques of the DICE-based global 
optimization modeling approach taken here are well known.  Suffice it to say that such 
integrated assessment models are tools like any other in public policy analysis, with 
comparative strengths in particular areas and weaknesses in others.  I focus on the strengths 
of this modeling approach.  As climate change is a global problem, I would argue that such 
globally-applied analyses are among the most informative for public policy decision making.  
The IAM applied in chapter three is meant neither to predict the future nor provide numerical 
estimates on what optimal policy paths may entail.  Rather, by integrating adaptation 
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decision making into the model it can demonstrate the general behavior of different types of 
adaptation vis-à-vis mitigation, especially when one of the adaptation types starts to fail.    
5.3.  Key Insights 
A number of general insights can be synthesized from this research, which lead to a 
set of specific policy recommendations in the following section.   
5.3.1.  Mitigation and adaptation tradeoffs matter. 
It is palliative to state that while mitigation and adaptation are both needed for an 
optional climate policy response, and tradeoffs between the two will be significant for public 
policy, that trying to think about them in joint implementation is too challenging because of 
the difficulties explored in section 2.2.2.  But this does not negate the importance of 
investigating a decision making process in which real economic resources and policy efforts 
will be allocated between the two strategies to respond to climate change.  With limited 
budgets, policy resources are constrained, and only so much of these resources can go to any 
one particular strategy.  The interactions are important even with unconstrained budgets.  As 
argued, the process of adapting and resolving uncertainty about how much we need (and are 
able) to adapt today can affect mitigation decisions, but the act of mitigating and then 
learning from this how much we can (or need to) mitigate provides much less information for 
today’s adaptation decisions.  Analyzing how the individual components of an overall 
response to climate change interact to create different outcomes over damages, costs, and 
welfare can provide useful insights to policymakers by improving policy allocation decisions. 
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5.3.2.  Adaptation types matter. 
The importance of construct paradigms is paramount, as they direct the way that 
people think about a problem and structure the boundaries of future research (Kuhn 1996).  
As argued in chapter two, many of the current set of adaptation typologies and constructs are 
not relevant to an analysis of adaptation in conjunction with mitigation.  Thus, at least for this 
question, these constructs have not generated the policy guidance that decisionmakers need 
to make informed investment and implementation choices between mitigation and 
adaptation.  Building off of the multiple constructs of Table 1, I have argued here that the 
temporal scope and lifetime of investments are the characteristics that allow decisionmakers 
to make better decisions about combining mitigation and aggregated adaptation policies.   
5.3.3.  Adaptation limits matter. 
Strong optimism about society’s ability to adapt to climate change is unwarranted, not 
because such adaptation cannot eliminate many of the imminent damages but because 
adaptation is a response that is limited.  These limits matter because they exist and will be 
surpassed, which will require substitution either with other pre-existing policy responses or 
with new responses that have yet to be developed and tested.  If one analyses a progression 
up a ladder of adaptation responses as with Fig. 7, then the adapting agent substitutes more 
costly adaptation responses for those that have failed until affordable options no longer exist 
and the adaptation stops.  Such a progression makes the strong assumption that alternatives 
will be readily available.  If the limits are examined using the model of chapter three, the 
effects of a flow adaptation that fails to adapt any further may (or may not) be compensated 
by increased response levels from either stock adaptation, or mitigation, or both, depending 
on the ability of policymakers to substitute these other strategies in for the failed one.   
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5.3.4.  Uncertainty matters.   
Uncertainty matters, both because it is an ever-present aspect of policy 
implementation in practice, and because incorporating it into analyses that assume certainty 
changes the policy results in significant areas.  It was argued here that the uncertainties 
associated with mitigation and adaptation are qualitatively different as to when they enter the 
society-climate-policy system, the mechanism for their resolution, and the timing and clarity 
of their resolution.  In this way different information is learned with the implementation of 
mitigation and different adaptations, and this information is of different degrees of 
importance and relevance for policy planning for each of the response types.  As shown in 
the decision tree of Fig. 11, three uncertainties over the net benefits of all types of adaptation, 
mitigation costs, and climate sensitivity affect the responses in order of when they are 
resolved, with long-term uncertainties relevant only for the strategies with long-term effects.  
From this I concluded that knowing how much we need to (and are able to) adapt today can 
affect mitigation decisions, but knowing how much we can (or need to) mitigate provides 
much less information for today’s adaptation decision.   
Uncertainty was not explicitly modeled in the IAM of chapter three, but it can be 
hypothesized that an additional uncertainty about the existence of a capacity limit on flow 
adaptation will change the level of optimal policies in early periods, before that limit is 
breached in a later period.  As explored in Fig. 31, the timing of when the capacity threshold 
is surpassed will be determined in part by the implementation rate of the strategy.  If the 
threshold level is uncertain, then the time periods for the resolution of that uncertainty will 
depend on the rate of implementation as well.   
Uncertainty matters internationally because if and when nations do participate in a 
post-Kyoto follow-on treaty they will want to verify that other parties are in compliance with 
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their obligations.  In the medium term, group one members will require a credible, verifiable 
commitment to eventual mitigation by group two members.  In the near term it means that 
international adaptation financing, when transferred to group three members, can be shown to 
be going to verified adaptation projects rather than other uses.  For their part, group three aid 
recipient nations are motivated to reduce uncertainty about the level of future aid flows, the 
commitment to keep that aid continuing in the future, and the specific aid levels from year to 
year for project planning purposes.   
5.4.  Policy Implications and Recommendations 
I have argued in this dissertation that when thinking about a joint mitigation and 
adaptation climate response it is important to address the different time profiles for benefits 
and costs for each strategy as well as their different degrees of flexibility under uncertainty.  
Applying this way of thinking to climate policy development presents many practical 
implications for policy decision making, depending on which level of government 
implements the policy.  As shown in Fig. 38, the mitigation versus adaptation question rises 
in relevance with enlarging scales of governance, as long as an applicable governing 
decisionmaker exists at that scale.   
In this section I examine how putting the framework developed here into practice at 
different levels of governance can provide positive contributions to policy decision making.  
The challenges to developing viable climate policy at the international level were 
investigated in chapter four.  How could this research be put to use to better inform policy 
decisions with the UNFCCC?  At the national level, the United States currently lacks a 
coherent climate change policy with binding mitigation requirements.  In the public sector 
the federal government has the potential to be the largest player in national climate policy.  It 
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can control the most public investment dollars for disbursement to projects nationwide, as 
well as leverage much greater potential investments through the development and execution 
of national climate change policy.  Relatedly, it is only on the national scale that mitigation 
goals play a role at the global scale.  If, but more likely when, such a policy eventually comes 
into existence, U.S. federal agencies will want to know the best allocation of policy dollars.   
*  *  * 
A number of specific policy recommendations can be made from the research in this 
dissertation.  I present them here as they apply to U.S. national-level policy, international-
level policy, and general climate policy.     
5.4.1.  U.S. National Level 
 Pursue a national adaptation strategy that emphasizes long-lived stock adaptation 
approaches rather than short-lived and repeated flow adaptation approaches.   
Stock adaptation has a distinct advantage over flow adaptation because it lasts longer 
in addressing climate change damages.  The advantages of flow-type adaptation is that it is 
more flexible in responding to damages as they occur, and in a manner that lowers the risk of 
over-adapting to a given type of damages.  If there was relatively high uncertainty over the 
level and characteristics of future damages over the coming three or four decades, then the 
flexibility of flow adaptation might be preferred to a strategy of ―climate proofing‖ 
vulnerable sectors, at least until we became more certain about the level of damages that we 
will be facing.   
However, the opposite is true.  We have a very good idea of both the level and type of 
climate damages that are imminent, and we know that over the relevant timescale mitigation 
can to nothing to stop these negative impacts.  The risks of overinvestment in long-lived 
adaptation measures is thus low, especially when it is also clear that many sectors are already 
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under-adapted to the present climate (and will be even more so lacking any new investments 
in infrastructure).   
Adaptation investments should be tuned to address our expectation of future damages 
within the designed capacity lifetime of the adaptive investment, and in consideration of the 
tolerance for damage risks within the affected sector.  What this means in practice is that 
long-lived adaptive responses should be implemented now with both capacities and lifetimes 
that are calibrated to our best expectations of damages that we will suffer.  This is not call for 
a nationwide climate proofing approach that is based on worst-case damage scenarios.  
Rather it is an argument to build long-lived responses now to address expected damages, 
with an additional capacity buffer to account for the risk that these stock adaptations may be 
overwhelmed by the damages.  For example, if a long-lived hurricane protection system for 
New Orleans is expected to last for fifty years, then it should be built to withstand the 
damages of those levels of hurricanes that can be expected over the next five decades, with 
an additional capacity to reflect our preference to avoid system failure (where in this case the 
system fails catastrophically).  Acknowledging a political reality that such large-scale federal 
investment projects may face competition with other such projects for placement across a 
wide (and sub-optimal) range of Congressional districts, the goal should be to compare, 
locate, and fund these committed investments by where and in which sector they provide the 
highest net societal benefits.  In localities or sectors where future damages remain less clear 
then a more flexible flow-type approach would be more applicable, but in those areas and 
sectors where the damages can be foreseen now – especially with sea-level rise and the water 
sector at the regional level – stock adaptation investments can begin now.    
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The barriers to pursuing such a strategy emphasizing long-lived adaptation responses 
are not insurmountable.  First, while flow adaptation appears cheaper, it is so only from a 
cash-flow perspective and not from one of net discounted benefits.  With flexible financing 
arrangements over a term that matches the expected lifetime of the investments, stock 
adaptation projects can start to appear more like repeated flow adaptation, at least from a 
cash-flow perspective, and thus be more politically acceptable.   
Second, differences in the strength of stakeholder preferences will have to be 
surmounted by traditional political negotiations.  As discussed further in section 5.5.1, 
nations that are large enough to encompass multiple climatic zones will experience different 
types of climate damages, which will be felt by different stakeholders.  The qualitative nature 
of adaptation needs will be different in Alaska and Florida, for example, which will both 
likely have more intense adaptation needs than those in a state like Minnesota.  The necessity 
of political influences in distributing much of the adaptation project funding does not weaken 
the need for a long-lived adaptation strategy response in those parts of the country most 
exposed to a changing climate.   
 Unify federal funding for climate change-related programs with a lead coordination 
body;  keep implementation agencies separate.     
This dissertation has emphasized that the two key responses to climate change must 
not be thought of separately but instead conceptualized in joint implementation.  Yet this is a 
separate issue from the implementation of the approaches, where from a technological 
perspective the two strategies operate in largely separate spheres.  In implementation, 
budgetary tradeoffs are the key relationship and policy synergies between the two are weak.  
At the U.S. federal level, the Environmental Protection Agency will likely be tasked with 
implementing and overseeing an eventual cap-and-trade system for mitigation, the 
189 
 
Department of Energy will continue its work on research into potential new mitigation 
technologies, the Corps of Engineers will play a large part in constructing stock adaptation 
and retrofitting of pre-existing stock, and the State Department will coordinate international 
climate change policy efforts.  It makes no sense to try and unify such a diverse set of federal 
agencies with different core competencies under a new national climate change agency when 
the implementation of these mitigation and adaptation efforts has little to do with one 
another.   
At the same time a coherent national-level climate change policy still needs to be 
developed, one that assesses all of the different types of approaches to the changing climate 
and is able to structure them as a coherent response rather than a shotgun blast of policies 
issued from across the federal government.  A better understanding of how the nation as a 
whole is responding to climate change would emerge if a single oversight office was tasked 
with coordinating and harmonizing all climate change efforts across the U.S. federal 
government. 
Four existing entities could be empowered to fill this important role.  First, the White 
House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) is the coordinating body for federal 
environmental policy, and its chair the chief environmental policy advisor to the president 
(White House 2010b).  If it were to take on the role of coordinating U.S. federal climate 
policy, the CEQ has the advantage of being long-established and fully institutionalized (it 
was created under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969), but the possible 
disadvantage of already operating at full capacity in its efforts to address a large range of 
environmental issues that are not specifically related to climate change.  Similar in qualities 
but with a different topical mandate is the White House Office of Science and Technology 
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Policy (OSTP), established in 1976 to advise the president on science and technology matters 
(White House 2010a).  As with the CEQ, the OSTP is already fully immersed in a large set of 
issues relevant to its mandate, and assigning it the charge of coordinating climate change 
policy may risk overreach.   
The third candidate to fulfill the coordination role is the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program (GCRP), which currently coordinates climate change research across 
twelve federal agencies and entities.  The GCRP is also relatively well established and 
provided much of the scientific basis for a recent interagency task force report on federal 
adaptation policy that was overseen by the CEQ (White House 2010c).  The strength of the 
GCRP is its singular focus on climate change research, but it is an open question whether this 
ability to oversee research efforts could translate well into a stronger coordinating role for 
the implementation of national climate change policy.   
The new White House Office for Energy and Climate Change is the youngest and 
currently least-developed of these four candidates, having been created in 2009.  However, it 
has the most potential to best fulfill the role of U.S. federal climate policy coordinator, 
because of its position within the executive branch and its sole focus on the interrelated 
issues of energy and climate change.  The office is small now because it is new, but more 
importantly because there is no national climate change policy for it to coordinate and no 
foundational law upon which the office can base its work (as, for example, the CEQ bases its 
work on NEPA).  When such a law is eventually passed, this office should be designated as 
the lead coordinating body for implementation of the law across the federal government.  As 
its capacity (and funding) is ramped up, it could absorb under its umbrella those climate-
centered functions that are currently under both the CEQ and the OSTP.  Additionally it 
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would fully absorb the GCRP, allowing it to coordinate both research and implementation of 
climate policy at the federal level.    
5.4.2.  International Level 
 At the international level, avoid incentives to provide international adaptation 
financing aid primarily in the form of short-term rather than long-term projects.   
The danger at the international level is that as international adaptation financing aid is 
incorporated into a Kyoto follow-on treaty the preferences of both donor and recipient 
nations may align to over-promote flow adaptation at the expense of stock adaptation.  For 
donors, short-term flow adaptation is attractive because it requires no long-term commitment 
to see a large and specific stock-type project through to completion.  At the same time money 
can get out the door and disbursed more quickly if it is for flow-type purposes, allowing the 
donor to show the recipient nation that something is being done to help them with adaptation 
needs.  For aid recipient nations, aid for flow-type adaptation may be preferred for similar 
reasons.  Stock projects take longer to deliver benefits because they must first be completed, 
and are often specific to one area, while flow-type adaptation can provide its benefits 
relatively quickly and over a larger area if necessary.  Furthermore, the poorest nations that 
are vulnerable to climate change impacts may lack the institutional capacity to absorb the 
benefits of stock adaptation.   
Yet long-lived stock adaptation should be promoted for poor and vulnerable nations – 
for the same reasons that it should be promoted in developed countries, as discussed above – 
but at a pace that matches the recipient’s capacity to absorb such investment.  Climate change 
damages are occurring now and are the ―new normal‖ conditions under which these states 
will try to simultaneously cope and develop economically.  Such an adaptation strategy 
would operate in conjunction with the national economic development goals, acknowledging 
192 
 
the important co-benefits that long-term adaptation can provide for development as well as 
the fact that no nation developed economically using short-term approaches.   
5.4.3.  General Climate Policy 
 Successful adaptation does not imply that less mitigation is needed now.   
In chapter two it was argued that learning new information about the feasibility of 
adaptation will affect decisions on mitigation levels more than will learning new information 
about mitigation decisions affects decisions on appropriate adaptation levels.  The conclusion 
was that a rationally chosen mitigation level will be influenced by present-day adaptation 
levels and our learning on how effective they are at reducing damages.  From this one may be 
tempted to assume that if adaptation was found to be successful at lowering damages now, 
then less mitigation would be needed as we are able to cope with climate change better than 
expected.  But the examination of different strategy timescales in chapter two, along with the 
implementation limits of adaptation in chapter three, shows that such an assumption would 
be mistaken.  Today’s adaptation is applicable to damages only for the next several decades, 
while today’s mitigation will take effect only after that.  Even if today’s adaptation 
successfully avoids technological limits within its designed lifetime, it will still meet the end 
of its lifetime (its temporal limits) at some point, at which time new adaptation measures will 
be needed.  And any breaching of adaptation limits at a point earlier than was expected will 
cause regret at having not mitigated enough earlier on, in order to offset some of the new, 
higher damages.   
 Develop a research agenda for the study of both uncertain adaptation limits and the 
possibilities for increased interchangeability among adaptation types.   
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Such an effort would investigate technological capacity limits for all types of 
adaptation (flow, stock and retrofitting), when these limits are expected to be reached, and 
how the breaching of these adaptation thresholds will affect the need to respond with 
alternative replacement strategies.  Because these limits are uncertain, the more that is known 
about them now the more can be done now to prepare for the inevitable policy disruption in 
the future.  Without the effects of mitigation, policymakers can do little to change the 
character of climate damages that they will face in the near term;  the portion that will be 
more amenable to a flow adaptation approach rather than a stock adaptation approach will be 
dictated by nature.  Interchangeability between the two adaptation types (the elasticity of 
substitution as explored here) may be more receptive to human influence.  If certain 
categories of adaptation can more easily substitute for others when they inevitably fail, this 
may help to reduce losses due to climate damages.   
 As a general rule, incorporate climate change adaptation into planning as 
characterized by its longevity as it relates to expected damages.   
This way of thinking about climate policy will be useful even in those cases when 
policymakers may not be focused on explicit policy interactions and tradeoffs between 
mitigation and adaptation.  It does not matter if the short-term and frequently repeated 
adaptation is termed ―flow,‖ or that the long-term and less frequent expenditures are named 
as ―stock‖ investments.  Rather what matters for a national policy that will also be balancing 
with mitigation, is that conscious attention is paid to the lifetimes of the investments under 
uncertainty.  Such designation can assist budgetary planning both within developed nations, 
as money is allocated to different forms of investments, as well as for international 
adaptation financing aid, where the consistency and longevity of such funds are more 
transparent to both aid donor and recipient nations.   
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5.5.  Research Extensions 
5.5.1.  Framing 
The focus to this point has been on the choices of a single policy actor among 
mitigation, a repeated and short-lived adaptation spending, investments in long-lived 
depreciable assets, or the retrofitting of pre-existing assets.  This research scope could be 
broadened to encompass non-climate co-benefits, which will influence the chosen levels of 
policies (whether they are optimal or not).  For example, mitigation can reduce local air 
pollution, adaptation can reduce vulnerability to climatic variability apart from climate 
change, and both can be catalysts for economic development.   
The number of policy actors studied could be enlarged as well, in two ways.  In the 
first, the existence of both a private and a public sector would allow for an examination of the 
credibility of long-term public commitment to adaptation flow, stock, and retrofitting 
spending.  If this public commitment is allowed to vary then it will have a large effect on the 
decision making of private asset owners and hence on overall societal welfare outcomes.
3
   
In the second way of expanding the number of policy actors, the multitude of 
different stakeholders can be acknowledged within nations in order to understand how they 
may respond to different types of climate policies.  This dissertation has treated nations in a 
simplified way, as unitary actors that can make mitigation and adaptation decisions that best 
match their perceived national-level payoffs both at home as well as in international climate 
change negotiations.  But when viewed internally instead of from outside, nation-states are 
heterogeneous collections of multiple interest groups with financial stakes in climate change 
outcomes, policies, or both.  Across a geographically diverse nation, climate change impacts 
                                                 
3
 This point was raised by Gary Yohe.   
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will create both losers and winners, depending on where the stakeholders reside and the 
extent to which they are personally invested in climate-sensitive sectors.  Coupling climate 
change policy with these effects will also create winners and losers, depending on the 
incidence of the policy on policy-sensitive sectors.  Both climate impacts and climate policy 
will have large redistributional consequences.  In the United States at least, divisions among 
stakeholders over these consequences have so far prevented any environmentally effective 
national climate policy from emerging in federal law.  This research extension would take an 
approach that is similar to that taken in chapter four, except that the parties in the 
negotiations would be states or regions of the United States (rather than nations), the goal a 
U.S. national climate change policy (instead of an international treaty), and the venue the 
U.S. Congress (and not the UNFCCC).   
Another promising research avenue is to broaden the framing of chapter two in order 
to test its applicability to a larger set of policy circumstances and types of adaptation that do 
not fit as neatly into the flow/stock/retrofitting categories, such as educational initiatives, 
changes in zoning laws, or harmonization of insurance availability, prices, and the known 
risks of climate change.  In this way, the adaptation analyzed would be expanded to include 
all of its forms, falling under the rubric of ―adaptation services,‖ which encompass all actions 
– both ―hard‖ infrastructure investments as well as ―soft‖ approaches such as public policy or 
behavioral changes and other types of facilitative adaptation.  An adaptation services 
approach encourages policymakers to include all adaptation options that are available, with 
the goal of reducing damages with the best tools available. 
By broadening the set of choices available, the policy allocation decision can be 
placed within a larger way to understand how to best provide adaptation services under 
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uncertainty.  The point is not the physical manifestation of what is created to adapt, but that 
money is spent to provide beneficial adaptation services.
4
  As the focus is not on capital but 
on adaptation services, a long-term policy response could come either in the form of a large 
stock investment or a large public policy adjustment such as a wholesale change in zoning.  
Both policy choices are for the long term, but the former will depreciate while the latter will 
not.
5
  For adaptive policies, this involves improving their efficiency without undergoing 
large-scale discontinuous change.  If such soft adaptation is complementary to hard 
adaptation, then it can be seen as a retrofit that increases the adaptive capacity of the latter.   
5.5.2.  Modeling 
To the extent that integrated assessment models can more precisely inform public 
policy decision making the more they are based on assumptions that match reality, then the 
approach developed here can be applied to ongoing efforts to improve such IAMs with both 
mitigation and adaptation as policy choice variables.  A start to this effort is joined in chapter 
three with the modeling of adaptation as a flow and a stock investment decision.  This 
modeling research can be extended either by utilizing the current AD-DICE S/F model more 
fully or instead by adding to it in more significant ways.  As for the first, changes to the 
returns to scale parameter (α) in the adaptation production function were not explored, and 
different assumptions about how the total level of adaptation behaves at different returns to 
scale could be investigated.  Also, as modeled here, adaptation stock is constructed 
                                                 
4
 An analogy can be made to the recent U.S. health care reform debate, during which it was argued that the goal 
was not necessarily to increase the number of doctors, hospitals, or health clinics, but rather to broaden and 
improve the provision of health care services, which are all instruments (among others) to help achieve that 
goal.   
5
 ―Institutions and habits may also be considered to be like protection capital, although they are not present in 
national economic accounts‖ (Dumas and Ha-Duong 2008).  
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instantaneously upon deciding to invest in it.  Accounting for both 1) unavoidable delays in 
the planning, financing, and actual construction of large stock projects (a period that is likely 
longer than the current 10-year model time-step), and 2) an exogenous budget constraint that 
would restrict expensive one-time projects, would more accurately model reality.   
As for more significant alterations to the model, the logical extension is to complete 
the full development of this dissertation in model form by incorporating flow, stock, and 
retrofitting policy options into the adaptation portfolio.  Variations in the pathway of climate 
damages could also be included, to add a small but positive probability of catastrophic 
damages (defined as those damages that overwhelm the technological capacities of both flow 
and stock adaptation).  Non-climate co-benefits could also be included in a model.  To the 
extent that these benefits are at a policy-significant level, their inclusion in IAMs with 
adaptation will improve these models’ congruence with reality.   
Uncertainty could be modeled in two ways, first by operationalizing the decision tree 
of Fig. 30, where the uncertainty is over the level of limits on flow adaptation capacity.  
Second, as defined here, the optimal input share of flow and stock adaptation in the 
adaptation production function is defined by the type of damages that climate change 
produces, and is thus uncertain.  Further analysis could be done on the uncertainties inherent 
in trying to match a flow/stock response ratio to the actual flow/stock ratio that is described 
(and prescribed) by the damages.  With learning and information about the best type of 
adaptation, losses could be avoided from incorrect adaptive responses (i.e., if a stock strategy 
was pursued when it turns out that damages were better reduced with a flow strategy).   
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5.5.3.  International Policy Application 
The portion of this dissertation that is focused on international climate negotiations is 
geared towards contributing to the debates over the structure of a new post-Kyoto climate 
agreement.  With this in mind, a continuation of this effort would require updating of the IAF 
dataset, dropping those proposals from the analysis that have been rejected by the 
negotiators, and staying abreast of developments at future COP meetings.  Further research 
could also drop the ceteris paribus assumption that has been kept to this point and more 
extensively examine how other issues such as the size of the IAF transfers and the mitigation 
commitment enter into the negotiations, as variation in these other policy choice variables 
could overwhelm the effects of institutional design.  Another research extension to chapter 
four could drop the assumption that negotiating parity exists between the blocs.  This would 
lead to an assessment of the strengths of group preferences on negotiations, and how willing 
they are to compromise with each other to achieve a climate treaty.   
One proposal for IAF was included among the 22 proposals that were analyzed even 
though it has not been officially proposed or even developed – a climate policy regime that 
fully integrates mitigation and adaptation in an international system with trading on both 
mitigation and adaptation in the common unit of avoided damages.  This is in contrast with 
arrangements where trading only occurs on mitigation and in units of CO2 equivalents 
(CO2e) or certified emissions reductions (CERs).  While international GHG emissions 
trading is a well developed field and is a component of many post-Kyoto proposals, a system 
of damage or risk trading has not yet been fully explored (though it has been investigated in a 
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non-climate change case (Wiener 2004) and forwarded briefly in the climate change case 
(Schellnhuber and Cornell 2005)).
6
 
Under current emissions trading schemes the link from mitigation to reduced global 
damages is not direct and is instead routed through the price of carbon, its relationship to 
temperature, and finally through its relationship to damages to result in a post-mitigation 
damage level.  Adaptation, however, has a direct effect on lowered damages.  As adaptation 
cannot be measured in terms of GHG emissions, but mitigation can be measured in the terms 
of adaptation, i.e., reduced damages, then a jointly implemented mitigation and adaptation 
trading system would trade on damages and not emissions.  Emissions trading systems use 
CO2e emissions as the unit of accounting, allowing for the inclusion of all GHGs through 
conversion to a common metric.  As is known with trying to mitigate to achieve a particular 
climate outcome goal, it is more cost effective to make all primary GHGs available for 
mitigation credits, weighted by their respective global warming potentials, rather than trying 
to reach the mitigation goal by capping CO2 alone.  By logical extension, it should also be 
more cost effective in achieving a particular global welfare outcome by including adaptation 
in a climate trading system.   
Under such a damage trading system a participating group one country would choose 
to meet damage reduction targets rather than mitigation targets.  It could then buy credits that 
would be used either for:  1) mitigation abroad, with global effects, or 2) adaptation abroad 
with national effects, which satisfies the need for IAF in the most vulnerable countries.  
Developing such a mitigation and adaptation damage trading system would require that 
several conceptual challenges be overcome, most prominent being the need to compare both 
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 My thanks are to Jonathan Wiener for discussions on these ideas. 
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strategies together on a common metric of avoided damages.  Multiple ways of mitigating 
exist, which can be ranked on a cost curve from the cheapest to the most expensive (Enkvist 
et al. 2007).  Despite the diversity of approaches, the technological effects of mitigation are 
relatively easy to measure in is ―own‖ units – the amount of GHG emissions avoided or 
sequestered.  The units of adaptation – reduced damages – are harder to measure because of 
the applicability of adaptation to multiple damage sectors, technologies, localities, and 
timeframes.  Mitigation would need to be converted to these damage outcomes in order for 
trading on a common scale to be conducted.  
5.6.  Conclusion 
The question that arises now is whether adaptation will become the de facto climate 
policy, the default mechanism, simply because no one is prepared to lead the more 
difficult and complicated effort required for us to mitigate climate change.. 
   – Paul Roberts, The End of Oil (2004, 139). 
This dissertation has sought to further understand this relationship between the two 
essential policy responses to climate change.  Through three essays on framework 
development, modeling exploration, and international policy application, I have looked to 
answer some questions about how policymakers can understand mitigation and adaptation in 
joint implementation and make better policy allocation decisions.   
Until now the phrase ―mitigation and adaptation‖ has carried two divergent 
connotations.  With one it is a way to summarize responses to climate change, a self-evident 
and too simple banality that is mentioned in introductions before the remainder of the 
research proceeds to ignore one of the two responses.  For others, the phrase is a multifaceted 
and intractable joining of two very different responses, a serious prospect and one too 
complicated for any one analysis.  If this dissertation is successful in its aims then both 
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connotations will start to drop away.  ―Mitigation and adaptation‖ will be seen in its proper 
context as a serious question with which to wrestle, but one with achievable rewards.  While 
mitigation and adaptation will in many ways remain in separate realms, a unified analysis can 
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